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Abstract 
Saudi Arabia is a young wealthy nation with multiple social and economic problems. 
While the country is extremely wealthy, it has a young population, many of whom are 
unemployed. The country is highly dependent on a single resource (oil), and relies heavily 
on imported labour to meet the requirements of economic growth and contribute to the 
development of the country. In recognition of these systemic problems, the Government 
has developed a policy of ‘Saudization’ as a way of replacing expatriate with Saudi 
workers as a way of solving the problem of unemployment.  
This thesis is an attempt to understand the roots of this paradox of high wealth and high 
unemployment. How did Saudi Arabia arrive at a situation where it became dependent on 
the labour of expatriates and why did the government not use the countries’ wealth to 
create a vibrant high-skill economy? What strategies is the government using to deal with 
alarming rates of high unemployment, and how successful are their endeavours. Is 
Saudization the answer to the current labour market situation and, if not, what are the 
shortcomings of the policy? These are questions addressed in this thesis.  
With Saudi Arabia having developed relatively recently, the thesis begins by providing an 
historical overview of the establishment of the Kingdom and at the impact of the 1970s oil 
boom. It focuses on the labour market, the role of religion and on government attempts to 
stem rising unemployment through the policy of Saudization. The thesis draws on 
documentary evidence as well as on interviews with representatives of the key stakeholder 
groups: policy makers, employers and employees.   
It is argued that the roots of the problem in the Saudi labour market can be traced back to 
the process of transformation from an agricultural to an industrial society. Reliance on oil 
wealth and the establishment of a rentier economy led to a situation where citizens had a 
low level of involvement in the economy or the political process and labour needs were 
met through the recruitment of expatriate employees rather than through education and 
training. 
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The thesis argues that the policy of Saudization falls short in several key areas. First, 
Saudization as a policy is targeting the symptom (unemployment) instead of focusing on 
the problem employability. In many respects, the education system and labour market 
situations are poorly aligned; strict religious controls over the content of the curriculum 
and a lack of forward planning means that young Saudis are not being equipped with the 
hard or soft skills necessary to meet economic demands. Second, the policy is not tuned 
into the needs of the private sector and has failed to meet the concerns of employers or 
employees. Third, the policy has failed to respect the varying situations of employers in 
different sectors of the labour market and should recognise the need to set industry specific 
targets for Saudization.  
In sum, the research lends weight to the idea that Saudization is deficient as a policy and 
that, without targeted logistics and application, provides little more than a short-term 
solution to unemployment. 
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Chapter One 
 
The Saudi Paradox 
Introduction 
This thesis is an attempt to look at Saudi Arabia’s labour market in terms of its socio-
economic structure: specifically, its history and the factors that have shaped the country’s 
work culture. The purpose of the thesis is to analyse, first, the Saudi labour market’s 
disequilibrium that has resulted in high unemployment, and, second, the solutions to this 
problem proposed by Saudi policy-makers. The thesis concludes with an analysis and 
evaluation of the process of ‘Saudization’ proposed by the government as a solution to the 
high rate of unemployment among its citizens and its reliance on foreign labour. 
As an introduction, the present chapter focuses on the historical, social and economic 
environment that produced modern Saudi Arabia. It describes the Saudis’ national profile 
and the social indicators – the characteristics of Saudi Arabians at work – that emerged 
during the country’s transition from a nomadic/subsistence to an urban/industrial economy. 
It also explains its work culture, work ethic and current economic prospects. 
By way of contrast, the modern transformation of Saudi society will be examined in the 
light of similar changes that occurred in the British economy during the Industrial 
Revolution, when Britain moved from being an agrarian/rural to an urban/industrial 
economy. Through an analysis of the similarities and differences between these two 
societies, the chapter aims to show how these changes in Britain produced an industrious 
and innovative industrialised economy while the equivalent economic transformation in 
Saudi Arabia produced less satisfactory results from an economic point of view. It is a 
paradox how Saudi Arabia, an extremely wealthy country, nevertheless, has a major 
problem with unemployment. With a GDP of $546 billion as of 2008, according to the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA, 44th Annual Report, 2008), the kingdom should 
possess a flourishing, developed industrial economy; however, this is not the case. 
Saudi Arabia has 25 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and has recently seen its 
economy boosted by record oil prices in excess of $140 per barrel in June 2008 
(Bloomberg, 2008). The oil sector accounts for roughly 75 per cent of Saudi budget 
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revenues, 45 per cent of GDP and 90 per cent of export earnings (estimates from CIA 
World Factbook, 2008). Crude oil production, oil refining, basic petrochemicals, ammonia, 
industrial gases, sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), cement, fertilizer, plastics and metals 
have also grown, as they are important for the petroleum industry. However, oil is still the 
essential component of the Saudi economy, and is expected to sustain the kingdom’s 
economy for the next half century (Al Naimi, 2004). 
Amid all this oil-generated wealth, however, unemployment remains a problem. Index 
Mundi estimates put the Saudi unemployment rate at approximately 13 per cent among 
males in 2008; other independent observers estimate that the ‘real’ rate may be as high as 
25 per cent (CIA World Factbook, 2008). Added to the fact that, as a low estimate, only 
5.5 per cent of the female population is employed, this gives an overall unemployment and 
inactivity rate of around 60 per cent, possibly as high as 72 per cent (Ministry of Economy 
and Planning, Labour Force Survey: 2008). The government understands that oil wealth 
alone will not be sufficient to sustain the welfare of a country with such a fast-growing 
population and that in the long run the issue of unemployment and underemployment must 
be dealt with. This is a key issue for the Saudi economy as it is not the unemployment 
figures as such that are alarming, but their significance for the sustainability of wealth 
production of Saudi Arabia. 
How did this situation come about? The answer lies in the fact that while Saudi Arabia 
benefited from a huge influx of petrodollars during the second half of the twentieth 
century, there was no indigenous domestic social structure to provide the people with the 
skills necessary for the building a modern state. Workers and their knowledge had to be 
imported. Thus, instead of the gradual development of an education system that provided 
indigenous workers with appropriate skills over generations, or a gradual migration away 
from traditional agrarian and subsistence economies (as was the case in Britain), in Saudi 
Arabia – based on the largely nomadic nature of the society – industrialization arrived 
‘pre-packaged’, purchased with the sudden advent of enormous wealth. 
Dealing with rising unemployment among Saudi youth has now become the focus of the 
government’s efforts. A government policy of Saudization – the compulsory inclusion of 
Saudis on the staff of national and foreign companies operating in the kingdom – has been 
introduced. However, Saudization has so far done little to increase skills or lower the 
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unemployment rate. Employers report a mismatch between the skills with which Saudi 
youth leave school and the requirements of the labour market. Added to this is a reported 
lack of motivation or ‘work ethic’ among Saudis, coupled with a refusal to take on specific 
jobs (for example, manual labour and/or artisanal occupations) that Saudis see as ‘beneath 
them’. The lack of a work ethic only compounds the problem of unemployment among 
Saudi nationals since they are already regarded as unskilled by potential employers and 
thus considered to be unable to replace the expatriate skilled workforce that currently 
sustains the economy of Saudi Arabia. 
Pre Industrial Saudi Arabia 
This section focuses on Saudi Arabia’s pre-industrial era and the history of the kingdom’s 
foundation. The political and ideological foundation on which the Saudi state was 
established helps to explain the nature of Saudi society today. The foundation of the Saudi 
Arabian polity in 1932 was influenced by two principal factors. The first was the political 
power vacuum created by the demise of the Ottoman Empire and Britain’s expansionist 
ambitions. The second factor relates to the rivalries between the two main local candidates 
for ruling Arabia, Sharif Husseyn bin Ali of Mecca and the later-to-be King Abdulaziz Al 
Saud (Menoret, 2005). 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was in decline, and it 
struggled to maintain its grip over the Arabian Peninsula. Not prepared to forego Arabia 
without a fight, it undertook several invasions in 1818 and in 1871 in an attempt to re-
establish its authority. However, large areas of these territories remained without an 
Ottoman governor. The only Amir who still supported Ottoman rule was Ibn Rashid of 
Ha’il, if only nominally and without giving military support according to al-Angari (1998). 
Meanwhile, Sharif Husseyn in Hijaz actively supported the British against the Ottomans 
whereas Ibn Saud also allied himself with the British but without direct involvement in the 
war against the Ottomans. 
After the First World War, Britain and France divided up the Ottoman territories between 
them. Although the Arabian Peninsula fell under the British sphere of influence, Arabia 
was never to become a colony or a mandate in a similar manner to other parts of the former 
Ottoman Empire. During the war, Britain cultivated close relations with both Ibn Saud and 
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and consolidation of its four regions (Hijaz, Najd, Hasa and Asir) was primarily due to Ibn 
Saud’s efforts over the next thirty years (1902–1932) (Vassiliev, 2000).  
Ibn Saud’s claim to ruling the peninsula was based on his being a descendant of the Saudi-
Wahhabi rulers of Dar’iya (the home town of the Al Saud). The Wahabbis were a religious 
reformist movement that preached a puritanical, strict interpretation of Islam (Vassiliev, 
2000; Almana, 1980). They had ruled the area from 1744 to 1818 and again from 1824 to 
1891. However, this claim did not justify Ibn Saud’s rule over the peninsula’s other 
regions or emirates, and especially not of the Hijaz, where the Sharif of Mecca, Husseyn 
bin Ali, held a stronger ancestral claim and legitimacy, being a descendant of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). Therefore, Ibn Saud had to resort to other methods to enforce his 
presence in what was to become the kingdom. So, like his ancestors, he justified his claim 
to rule with the rhetoric of the Wahhabi movement, which aimed to purify the religious 
practices of the region from ‘bid’a’ (novelty) and to enforce closer conformation to the 
divine law of God as represented in the shari’a. 
In turn the Wahhabis were more than ready to expand their religious influence through this 
alliance with Ibn Saud as early as 1902, Ibn Saud enlisted the mutawwa (who were then 
merely self-appointed experts in Islamic ritual) in the process of expansion. The mutawwa 
established a strict regime of discipline and punishment to enforce the more ritualistic 
aspects of Islam in the communities into which they moved. Ibn Saud now used this rigid 
interpretation of Islam to subdue the rebellious population in areas into which he wanted to 
expand and establish himself as imam. 
Ibn Saud would send the mutawwa to tribal confederations before arriving with his troops 
(Vassiliev, 2000). Here their job was to familiarize the population with: the importance of 
obediently following the ruler, a process called ta’at woulaat al-amr; ridding their 
religious practices from bid’a; paying zakat (Alms Tax); and being prepared to engage in 
jihad (holy war) for the cause. This ideology usually encountered little resistance for the in 
the regions Ibn Saud was expanding into the population was mainly illiterate, and the 
people were easily intimidated by the mutuwwa. Gradually, the mutuwwa inculcated and 
ingrained the virtues of obedience into these communities. Although in this context the 
mutuwwa’s concept of obedience’ was supposed to be obedience to divine law as 
sanctioned by God, (or shari’a), the implication of the doctrine was that this was not 
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possible without wholeheartedly accepting the rule of the leader or imam, (that is to say, 
Ibn Saud), as well. According to the mutuwwa, without this acceptance, deeds performed 
in good faith would not be found acceptable to God. 
Ibn Saud’s expansionist designs were put into practice through a series of military 
incursions: these were achieved through the formation of the Ikhwan (Vassiliev, 2000; 
Almana, 1980), a tribal-military force formed by the muttawa and dedicated to fighting in 
the name of jihad against ‘infidels’, a loosely defined category that at times included 
anyone who was not willing to accept Ibn Saud’s leadership.  The creation of the Ikhwan 
only increased Ibn Saud’s growing political power. 
Ibn Saud never set out to establish a nation; this was a later development, as noted by al-
Al-Rasheed (2002): moreover political movements with a religious element were hardly 
unusual at the beginning of the 20th century. However, the key issue here, specific to Saudi 
Arabia, was that Ibn Saud’s particularly strict and orthodox Wahhabi ideology to eliminate 
all the other more moderate schools of Islam in the peninsula. But in the long term this led 
the kingdom into a vicious circle of isolation, slowing down the introduction of modernity. 
It could be argued that it is Wahhabism that is essentially responsible for the Saudi 
Arabia’s continuous religious upheavals and economic stagnation (in terms of the labour 
market). The key issue here is Ibn Saud’s fusion of the religious and the political creating a 
political expansionist ideology that was also religious. In Britain, by contrast, Protestant 
beliefs had encouraged a separation of the religious from the secular, which allowed 
unhampered growth and development in areas of scientific and technological development 
and a separate secular state to emerge, while retaining the discipline and ethical constraints 
needed to engender a productive economy (Armstrong, 2007). 
As King Abdulaziz established his kingdom over the four regions of the peninsula, he 
continued to enforce his position by buying allegiances into the 1940s. Acts of generosity 
to heads of tribes, and marriages in marginalized branches of the Al Saud as well as within 
the Arab nobility became another way in which he consolidated his influence and power. It 
is important to note that affairs of state at this time were very informal and had no real 
structure. There was no existing government authority, no state machinery, no ministers 
and no judiciary. All-important political decisions were made by the king himself. 
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However, the Saudi king did have help in making these decisions in the form of the al-
Shu’ba al-Siyasiyya (the Political Committee) (Almana, 1980 and Jerichow, 1997)). This 
committee consisted of eight members, mainly Arab nationals (Syrians, Egyptians, 
Lebanese and a Libyan) and Harry St John Philby, a British adviser and observer. They 
provided advisory services for King Abdulaziz since they brought knowledge of public 
organization from their own countries. Some of Saudi Arabia’s most important 
organizations (such as the education system, which was based on the Egyptian model) still 
carry the imprint of those early importations. This was only possible because of the 
absence of local know-how and the pressing need to rapidly build state institutions. Due to 
Saudi Arabia’s total isolation from the rest of the world in both government infrastructure 
and religious readiness to change, plus the absence of a previous frame of reference on 
which to build a government, it was nearly impossible to build a nation that was uniquely 
Saudi, by Saudis and for Saudis. As Niblock (2007, p 33) says, ‘The edifice of a modern 
state was developed, but not its reality.’ For example, unlike other countries around the 
same period, it has been argued that up until the 1940s, Saudi Arabia had no archives 
recording expenditure or any other official acts. Another example is the unplanned 
demographic shifts in many parts of the young Saudi nation that led to a loss of manpower 
in areas that were originally agricultural. The government failed to stem this move: nor did 
it make any attempt to keep people on the farms or use the new wealth to empower them to 
further develop the agricultural sector. People simply moved to areas with newly available 
services, but this brought no economic benefit to the Saudi economy. 
The management of the Saudi state was thus carried out by an informal system of social 
and cultural mechanisms specific to the Arabian Peninsula (Jericow, 1997). This system 
was highly dependent on the king’s public majlis, or court. Most state affairs were dealt 
with behind closed doors and out of the ambit of the Political Committee. Since the 
declaration of the kingdom in 1932, the king and his elder sons, Saud and Faisal, his 
foreign advisers and employees constituted the entirety of the government. None of the 
other areas of the new kingdom (for example, the Hijaz or western region) were 
represented in this government. 
At this point in the development of Saudi Arabia there was very little economic activity. 
Before the advent of oil, the country had very little agricultural activity, and what existed 
was mainly subsistence agriculture. There was a small surplus from internal trade and 
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passing travellers en route for destinations outside the area – as, for example, in Aljouf, 
which served the Persia–Egypt trade route. The Hajj economy of the Hijaz was self-
regulating and needed no direct involvement by government. According to an estimate of 
state revenues quoted by Niblock (1982), in 1938, just before the first major oil find, Hijaz 
customs and revenue from pilgrims amounted to £1.3m (gold). Salaries to state employees 
could not be paid until the pilgrims’ revenues had been received. 
By 1939 Saudi Arabia was producing more oil per day from one well than any oil well in 
the United States. At that time King Abdulaziz was passing on the reins of his young 
country to his two sons, Saud and Faisal. There was talk of establishing a Council of 
Ministers but this never materialized in his lifetime. 
Saudi Arabia suffered from a lack of resources up to the point at which it began to produce 
and sell oil. Niblock (2007) points out that the only ministries in existence at that time 
were Finance (1932), Foreign Affairs (1933) and Interior (1944). The king used any state 
resources as if they were for his own private use, or for him to allocate in the public 
interest. 
Even when oil revenues started to flow in, in 1948, and the state had more resources at its 
disposal, the socio-political system remained the same: thus there was no state planning 
whatsoever (Niblock, 2007). Subsequently, there was some government development, 
when the ministries of Interior and Health (1951), Water and Agriculture, Education, and 
Communication (1953) were established. However, government ministers were not paid 
regularly and there was no centralized administrative system. Ministries worked on a semi-
independent basis.  
By the time of the founder’s death in 1953, institutions, civil services and bureaucracies 
that had developed over centuries of war, rebellion and organic growth in democratic 
European states had been imported, ready packaged, to the unfamiliar soil of the fledgling 
Saudi Arabia, but without the wealth of experience that had developed those structures. 
 
 
9 
 
Nation building 
Nations are built through a process of social and historical development as a combined 
result of people and policy-makers’ efforts, and at times struggle. Religion and key 
historical events also often play a role. This section of the thesis focuses on Saudi Arabia’s 
history from the 1960s to the early 1990s. These years include the rules of King Saud 
(1953–64), King Faisal (1964–1975), including the oil embargo–‘boom’ effects of 1975, 
and King Khalid (1975–82), through to the early years of King Fahad’s (1982–2005) rule, 
culminating in the ‘bust’ and what it revealed about the structure of Saudi Arabia’s 
nationhood. 
In the early days of the state, the traditional relationship between the ruler and the ruled 
persisted. The ‘head of the tribe’ remained the centre of mediation and decision-making 
and the source of patronage, gifts and handouts. This pattern of rule – based on the 
distribution of patronage, both in the form of influence over public-sector jobs and in the 
provision of welfare schemes for the remainder of the population – continues to the present 
day (Yamani, 1996; Champion, 2003 and Amuzegar, 2001). The heirs of King Abdulaziz 
continued this pattern as far as they could, although the population was increasing rapidly. 
(According to the Human Development Report UNDP, 2001), the population grew at 3.32 
per cent from 1950 to 1974 and then peaked in the 1970s and 1980s at around 4.6 per cent 
per annum) according to the UNDP 2003 report. 
King Faisal’s initial efforts concentrated on resolving the country’s debt problem and lack 
of infrastructure. According to Rentz (in Beling, 1980), Saudi Arabia was on the verge of 
bankruptcy by 1958. In order to prevent a repeat of the struggle for power which had 
dogged the early years of his reign, King Faisal appointed a loyal heir and delegated what 
he thought of as the vital ministries of Defence and Petroleum to trustworthy individuals.  
As the country’s GDP rose from 10.4 billion to 163.53 billion Saudi riyals (SR) in the 
decade 1965–1975, King Faisal launched Five-Year Development Plans based on a 
projected 9.8 per cent annual budget increase. Those expenditures were concentrated in the 
areas of defence, education, transportation and utilities. The First Five-Year Development 
Plan (1970–75) prioritized the development of the material infrastructure, including 
transportation, services such as the wider geographical distribution of electricity and water, 
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and the construction of roads and ports became a priority. Much of the expenditure was 
unaccounted for, however, since oversight and government control were still very much in 
their infancy, (Al-Rasheed, 2002). 
The expansion of education followed, to cover distant regions of the kingdom that had 
previously had no elementary education. In addition, girls’ education was introduced in the 
mid-1960s under the king’s personal protection and patronage. Four universities were 
established, making a total of five, and producing the kingdom’s first generation of 
formally educated nationals. Vocational training and higher institutes of education 
followed (Al-Salloum, 1995; Niblock, 2007). King Faisal also created a new Ministry of 
Higher Education to reduce the pressure on the Ministry of Education due to the massive 
expansion required by tertiary institutions, reflecting an approximate 10 per cent per 
annum increase in the education budget. Throughout the creation and expansion of the 
education system, the establishment of vocational training centres, the building of girls’ 
schools and later the extension of girls’ higher education, foreign systems, programmes 
and teachers were imported to implement this rapidly expanding area of nation building. 
Later in this chapter, this fact will be examined in terms of its effects on the suitability of 
the Saudi educational programmes, their outcomes and how they have affected the labour 
market up to the present day. 
The Saudi government offered education, healthcare, medical services, water and 
electricity and grants of agriculture land. Subsidies on food and petrol were introduced, so 
that a high standing of living became the norm for the average Saudi. In the 1970s, 
according to the World Bank, Saudi Arabia’s per capita GDP was $16,000. 
During King Faisal’s reign, the Saudi state offered interest-free loans to private 
entrepreneurs and businessmen who helped develop the nation’s services, thus continuing 
the Saudi ruling family’s tradition of largesse. Thus, under King Faisal, the state became a 
source of welfare for its patrons. In effect, the state operated a paternal relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled, dependent on the immense oil wealth controlled by the 
Saudi government. This largesse encouraged the rapid development and expansion of the 
private sector, in relative freedom from government restrictions (though it mainly relied on 
foreign labour and expertise). This explains the resistance of the current developed private 
sector to government interference in the form of labour control, and the state policy of 
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‘learned helplessness’ among many unemployed Saudi nationals, creating unrealistically 
high expectations (in lifestyle, income and social position) that were not earned and could 
not be sustained after the oil wealth slowed down in the following decade. 
In other words, Saudi Arabia’s wealth was not the result of the development of the 
country’s internal productive forces, but rather derived from the export of a raw material 
(oil) whose exploitation required imported expertise and few local workers, setting the 
ground for total government control over the country’s wealth, (Amuzegar, 2001). This is 
in sharp contrast with the modern capitalist economies of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and South Korea. In those countries, rapid economic growth was due to an aggressive 
strategy that promoted the export of new manufactured goods rather than more traditional 
primary commodities (like oil) (Isbister, 2001). 
This development of Saudi Arabia as a rentier economy (as opposed to a more ‘normal’ 
capitalist economy) has had deep and lasting effects on the country: economically, socially 
and politically. Areas associated with the extraction and exports of oil, the main income-
generator, were developed at the expense of other forms of economic development. The 
fact that the oil sector required minimal manpower and thrived at the expense of other vital 
sectors such as agriculture and industry, regardless of how developed they were, has had a 
major influence on Saudi Arabia’s economy. Today, only 10 per cent of the kingdom’s 
revenue comes from sources other than the export of oil (CIA: 2007). The only exception 
to this over-reliance on one sector is the collateral development of the petrochemical and 
related industries. 
Oil revenues also allowed the government to dispense with ad hoc taxpayers, i.e. pilgrims 
and the old merchant families, as taxation became an insignificant source of income for the 
economy. As Al-Rasheed states (2002, p.126) ‘With oil, local merchant families lost all 
semblance of their previous bargaining power vis-à-vis the state.’ This bargaining power 
could have gone towards earning the right of these merchant families to a say in the 
policies that were being created to govern the young kingdom, such as the education 
system, the establishment of a free press, the distribution of wealth and land, and 
development priorities. Had this representation been allowed in the significant years of 
nation building (1964–1980), it may well have become the norm in the following decades, 
allowing the country’s educated, liberal merchant elites to make a positive contribution to 
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the countries’ development. To turn the famous American slogan on its head: there can be 
no expectation of democratic representation without taxation (Heradstveit and Hveem, 
2004). 
As for the politico-ideological alliance between the ruling family and the Wahhabi 
religious class, it transmogrified (and continues to do so), depending on several factors. In 
the early years, the alliance was very important for the kingdom’s legitimacy. During the 
crucial reign of King Faisal, muttawa leaders were placed in government positions, 
depending on their flexibility and their allegiance to the needs of that era (Champion, 
2003). Although over time their role has weakened as religious leaders, their effect on the 
education, the media and the status of women has remained strong. Later, after the 
invasion and occupation of the Holy Mosque at Mecca by the religious fundamentalist 
Juhaiman Al-Oteibi (Pfaff, 1991) and his followers, the religious authority regained 
significant control over the same vital organizations and everyday lives of Saudis. This 
would change again in 2001, after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre, 
when the Saudi government had to be seen to be attempting to curb the muttawa’s power 
and interference, both for national security reasons and to protect the country’s image 
internationally. 
To an observer it might appear that there was nothing wrong with most of the Saudi 
government’s measures in building a nation during the ‘golden decade’ (1970s–1980s). 
However, from a sociological viewpoint, this ‘golden era’ – characterized as it was by 
‘rentierism’, extreme wealth, speed of development without a frame of reference, complete 
dependence on the importation of expertise, systems and manpower, the eradication of 
taxation and the creation of unsustainable expectations in the mind of every Saudi citizen – 
has hindered the process of nation building in Saudi Arabia. 
This will become clear by examining state policy in the years of the ‘bust’ and during the 
Gulf War of 1990–1991. The events that took place in the decade 1980–1990 help explain 
the defects in nation building which have influenced the country’s social and economic set 
up. 
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As a result of the growing deficit and a drop in GDP from an expected 4 per cent to 1.4 per 
cent per annum, the government was forced to draw on its reserves and borrow from local 
economic organisations (Amuzigar, 2001): several government projects were cut as a 
direct response to the economic uncertainty. Even plans to invest in the construction of 
new oil refineries were halted(Vassiliev 2000). In the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan 
(1985–1990), as a response to the bust of the 1980s, expenditures on infrastructure and 
several ambitious projects shifted in the direction of developing economic and human 
resources. 
Life in Saudi Arabia as Saudis knew it during the 1960s until the early 1980s was coming 
to an end. The government resorted to a better development of alternative resources and 
human capital to protect the economy from the harsh economic realities of the 1990s. The 
country also had to take account of the political, social and economical ramifications of the 
1990–1991 Gulf War. Saudi Arabia discovered it was vulnerable to events outside its 
control for the first time. It was threatened militarily, and the Saudis realized that the 
source of their wealth – the Eastern Province’s oilfields – were not as secure as they had 
believed. The implications of the bust and the Gulf War brought to the surface many socio-
economic problems, the most urgent of which were reduced government spending, a halt to 
educational expansion and higher-education opportunities, an increase in poverty and 
rising unemployment. These problems were magnified and experienced as something new, 
however, because the population was growing rapidly: at a rate of 4.8% in the first half of 
1990s, according to UN estimates. Before the bust, being unemployed was not as keenly 
felt because of the benefits provided by state welfare: after the bust, there was a very 
definite pressure on Saudis to become employed.  
The next section of this chapter will describe and analyse Saudi government policies in 
relation to the present state of inertia in the kingdom, and particularly the current state of 
the labour market. 
State Policies 
Saudi Arabia had had a promising future for its nationals, as well as for the neighbouring 
countries that benefited from Saudi petrodollars. The combination of abundant natural 
resources, great wealth and a small population should have encouraged successful nation 
16 
 
building, prosperity and a dynamic labour market. When Al Namla, ex-Minister of Labour, 
announced in 2003 that there were 3.2 million unemployed Saudis and shortly after 
announced that 5 million Saudis were below the poverty line, the question had to be asked: 
what went wrong? 
Saudi Arabia today suffers from many serious structural socio-political and economic 
problems: dependence on oil and deficiencies in other areas of the economy, coupled with 
demographic and regional differences (i.e. the lack of a national identity and 
homogeneity), and fundamentalism that spawns terrorism. These factors have led to rising 
social unrest, an increase in crime and drug trafficking, poverty and high levels of 
unemployment. 
The state of inertia that has befallen the kingdom derives from its history. Current Saudi 
state policies vividly reflect its short history: a lack of vision, internal contradictions and 
various instances of the mismanagement of physical and human resources. 
These problems go back to government policies created during the nation building phase of 
Saudi history which to a certain extent continue today: for example in the Saudi policy-
makers’ approach to tackling rising unemployment. 
The key problem is the Saudi’s unique fusion of religion (in a highly specific, 
fundamentalist form) and more or less secular politics (Aarts and Nonneman, 2006). This 
has led to fundamental problems arising from the lack of separation between the secular 
(economic) spheres and the religious (in the particular form encouraged by the 
government). How can a government, for instance, encourage the innovation [ibda’a] 
necessary for economic development something encouraged by (mainstream) Islam, yet 
stifle novelty [bid’a] on the grounds that it is forbidden by the religious authorityas being 
irreligious and corrupt? (Aarts and Nonneman, 2006). 
To repeat: the kingdom was founded on a politico-religious ideology, following a set of 
rules derived from a limited and restrictive orthodox interpretation of the Islamic faith. The 
unusual nature of this ideology made it possible for King Ibn Saud to unite numerous 
disparate peoples into one country. However one must consider the consequences of 
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imposing one ideology (and a highly reductive, restrictive one at that) on a vast nation with 
such a diverse, unique social and religious composition. 
Each region before unification had had its own social structure. For example the Western 
region was more ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘progressive’. The Eastern region had for some time 
been under British influence, and had a population which, for the most part, followed a 
different sect of Islam altogether (Shi’a). Even in the South there was a vibrant 
agriculturally based community, which has had to conform to the kingdom’s uniform ways 
of life. 
Instead of allowing the merged regions to retain individual characteristics vital to their 
existence, the Saudi rulers imposed the culture of their own region. This totalitarian 
approach has prevented genuine nation building, and instead of a democratic state, it has 
produced a centralized, authoritarian regime.  
Vassiliev (2000) believes that the Saudi government lacked the vision to provide long term 
plans for its economy. Many of the government’s development schemes were not designed 
with a long-term view. In addition, 5-year Development Plans, as will be seen in later 
chapters, do arise from a comprehensive study of the growing economic crisis. Lack of 
vision is also apparent in the Saudi habit of prioritizing the building of infrastructure as 
opposed to developing human capital. 
Another manifestation of the lack of vision in Saudi state policies can be seen in its failure 
to develop and protect certain industries vital for the development of a healthy diversified 
economy. Agriculture and fishing were potential areas of strength for the Saudi economy 
had they received enough protection and proper management, especially in the 1970s. 
(Metz, 1992)Saudi Arabia was self-sufficient in food production until the late 1960s. Hasa 
produced large quantities of dates (Beling, 1980). The southwest of the kingdom in 
addition to other areas with deep-water wells and valleys produced vegetables, fruit and 
grain. 
The lack of vision is reflected on the development of agriculture in two ways. While water 
wells were used to supply growing cities with drinking water, most of the deep-water 
reservoirs were depleted to irrigate grain production in desert land. Thus, according to data 
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from the US Library of Congress (Metz, 1992) after a decade of massive government 
incentives, agriculture in 1999 accounted for only 10 per cent of GDP, up from 1 per cent 
of GDP in 1982. Rapid growth in output led to some food self-sufficiency (particularly 
grain), but caused a scarcity of vital underground water resources (Elhadi, 2008). 
In addition, the process of rapid urbanization caused by low incentives for small farmers, 
forced them in their thousands to the cities in search of easier better-paid employment 
adding pressure on the labour market and the economy as a whole. 
The lack of vision is also seen in the failure of the state policies to promote the fishing 
industry until as late as the 1990s. Despite 2100 km coastline both on the Red Sea and the 
Arabian Gulf, the kingdom only produced some 50,000 tons of its approx. 100,000-ton 
annual consumption (Report on Fishing Industries Development, GCC, 1993). 
Another defect in the Saudi policies is that some are in conflict with the general goal of the 
state or with another policy, which can adversely affect efficient policy execution and can 
lead to policies that contradict each other. Amuzegar (2001) gives a glaring example in the 
area of agricultural policy. This policy encouraged a surplus in some crops, favouring 
landowners and entrepreneurs rather than the indigenous small farmer. The agricultural 
policy quest for economic diversification and food self-sufficiency was in conflict with 
both retaining the small farmers’ continued interest and the country’s water development 
and conservation. Agriculture accounted for nearly 90 per cent of water consumption in the 
late 1980s (Amuzegar, 2000). Water needed for non-essential agriculture was drawn from 
deep wells, depleting the aquifers. This in turn resulted in increasingly deeper drilling and 
the costly purification of seawater, as a final resort to meet the country’s water demands. 
As well as this issue of ‘contradictory’ or ‘paradoxical’ policies there is also the issue of 
‘lack of policy development’ Specifically, many policies which, if implemented, would 
have helped to modernise the country have stagnated or remained on the drawing board. 
An example is the failure to privatize several government public-service utilities, as 
discussed in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1985–1990). In 2001 there was a 
new drive towards privatization, targeting several vital public utilities such as water 
supply, telecommunications, and air and rail transportation (Aarts and Nonneman, 2006). 
Plans were drafted and announced throughout the years 2000–2005 to privatize public 
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companies, with an emphasis on water desalination, seaports, railways, Saudi Arabia 
Airlines and Saudi Telecom. However, as of January 2009, only one public company, 
Saudi Telecom, has been fully privatized (AME info, 2008). 
Mismanagement of wealth and the suppression of knowledge and expertise seem to be 
another problem with Saudi state policies. The Saudi royal family has assumed great 
personal interest in profiting directly and indirectly from oil exports and commissions in 
areas such as the purchasing of arms, land gifts the exploitation of many other sectors of 
the economy. Royalty who served as ministers together with those who had no political 
role during the reign of King Faisal (1964–1975), for example, seized the new economic 
opportunities and became the state’s subcontractors, receiving substantial commissions on 
projects and materials they then sold back to the state (Al-Rasheed, 2002). 
Another key issue is the lack of free speech and a concurrent lack of transparency in terms 
of the development of state policy. For example, world class Saudi academics and experts 
who have spoken out against the regime have been placed under house arrest and 
imprisoned (BBC news, 2003) and otherwise prevented from taking part in the democratic 
discussions that would facilitate the development of coherent and meaningful economic 
development policy. In addition, the Saudi government bans any form of elected 
parliament, guilds, and trades unions or public gatherings. Any form of group discussion of 
ideological issues or a free press is banned (Asianews, 2008 and US Department of state 
2003). Jail sentencing, public whipping and business closure have also been used as a 
means of punishment to any criticism by journalists, academics or publishers. For example, 
world class Saudi academics and experts who have spoken out about social and judicial 
reforms have been placed under house arrest and imprisoned and otherwise prevented from 
taking part in the democratic discussions that would facilitate the development of coherent 
and meaningful economic development policy (CSMonitor.com, 2004). When a political 
movement of reform took place in the early 1950s by the Front of Nationalist Reforms, 
some of its leading members were jailed and its leader, (Abd al-Rahman Shamarani) 
executed. Other demonstrations and strikes that took place by ARAMCO employees in the 
1950s were suppressed by the army and led to King Saud issued a royal decree banning all 
 
1  This discouraged the only legal form of public gathering, and has led to   thousands of non licensed 
religious Wahhabis and extremists ‘filling the gap’. . This has in turn led to a new process of radicalisation  
which has led, in some cases, to the formation of underground anti-regime terrorist ‘cells’.. 
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strikes and demonstrations. The general strike of 1956 was the last large-scale Saudi 
demonstration in the twentieth century (Ménoret, 2005).  
Mismanagement in state policies also occurs in the media and the educational system. 
Saudi media are policed and censored by the government for ‘religious reasons’. Saudi 
schools (public and private alike) have to follow a unified school curriculum from which 
deviations are not tolerated. The education of women is, generally speaking, not effectively 
utilized, leading to a waste of resources in terms of women’s potential contribution to a 
skilled national labour market.  
This impact of the Saudi government on the education of Saudi youth extends even to 
those who study outside the country. Although there is no law to this effect, it has been 
reported narrated by students sent to universities in the west that they have been dissuaded 
from studying political science, philosophy and international affairs, for example, as they 
were seen as contradicting with the country’s ideology. 
Saudi state policy in terms of education contrasts sharply with another Islamic society, 
Malaysia which has constructed a model economy in just twenty years and is a highly 
respected member of the Islamic fraternity. The ex-prime minister of Malaysia, Dr 
Mahatere, the architect of the ‘Malaysia Can’ campaign, was an advocate of engendering 
expertise among all nationals to build greater confidence and ability in all fields of society. 
Modern Malaysia is an example of what can be done with the right state participation by a 
young Islamic state (Dr Mahatere speech, Jeddah Economic Forum, Feb, 2004). 
Contrasts with Classic Models of Industrialization: The Case of Britain 
As mentioned in earlier parts of this chapter, Saudi Arabia reached a considerable degree 
of wealth and industrialization, albeit mainly restricted to the petroleum industries, in a 
span of thirty years. The fact that it did so without relying on its indigenous population to 
extract, develop or reach an industrial status has given it a unique labour market dilemma 
of high unemployment in a country of great wealth. This predicament invites us to look at 
classical models of industrialization, namely the UK in the nineteenth century, in an 
attempt to recognize what factors led to an industrialized nation creating a professional 
local workforce. Those factors will be analysed in the light of the Saudi economic, social 
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and political situation to better understand the processes that led to the creation of a 
‘strong’ work culture/ethic in the UK vis a vis a ‘weak’ work ethic in Saudi Arabia. 
 Therefore the following section of this thesis will look at both countries’ economies, state 
policies and social structure, with a view to assessing the impact of these factors on the 
creation of a dynamic labour market. 
A key distinction must be made here between factors that operated over a long period of 
time and others which generated change in the short term (usually via a trigger 
mechanism). This division between long-term and short-term factors is particularly 
important to this comparison, since it is the ‘long term factors’ that are lacking in the Saudi 
Industrial development model.  
There are two main pillars that supported the economic development of Britain from a 
largely agrarian economy to the world’s leading industrial nation. The first of these was 
ready access to local, natural, physical, resources such as wood, coal and water coupled 
with a network of rivers and waterways that aided the transport of goods and products 
throughout Britain. This was facilitated by Britain’s being a colonial Empire which 
allowed the importation of unavailable natural materials and also provided a ready market 
for British exports. The second pillar was a labour pool willing to migrate to towns and a 
developing education system that supplied workers with sufficient industrial skills to work 
effectively. It is difficult to make meaningful generalizations about labour’ mobility, 
leading to and during the industrial revolutions for movement came at a heavy social cost 
(Morris, 1979).Workers moved temporarily and then permanently to new locations 
searching for employment as in the case of Scotland’s southern and eastern Highland 
people who were basically forced to move to the lowlands and in the case of Irish migrants 
who flocked to the Lowlands and the central belt as cheep labour. It is best then to describe 
the labour pool of Britain as champions of that revolution for they paid the price of 
changing craft, cyclical unemployment, living away from their families in settlements or in 
bad living standards while the government catches up with new over crowding in towns 
and lack of basic services, poor sanitation and bad housing (Whatley, 1997). 
It should be stressed that despite the name ‘industrial revolution’ it should not necessarily 
be inferred that the key factor in terms of the British economic transformation in this 
period was its rapidity. Actually long term factors such as political stability (i.e. the 
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absence of political revolutions as in France) and highly developed pre-existing economic 
and social structures were as important in terms of ensuring that Britain’s economic 
changes could be built on and developed even long after the ‘industrial revolution’ itself 
was over. 
If Britain’s industrial development arose out of a gradual coalescence of socio-cultural and 
physical circumstances, Saudi Arabia’s transformation from a traditional peninsular 
economy to an oil dependent state with its associated technical infrastructure happened 
more or less overnight. The oil boom of the 1970s made the kingdom a wealthy country 
but failed to provide a broader industrial infrastructure to tap into the country’s other 
natural resources. Technology necessary for the developing oil industry was imported and 
did not develop from a change in training, education, work culture or a self-sustained 
indigenous development of scientific thought. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia’s industrialization, economic and resources factor seem to be 
less significant in creating a modern work culture than in Britain. Saudi Arabia lacked the 
long-term aspects of developing an industrial nation. The 1970s oil boom was the short-
term trigger mechanism for the industrialization of the kingdom. Building on pre-existing 
economic or social structures was not an option as they were simply not available. This is 
why the industrialization of Saudi Arabia fell into the trap of rentierism and Dutch Disease 
phenomenon2. Even today Saudi’s industrialization fails to fully exploit its human capital. 
The British Empire and British Agriculture 
By the time the Industrial Revolution took off, the British Empire was the largest free trade 
area in the world. According to Mathias (2001), restrictive foreign trade practices enforced 
on its colonies and competitors provided the UK with additional natural resources and a 
ready market for Britain’s goods. The colonies became protected markets for Britain’s 
exports.  
Agriculture, as well, was a driver for industry, providing food, raw materials for 
industrialization and the migrant labour force. Capital flowed from the land to industry, 
 
2Dutch Disease is an economic concept that tries to explain the apparent relationship between the 
exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector combined.   
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forming a flow of investment before the Industrial Revolution took off. As the single 
largest contributor to the economy, it enabled money to be invested outside agriculture in 
areas such as industry and transportation. Agriculture also provided the industry with a 
labour force thus providing an incentive to those left behind on the land to increase their 
productivity in order to feed the new urban-based population.3 
The agricultural position in the two countries contrasted drastically even before 
industrialization. In pre-industrial Britain, agriculture provided one third of the national 
income and employed one third of the population (Trevelyan, 1942). According to 
Hobsbawm (1999), agricultural output in industrializing Britain adequately met demands 
and put no strain on the industrial and trading sectors of the economy. In the 1830s, 90 per 
cent of food consumed in Britain was grown locally and this was with about twice the 
population of 1750. In addition, the agricultural sector was becoming increasingly 
efficient: there were no famines or serious strains on the growing non-agricultural sectors 
of the economy (Mathias 2001; Breunig and Levinger, 2002). It is evident that in the early 
stage of industrialization sustained economic growth in non-agricultural sectors was 
dependent on the increased efficiency of the agricultural sector. 
In comparison to Britain, the Saudi model of industrialization lacked the advantage of 
relying on any devolved sector of the economy, thus severely limiting the young 
kingdom’s ability to rely on any successful, well established economic structure to provide 
for security (such as food supply), Capital (other than oil income)and most importantly a 
source of trained labour able to migrate expertise into other industries. 
The Role of the State in Britain 
British industrialization was a classic case of spontaneous growth, in that growth was not 
planned by government but was instead caused by market influences and underlying social 
institutions. The state in industrialized Britain neither led nor hindered change. 
 
 Deane and Cole 1969) estimated agricultural output growth on the basis of population growth obtaining 
results that show growth in agriculture output of 0.24 per cent per year in 1700-1760 and 0.56 per cent per 
year in 1760-1801. More exhaustive calculations at present have shown a 0.60 per cent per year growth that 
rose to 1.18 per cent per year by 1801-183 Crafts, 1985: 38–39). 
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Nonetheless, the role of the state in Britain Industrialization proved essential. By 
maintaining social stability and assuring wealth creation, government’s policies helped 
develop the Industrial Revolution and sustained it for more than a century. The 
government’s positive role was twofold. Firstly the state by providing protective laws for 
the agricultural and trading sectors. Secondly allowing the market to grow freely. 
Mathias (2001) describes the ways in which the state contributed to industrialization. First 
was the role the state played in creating the context in which the economy thrived; second 
was the role it played in responding to new economic demands. In terms of context, it 
provided security at home, by producing a period free of major wars allowing new wealth 
to take long-term risks in business projects. A second area of positive government action 
cited by Mathias (2001) was protection, as a way to respond to new economic demands. 
Protective laws promulgated between 1651 and 1660 promoted economic growth protected 
both Britain’s agricultural sector and foreign trade economy (Breunig and Levinger, 2002). 
The state issued laws helped the growth of new industries such as weaving, papermaking 
and shipbuilding. These laws created a healthy trading structure with differential duties 
regulating shipping, inter-colony trade and excluded rival trading nations such as France 
and the Dutch from trading with British colonies. Protection of trade and high tariffs ended 
in 1840s inspiring the many trade policies in other European countries, encouraging new 
skills and protecting national enterprise.  
From a judicial viewpoint, says Mathias (2001), restrictions on the legal status of the 
exclusive guilds, charters and internal monopolies opened up the British economy to the 
forces of the free market. Breunig and Levinger (2002) cite another example of positive 
state intervention in encouraging the mobility of the labour force. When poor-relief was 
introduced by the state in the eighteenth century, it contributed to the emergence of a 
mobile workforce in England by giving rural inhabitants some assurance that they could 
move away from their homes without risking starvation for them and their families. 
In Saudi Arabia, on the contrary, the role of the state was limited to a ‘trickle-down’ 
welfare state structure to provide for its citizens. Instead of ‘laissez faire’ policies, the 
Saudi government has enacted restrictive laws with, for example, regulations regarding the 
abolishment of guilds and unions and later (in the 1990s) employment laws which tightly 
regulate the labour market. 
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In Saudi Arabia, wealth creation was less of an issue and social stability was seen as being 
achieved not so much through the provision of jobs but through conformity to the political 
/religious system. Unlike Britain, the Saudi government relied on the traditional system of 
wealth trickling down from the top through well-established traditions of patronage, and it 
therefore felt less pressure to create an infrastructure where the population felt responsible 
for generating their own wealth. 
Industrialization, Inventiveness and Innovation in Britain 
To recap: industrialization in Britain was supported by many factors, based on Britain’s 
development in the two centuries prior to the ‘industrial revolution’. Even before 
industrialization ‘took off’, the UK was in an advantageous situation in that it was a 
colonial power with a ‘captive’ market for trading. Britain’s flourishing agricultural sector 
was also a vital factor in that this provided food security, goods for trade, capital to invest 
in other growing sectors of the economy and a pool of skilled labour ready and willing to 
take on and migrate to where the new industries needed. Finally, the positive role of the 
state both in the way it allowed the markets to run themselves free from obstruction and 
restrictive laws whilst at the same time protecting key industries and sectors of the 
economy, allowed Britain to reach the ‘tipping point’ of industrialization. Mathias (2001) 
argues that innovation in Britain was triggered by demands made by businessmen eager to 
develop machines to solve production problems or increase profit. Innovation was a vital 
enabling factor in establishing large industrial enterprises and inventiveness was driven 
and supported by industries that had the capital to support it and the profit motive to 
encourage it. 
The two most important elements that characterized innovation at that stage were the shift 
from brass to iron and the availability of massive power on demand generated by the steam 
engine. Those technological improvements were not driven by advances in the realm of 
pure science; rather, new production techniques evolved in response to specific economic 
demands (as opposed to being legislated for by the state). Therefore, most technical 
changes in Britain (except for military technology) took place in a ‘free market’ 
commercial context.  
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As efficiency of production increased, so did demand, driven by lower prices based on 
mass production and increasing demand from a swelling population at home and in the 
colonies. This developed into a self-sustaining cycle of innovation and demand between 
1700 and the late 1800s (Mathias, 2001). 
In a nutshell, the British Industrial Revolution was built on centuries of inventiveness by 
small industries and, funded by entrepreneurs. The ‘revolution’ itself was triggered by the 
commercial need for profit. 
In Saudi, however, the oil boom allowed the instant import of the fruits of industrialized 
economies without a pre-existing history of development. The country’s income was 
created almost instantly with no prior history of intellectual or industrial development by 
either the government or the people. Therefore the link, necessary to the process, between 
the pre-existing need for, and the supply of innovation did not exist in Saudi Arabia’s case. 
Except for the pilgrimage industry, Saudi Arabia was a subsistence economy before the oil 
boom. Over half its population was nomadic or semi nomadic Bedouin. El Ghonemy 
(1998) shows that the Saudi economy was chiefly dependent on grazing, camel raising, 
growing cereals when rainfall permitted, fishing, exporting sheep, hides and dates, and 
relying on revenues generated by pilgrimages. Very few small-scale industries existed, 
most of which depended on imported raw materials such as dressmaking, textile dying and 
simple leather goods making that required few manual skills. The severe shortage of 
indigenous professionals and a skilled labour force was and still is an inhibiting factor in 
terms of industrialization and economic development. 
The second major problem in Saudi Arabia after the boom was the type and rapidity of the 
increase in wealth. The unprecedented influx of wealth resulted in an increase in a per 
capita income 40 times higher in 1962 than in 1957, a fourteen fold rise by 1970 and an 
incredible 75 per cent increase just in two years 1979-1981 (El Ghonemy, 1998). That 
sudden increase led to rapid dependency on imported consumer goods as opposed to goods 
produced domestically. 
27 
 
A third factor hindering the encouragement of economic innovation in Saudi Arabia is 
social and religious attitudes. Wahhabism severely discourages the idea of change and 
considers it a clear crossing of religious boundaries, condemning it as bid’ a (novelty).  
Encouraging innovation in Saudi Arabia after the boom would have required massive 
planning during the Second and Third Five –Year Development Plans (1970-75/1975-80). 
In particular, it would have been necessary to import industrial components, machinery 
and expertise in order to start manufacturing goods, allowing the growth in the oil industry 
to sponsor the development and production in other sectors. Instead, in the 1990s Saudi 
Arabia’s export of manufactured goods was less than 1 per cent of total exports (Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency/Economic and Research and Statistics). The import of goods 
should have been enough to satisfy the new needs of this developing rich economy yet 
monitored to sustain the population’s need to invent and produce for themselves. Perhaps, 
a greater effort should have targeted progressively educating and training nationals to (in 
time) take charge of their labour market as they qualified for this replacement especially on 
a technical and industrial level. Additionally, Saudi Arabia could have benefited (long 
term) from the influx of professionals, technicians and scientists that flooded the country 
during the boom years. The laws of the Kingdom did not allow naturalization (except for a 
few individuals who were of tribal descendants or those who served the royal family). 
Saudi law prohibited foreigners working in the kingdom from owning business, property or 
investing except under the cover of nationals. Therefore those who owned the know how 
had little incentive to benefit the host country whether by training Saudi’s to take over or 
by establishing their own businesses, which would have enriched both Saudi society and 
the Saudi economy on the long term. 
In Saudi Arabia’s case, inventiveness was a luxury that became unnecessary after the flood 
of petrodollars. As opposed to Britain (wherethe cycle of economic need led to invention 
which in turn led to better performance) production or profitability did not exist in Saudi 
Arabia’s subsistence economy. And after the petrodollar boom the Saudis quickly learned 
to purchase (rather than produce) any technology they needed from any part of the world. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the ideology that governed Saudi Arabia 
had and continues to have a restrictive impact on education, which is crucial for 
encouraging individuality, creativity and innovativeness. 
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Industrialization and the Human Dimension in Britain 
When it comes to the industrialization process, it is the human dimension that plays the 
most important role. Experimentation, productivity, and a positive work culture arise from 
specific human qualities (intellectual capital), which are in invaluable pre-requisite for 
industrialization. The social and economic structure of Saudi Arabia at the commencement 
of industrialization was vastly different to that of Britain. In Saudi Arabia, the majority of 
nationals were not in wage earning occupations, an economic structure, in the traditional 
sense, did not exist in the kingdom. Industrialization could have better utilized the national 
human resources at its onset in a more developed economic and flexible social structure. In 
contrast, the subsistence sector of the British economy prior to industrialization was very 
small. In other words, in Britain a market culture and a widespread familiarity with at least 
the rudiments of commerce existed where almost all groups of the society were committed 
to the marketplace; producing goods for sale, working for a wage, receiving rents and 
profits, investing, lending to some degree and so forth (Mathias, 2001).  
Saudi and British Social Structure 
Saudi Arabia’s social structure had a fundamental division between those of tribal descent 
and those who were not. This affected all aspects of Saudi society, especially as regards 
social mobility. This also affected people’s ability to acquire governmental positions 
especially in much sought after sectors such as the military and government ministries. The 
Saudi society is governed by favouritism, determining a person’s potential according to 
their tribal heritage. This characteristic, as fieldwork suggests, is perhaps an important 
factor in nurturing qualities such as irresponsibility and lack of motivation, blamed for low 
productivity and high unemployment among Saudi nationals. The less fortunate sectors of 
Saudi society believe they can do little in a life time of hard work, if society pre-
determines their potential and set limits on their social mobility. 
On the contrary, as Mathias (2001) points out, ‘For over two generations prior to 
industrialization, Britain’s social structure was flexible, in terms of mobility. The economy 
of Britain said to be differentiated with trade and commerce in association with 
differentiated social structure known all over Europe for the importance of its (middling 
 
4  One had to be of born and educated in Saudi Arabia to Saudi Parents to be accepted to serve in the military.  
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orders)’. Hard work earned recognition and social status in many cases and in certain 
circumstances the bestowing of titles and estates in recognition of exceptional 
achievement. 
A second point characterizing Saudi society prior to the 1970s oil boom is the lack of 
ethnic and religious diversity. Although a broader exposure through commerce to other 
faiths existed in the western and eastern regions, it was something of an exception. A 
population which is 100 per cent Muslims and, as mentioned earlier, severe restrictions 
caused by the government’s naturalization policy over the last four decades, has produced 
clear social rigidity and isolation. Until relatively recently in Saudi Arabia foreigners could 
not invest or conduct business without the sponsorship of a male national (this law also 
applied to women until 2004). This allowed the creation a class of uneducated, unqualified 
Saudi de facto business owners and the emergence of a new bourgeoisie bypassing the 
formation of a middle class. Today, young Saudis struggling to qualify and land 
employment are finding that they have to lower their job expectations in the new less 
forgiving economy. 
As well as this, pre industrial Britain’s social differentiation was characterised by 
increasing religious heterodoxy, in particular the Protestant nonconformists who associated 
their diverse theological views with different social ethics and economic roles. Also, the 
Methodist revival that swept Britain during the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century to some extent offered workers an egalitarian religious ideology that also had 
potential for political expansion. As a result of exposure to these religions coupled with its 
characteristics of open-endedness, mobility and flexibility, British society created a middle 
class. 
Liberalism, Socialism and Imperialism 
An essential element in the discussion about the Industrial Revolution is political sentiment 
and power reaching into the hands of the working class, in the form of political and social 
reforms taking place across Europe especially during and after the French Revolution.  
Socialism and Liberalism at the beginning of the twentieth century placed great value on 
the rights and dignity of the individual human being arguing that humans were best 
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capable of achieving their full potential when living in a free environment without 
government restriction. They imbedded concepts that included freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, imprisonment, assembly, speech, as well as freedom of the press.  
Liberals in Britain, as cited by Breunig et al (2002), also stressed the authority of reason 
rather than tradition, emphasized the perfectibility of a political and social institutions: 
contrary to the conservatives who often idealized the past, liberals viewing history as being 
progressive in nature. 
In contrast, Saudi Arabia has remained unchanged and in virtual isolation throughout most 
of its history. The Arab world was subjected to changes in the region brought about by the 
Ottoman and European influences in the twentieth century with the exception of the 
Arabian Peninsula. Colonization can sometimes deplete and mismanage natural and human 
resources, but it can also ignite seeded political and social responsibility and a sense of 
patriotism. In addition, change brought about by exposure to political movements such as 
Nasserite Nationalists movement in Egypt, and later Ba’thism in Iraq /Syria changed the 
Arab world’s ideology and sense of independence and patriotism in the 1950s. John 
Isbister (1998) believes that these political upheavals heralded the age of nationalism and 
independence for much of the Third World, establishing national identities and riding a 
wave of political self-determination. The Saudis however, became more inward looking 
and simply adapted to the new wealthy lifestyle that oil boom afforded them. 
Today, Saudi Arabia is inadequately prepared to face a rapidly changing world. The 
national education system is still controlled by government edicts and the spirit of 
Wahhabism, and the vocational system is failing to qualify Saudis technically in sufficient 
quality and quantity to replace a highly skilled foreign workforce. In Europe, mass 
education evolved from a need for a skilled and literate workforce in a modern economy. It 
also led to dynamism and a relatively fluid society. Workers’ demands for citizenship 
rights were met giving room for those with skill and talent to rise to positions of wealth, 
status and political engagement. Education therefore becomes a driving force instilling 
motivation and ambition. This is patently not the case in Saudi Arabia. 
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Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia and Great Britain underwent Industrial Revolutions, albeit very different in 
character and process, two centuries apart. They both arrived at the post-revolutionary 
period with an industrial infrastructure not seen before in their societies and both built their 
new social and economic infrastructure on new technologies. However, there are major 
differences between the roads they took. 
In the case of the UK, the existence of colonies and a social structure built up over 
centuries provided ready markets for goods to be exported to and sources of supply. Saudi 
Arabia had a ready market, but its wealth was derived almost entirely from within its 
borders. 
The products of Britain’s new industries were diverse, manufactured and labour intensive, 
the value added to raw materials through an increasingly educated and skilled local labour 
force. Saudi Arabia has a single-product economy, extracted and minimally processed (if 
at all) by a small, skilled but imported labour force. 
Perhaps most importantly, Britain’s revolution progressed slowly (over 200 years or so) 
producing out of necessity new skills, inventiveness and an education system that met, to a 
great extent, the needs of the new era. Backed by the protestant work ethic and enhanced 
by the migration from agricultural areas to cities, a perception arose that working in an 
industrialised area for a wage was the norm (as opposed to living in a relatively simple 
agrarian economy). 
By contrast, Saudi Arabia’s economy had an almost instant transformation from a 
nomadic/subsistence economy to an industrial monoculture with the accompanying 
technocratic elite being imported from abroad. There was no local skill base, educated 
workforce, industrial work ethic or effective education system. 
There was however a paternal patronage system that, following long established tradition 
structures, facilitated the ‘trickle down’ of cash from the oil bonanza to individuals and the 
physical infrastructure of post revolutionary Saudi Arabia. This paternal methodology of 
the ‘hand-out’ state was infertile ground for the germination of the work ethic; there was 
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little or no need to be economically and financially productive as money was easy to come 
by. 
Nearly 40 years on, although the kingdom has a small-educated elite and a fledgling 
vocational training sector, there is a huge mismatch between the output of the state 
education system and the needs of industry. Half the domestic population (Saudi women) 
is actively discouraged by circumstance, law or tradition from entering in any meaningful 
way into the workplace. 
Moreover the country is in effect managed and serviced in most areas by a foreign 
workforce that constitutes about one third of the total population of the kingdom. They are 
there as workers not immigrants (as it is almost impossible for a foreign national to 
become a Saudi national) and are consequently migrant labour, either long or short term. 
None of these factors encourage the development of a work ethic, the development of a 
skilled and motivated working class or the rapid development of skilled domestic technical 
sector. High unemployment even despite the financial riches of the country is the result. 
In the following chapters we take a detailed will look at the labour market in Saudi Arabia 
focusing specifically on the role of migrant labour and the effectiveness of the favoured 
policy response, Saudization, to labour market imbalances.  
Chapter two will examine Saudi Arabia’s labour market in terms of availability of physical 
and human resources. Those resources will be looked at in terms of their potential to alter 
the imbalances of the labour market, with a view to lowering the high rate of 
unemployment. In order to do so, the chapter will give a detailed description of the Saudi‘s 
human resources, their regional characteristics, their evolution according to   population 
and religious specificities as well as the general socio-economic development of the 
country. It will focus on important aspects of this process such as the role played by the 
foreign work force, on which the Saudi government relied since the oil boom and which 
now represents almost 90 per cent of the labour force, and the influence that such figures 
have on the national labour force, currently dominated by high unemployment rates. The 
chapter will then shed a light on the need for human and physical resources to be dealt with 
by government policies, and it will evaluate the effects of these policies in their attempt to 
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reduce unemployment by replacing the expatriate workforce with nationals. By illustrating 
the theoretical background of unemployment, the chapter will then describe the 
characteristics of Saudi structural unemployment, defined as an imbalance between the 
Saudi jobseekers’ expertise and education on one hand and the availability and 
requirement of jobs on the other.  
The chapter will end with considerations on skills development, as a mean to boost and 
develop human capital. Given the fact that education and training are the core of human 
capital development, the research will evaluate the quality of the education system, whose 
lack of effectiveness is seen as majorly responsible for the difficulties encountered by 
young Saudi entering the labour market. Similarly to its economy, Saudi basic social care 
and investment in education was sudden and rapidly developed. Faced with rapidly 
growing population, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in educating the rising numbers of 
youth. Although education in Saudi Arabia has always been an essential part of 
government policies and development plans, Saudi nationals still find extremely difficult 
to access a labour market which is still dominated by foreigners. The last part of chapter 
two will aim at analyzing the reasons behind the failure of Saudi educational system in 
producing young male and female Saudi fit for entering the labour force with imbalance 
between the Saudi jobseekers’ expertise and education on one hand and the availability and 
requirement of jobs on the other.  
Following on from this, in chapter three the methodological underpinnings of the empirical 
research undertaken as part of this study is described.  
Chapter four introduces the government’s initiative of Saudization, the key process which 
is intended to solve the problem of chronic structural unemployment in Saudi Arabia. This 
chapter is intended to reflect the policy-maker’s point of view on what Saudization is 
designed to achieve. The chapter describes other similar experiences of culturally 
homogenizing a work culture in countries similar to Saudi Arabia. Using qualitative data 
obtained via extensive empirical work, there will follow a discussion of perceptions of 
Saudization as an economical necessity. The importance of finding an immediate solution 
for unemployment will be stressed in the light of the fact that any unemployed young 
Saudi is seen as representing a risk to Saudi society (due to the risk of radicalisation) as 
well as an economical liability. Methods used to enforce Saudization will be discussed in 
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detail. Each method will be discussed separately illustrating how the policy-makers use 
them to enforce Saudization in different occupations and sectors of the economy. It is 
obvious that the Saudi government regard Saudization at a high priority, therefore, chapter 
four will describe in details the different agencies that issue and legislate for Saudization in 
order to demonstrate the difficulties inherent in Saudization and the conflicting priorities of 
the many different agencies and people involved in the process. Finally, the chapter lays 
out the many barriers the process of Saudization faces from the policy-maker’s point of 
view.  
Chapter five sets out to learn about the private sector’s views on labour market imbalances 
and the pros and cons of Saudization as a policy. The chapter will discuss why the policy 
of Saudization was received by the many private industries and businesses with disbelief 
and reluctance. As the government pressed for larger numbers to be employed 
progressively by the private sector, tightening the laws of Saudization, making it difficult 
to issue visas to recruit expatriates and restricted a list of occupations to nationals only, the 
private sector seem to continue to struggle with abiding by this policy.  
Chapter five will cover the views of the private sector on the matter, how they value its 
objectives and what impedes the progress of their compliance to this policy. The chapter 
will be supported by fieldwork conducted and carried out for this research comprising 
interviews with representatives from the private sector in different industries and size of 
organizations.  
Being the major recipient of Saudization reforms to prioritize national employment, the 
chapter aims at outlining the dilemma faced by the private sector, which realized that the 
Government openly and repeatedly pointed it as the main target to promote Saudization but 
at the same time is faced with the consequences, in terms of economic risks and logistic 
downfalls that such a structural change might bring to their business routine. The chapter 
will derive generalizations and evaluation of the private sector’s point of view by the 
extensive fieldwork that has been carried out in forms of in depth interviews. The chapter 
will also outline the major barriers faced by representatives of the private sector when they 
try to meet the objectives and apply the measures designed by the Saudization plan. The 
chapter shall also cover any areas of successful Saudization by the private sector as to 
verify how it is possible to be achieved if any.   
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While chapter four and five discuss policy-makers and the opinion of the private sector, 
Chapter six looks at the Saudi workforce. This chapter introduces the reader to the way the 
workforce in Saudi Arabia regards Saudization. It depicts the way Saudi nationals view 
this process as it was, after all, created with the intention of reducing their unemployment 
and increasing their chance to compete by removing what Saudi policy-makers see as their 
biggest obstacle; the expatriate worker. Qualitative data obtained from expatriates is also 
discussed. The chapter then moves to describe the dynamics of interrelations between the 
Saudi and the expatriate workforce and how they regard each other in the light of 
Saudization. The chapter then discusses workers’ views of Saudization and their evaluation 
of its strength and weakness.    
Chapter Seven concludes this research. It starts with a summary of each of the empirical 
chapters: four, five and six each representing one of the stakeholders involved with the 
process of Saudization. The chapter will analyze the policy makers view then move on to 
describe the employers’ viewpoint before representing that of the workers in today’s 
labour market in Saudi Arabia. Each stakeholder opinion of the objectives of Saudization, 
how is it progressing and what impedes it will be covered as a conclusion to the empirical 
chapters. The chapter will also examine and evaluate the transition that Saudization took 
over the last decade in terms of how it is being managed by each of the stakeholders nearly 
ten years after its introduction. 
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Chapter Two 
The Labour Market 
Introduction 
Saudi Arabia is a relatively young nation. Its economy and labour market present an 
interesting case for research for although other nations have similar sized economies (e.g. 
in terms of GDP), they do not share the Saudi labour market profile. 
Today, the kingdom possesses 25 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and many 
mineral reserves – notably phosphate, bauxite and gold. Its economy is heavily dependent 
on oil and petrochemical exports. Other sectors of the economy are mainly industries based 
on the country’s minerals and metals. The industry sector of the economy accounts for 60 
per cent of GDP (10% of which is manufacturing and 5% construction and building). The 
services sector accounts for 35% (of which 14% are Government services and 8% 
insurance and real estate). Neither agriculture nor tourism constitute more than 3% 
respectively of the total GDP according to SAMA, 2008. 
The sudden influx of a single source of wealth (oil) in the 1970s that still forms 80 percent 
of Saudi GDP, a rapidly increasing population (3.8 percent increase per annum1975-2005 
Ramady, 2005) of which 56% are below the age of 20, high unemployment among 
working age nationals, and a heavy reliance on imported labour provide a fertile 
environment for economic and social problems (Saudi Arabia Information Resources, 
2008). 
Saudi Arabia’s history of reliance on an expatriate work force since the 1970s was 
important initially for Saudi economic development as this experience was not readily 
available among Saudi nationals at that time. Non-Saudis constitute 86.9% of the Saudi 
labour market across all sectors of the economy as will be illustrated later in this chapter 
(SAMA, 2008). Those expatriates (about 7 million people) send an estimated 60 billion 
dollars a year back to their home countries: money which is, by definition, therefore, ‘lost’ 
to the Saudi economy. 
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High unemployment figures and an inability to rely on Saudi nationals to replace the 
expatriate workforce raise several questions: What physical and human resources does the 
kingdom have? Does the government have the vision and/or policies to maximize the 
potential of those resources? How efficient are the methods of reducing the unemployment 
among Saudi nationals?   
The Saudi Government has attempted to address the problem of high unemployment 
mainly by pressuring the private sector to employ higher percentages of Saudi nationals, 
limiting some employment sectors to Saudis only and is in the process of building new 
industrial cities to absorb thousands of graduates every year into an expanded labour 
market. The Government is also re-evaluating the curricula of its educational system and 
putting more consideration and emphasis into human capital development. 
However, The Saudi government’s efforts to develop national human capital have been 
criticized as being insufficient in terms of creating an able educated workforce of nationals 
and an industrialized society. 
This chapter will examine Saudi Arabia’s labour market in the light of available physical 
and human resources and its current economy. It addresses questions such as: Has the 
human aspect of Saudi resources been developed and utilized in an optimal fashion? Are 
the present Government efforts sufficient to remedy the labour market imbalance in both 
the short and long terms?The chapter will also detail how the labour market in Saudi 
Arabia evolved and what factors shaped it in the process; how and why the foreign work 
force became such an indispensable asset; and why most government initiatives (such as 
Saudization)intended to deal with these issues tend to fall short of their aims. The chapter 
will end with a discussion on human capital development in the Kingdom looking 
specifically at the educational system. 
The Saudi Context 
Liftwich (1973) defines economic resources as all the factors available to produce goods 
and services to satisfy the needs of individuals or society. Rational use of economic 
resources is crucial in terms of maximizing the efficiency of an economy. The choices a 
state makes about using its natural resources, the pace and level of dependency on them 
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and how it uses its human capital all go to determine the development of a society and 
individuals. Saudi use of human capital will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
For the purpose of this thesis, factors of production are divided into natural and human 
capital, natural resources being defined as factors supplied by nature (i.e. a wider definition 
of “land”.) 
Natural (Physical) recourses 
Physical resources will be reviewed in the country’s four geographical regions: Najd, Al 
Hijaz, Al Hasa and Asir. The same regional categorization will be maintained when 
addressing the different characteristics of the indigenous population, its history and 
cultural evolution in relation to their potential influence on the local labour market.  Figure 
2:1 illustrates Saudi Arabia’s geographical physical resources and economic activity. 
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Figure 2:1 Economic Activity Per Geographical Region 
 
Source: Al Tawati for CBS, 2006. 
The central region, Najd, is a mostly arid plateau that consists mainly of desert land. A few 
scattered oases exist (for example in Alqassim, Alkharj, Alaflag and Alhota) enabling 
herding of cattle to occur. This allowed the growth of a large dairy industry. 
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Najd has benefited the most from the government’s agricultural plans and distribution of 
arable land and Government investments in a modern infrastructure and good public 
services (Tawati, 1990). 
Alhasa, the Eastern Province, is the richest and most diversified region in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in terms of economic activities and physical resources. Even before the 
revenues from oil in the middle of last century, this region enjoyed good trade via the 
Arabian Gulf, the closest access to Asia, and access to British navigation and ships. Today, 
the Eastern region contains massive petroleum resources and is the headquarters of the 
Arabian-American company (ARAMCO). Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation 
(SABIC) the largest regional complex of petrochemicals is also located in Aljubail 
Industrial City in this region. This region also receives additional income from fishery and 
shrimp production as well as from housing the fertile oasis cities of Alhofuf and Alqatif. 
The former covers about 50,000 acres of agricultural land producing high quality dates 
(Hansen 2004) and (Saudi Economic Survey, 2003). 
Hijaz, located along the Red Sea hosts the two holy cities of Islam Mecca and Medina as 
well as Altaif, a rich agricultural area south of Mecca. Hijaz revenues come from trade and 
fishery but most revenue is accrued by providing pilgrimage services, which even before 
the discovery of oil, were sufficient to sustain a local economy.  
The southern Tihama coastal plain of Hijaz, sustains subsistence farming and produce 
small quantities of some seasonal crops insufficient to satisfy local consumption. The 
highlands of this region receive more rain however, providing self-supporting cultivation 
and, to some extent, commercial agricultural production (Metz, US Library of Congress, 
1992). The Kingdom, with additional effort planning for agricultural development in this 
region, could benefit in many ways. Produce high quality vegetables and fruits, employ a 
higher percentage of this province’s locals that now migrate north in search of jobs, 
increase this regions income and diversify economic opportunities away from the oil 
industry (National Agriculture and Water Research Centre, 1996).  
In addition to the above-mentioned resources, the Arabian Shield is known for being rich 
in minerals such as gold, iron, magnesium, phosphate and natural gas (Mobbs, 2000).  
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More government attention is being directed to the latter (natural gas until the early 1980s 
was flared) and its other rich hydrocarbon resources (Bahgat, 2004). 
Asir, the fourth province, lies to the south of the Kingdom extending from the south of 
Hijaz down to the northern borders of Yemen. This region houses the agricultural coastal 
plains of Tihama along the Red Sea. This area enjoys an average of 30.4mm of rain a year 
sustaining subsistence agricultural activities. Cultivation takes place largely in the 
floodplains. Despite the fact that this region is relatively richer than all other parts of the 
country in rainfall, this advantage is not fully utilized in crop and other agricultural 
production(Prinz, and Wolfer, 1998).  
Human Recourses 
Human resources are the second element needed to develop any economy. It is important 
to evaluate Saudi Arabia’s human resources in terms of their regional characteristics, the 
composition of the population and the underlying trends they exhibit.  Saudi Arabia has the 
problem of having one of the highest population growth rates in the world according to 
SAMA report on population 2003. The population of the Kingdom grew three fold from 
7.3 million in 1975 to 22.67 million in 2003 to reach 24.24 million in mid-2007 (SAMA, 
2008). A high growth rate of population was put by Ramady (2005) between 3.4 - 3.8 
percent per annum Improvements in the living standards, health and social conditions over 
the past three decades have contributed to that growth. Saudi Arabia’s population is not 
only one of the fastest growing but it is also characterized by a high fertility rate 
internationally (UNDP 2002). Table 2:1 compares demographic trends in the Kingdom to 
the rest of the world. 
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Table 2:1 Demographic Trends: Saudi Arabia and the World 
Description Year (Period) Saudi 
Arabia
Arab 
Countries
Developing 
Countries 
OECD The World 
Total Population 
(In Million) 
1975 7.3 126.4 2898.3 924.4 3987.4 
1999 21.3 240.7 4609.8 1122.0 5862.7 
2015 31.7 332.7 5759.1 1209.2 7048.2 
Annual Growth 
Rate of Population 
1975-1999 4.2 2.7 1.9 0.8 1.6 
      
1999-2000 3.0 2.0 1.4 0.5 1.2 
Urban Population 
(Ratio to Total) 
1975 58.4 40.4 25.9 70.4 37.8 
1999 85.1 54.0 38.9 77.2 46.5 
2015 89.7 61.9 47.6 81.3 53.1 
Population Below 
15 Years (Ratio to 
Total Population) 
1999 40.8 40.8 33.1 20.6 30.2 
2015 28.1 28.1 28.1 17.3 25.8 
            
Fertility Rate 
(Infants Per 
Woman) 
1970-1975 7.3 6.5 5.4 2.5 4.5 
      
1995-2000 6.2 4.1 3.1 1.8 2.8 
Life Expectancy 
(Years) 
1970-1975 53.9 51.9 55.5 70.4 59.9 
      
1995-2000 70.9 65.9 64.1 76.4 66.4 
Source: Central Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, 2003, and Human Resources Development Report of 2001, United 
Nations Development Programme, 2002. 
Note: Population Below 15 Years (Ratio to Total Population) in the table above presents equal (percentage of 40.8 in both Saudi Arabia 
and the Arab world). This particular grouping is faulty since the UNDP 2003 report (the original source of this table) groups Saudi 
Arabia in terms of population growth of 3% or more with only Mauritania, Palestine (occupied and territory), Somalia, Oman and 
Yemen. The rest of the Arab world falls under a lower percentage of population growth ranging between 2-3 % only. 
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Proselytizing by any other religion is not permitted and all other schools of Islam are 
persecuted; public practice of any other religion is strictly prohibited (Amnesty 
International 2002). A small percentage of European expatriates, especially of the higher 
paid jobs, work in Saudi Arabia and some Christians from East and South East Asia 
discretely attend limited religious services under the protection of a Diplomatic body or in 
private residential compounds. Non-Muslims are ineligible for citizenship. To expatriates 
of other faiths (or none), Saudi Arabia’s religious stature tends to be seen as being 
intolerant. This lack of freedom of religious practice and the rigid process of naturalization 
has discouraged many professional non-Muslim expatriates from working in Saudi long 
term. 
A brief portrait of the population region by region in the Saudi Kingdom will help fill in 
some of the necessary background in terms of the Saudi labour market. 
The majority of Najd’s population before the oil wealth was discovered in 1937 survived 
on herding and trade from and to Iraq and the richer neighbours north of the Kingdom. The 
mobility needed for herding in a dry land kept the tribal population of this region from 
developing sedentary communities. 
Loyalty to the ruling Al-Saud family and the resurgence of the Wahhabi religious sect is 
reflected in the people’s culture and lifestyle. The harsh environment of the desert and 
extreme temperatures also affects the social profile of the population of this region. Many 
consider Najd as a closed society that finds it extremely difficult to open up to modernity, 
women’s education and the other cosmopolitan activities essential to modern economic 
development. Intermarriages and exposure to foreigners is not common in this region. Still 
governed by tribalism, the family (mostly represented by the elderly males such as the 
father and grandfather) rules over the individual even in the smallest of personal 
preferences and choices let alone choice of occupation. Based on the researcher’s personal 
experience and informal feedback, it is believed among nationals in the kingdom that this 
region and its population are favoured by the government’s projects (such as infrastructure, 
the presence of all ministries, Government organizations and the diplomatic body) and 
public services.  
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The Eastern region’s population is mainly Shi’a. Reports by Amnesty International express 
concerns for the population of Shi’tes in the kingdom being discriminated against in job 
opportunities, education and access to government funds(Amnesty International report 
2000).The government acknowledged this point and took measures to prove otherwise. 
Interestingly, the private sector in the kingdom tends to favour hiring nationals from the 
Eastern region for their perceived diligence at work, sense of professionalism and positive 
work ethic (Work experience observation and informal interviews with private sectors 
business managers and HR). Hijazis the most densely populated region and most hetero-
cultural area of the Kingdom where the two holy cities of Mecca and Madina are located. 
Mecca attracted pilgrimages to the holy Kaaba for thousands of years even before Islam. 
Madina gained its holiness from the migration of the Prophet Mohammad to what was 
known as the small town of “Yethreb” about 1500 years ago.  
These important Islamic features and the fact that the region lies bordering the Red Sea, 
has a more moderate climate and is the location of the ancient port of Jeddah are reflected 
in the population’s ways of life. They are more open and able to mix with other cultures. 
This shapes their daily activities and their ‘entrepreneurial profile’ differs from other parts 
of the Kingdom. The Hijaz had a head start on other parts of Saudi Arabia in the 
introduction of education, organized business and trade with the rest of the world and 
women’s enrolment in education and the labour force.  A wider variety of occupations 
exist in this region such as the pilgrimage economy, fishing, some farming and agriculture 
in Madina (palm tree oasis’s), but most importantly in Taief, south of the region. 
The mountainous region of Asir was the last region to submit to the rule of Ibn Saud. They 
are described by anthropologists and historians such as Mauger and Philby (1996) as 
colourful, crafty, hard working people dependant on their agricultural crops for their 
livelihood. Although not described as completely open to other cultures and faiths, a 
phenomenon apparent in regions along the east and the west of the Kingdom, this region’s 
people lived a relatively open lifestyle. 
In Asir women enjoy a partnership with males in work, owned land and oversaw land 
cultivation (Mauger, 1993) giving them an advantage unique among women in Arabia until 
formal Government education throughout the country was introduced. Shortages in public 
services, especially quality education and health care, for many of the southern clusters of 
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the south has led to mass migration to large northern cities mainly in Hijaz but also to other 
regions. 
It should be noted that there have been major demographic shifts especially in the 1980s, 
disturbing the natural distribution of those human resources over the new, growing 
economy. According to the World Bank Annual Development Report (2002), 49 percent of 
the total population of Saudi Arabia was urbanized as early as the 1970s and 12 percent of 
the population lived in cities with a population of 1 million or more. So what was largely a 
rural society fifty years ago has become a relatively urbanized one over a short period of 
time. This rapid trend towards urbanization is the result of poor planning and an imbalance 
of regional development caused by the government building growth centres only in the 
main provinces of the regions. This trend led to the migration of the population to growth 
centres seeking better education and other services. The numbers of Saudis seeking 
employment in cities increased beyond the capacity of the each local labour market. 
Meanwhile, the numbers of those employed in agriculture dropped from 45 percent in 
1970 to under 7 percent in 1998 (World Bank Annual World Development Report, 2002) 
is further proof of the vacuum created in other local labour markets by this rapid 
urbanization.  
According to figure 2:3 below, based on the most recently released general census data by 
the Central Department of Statistics (CDS, 1999) of the Ministry of Economy and 
Planning, the areas of highest population density are the two main provinces, Mecca and 
Riyadh, and to some extent, the Eastern Province. 
  
Figure 2:3
Source: Cen
Another m
Kingdom 
population
the age 15
Saudi Ara
percent (1
of under 1
excluding 
compositio
 
Distributio
tral Departme
ajor and w
in additio
. The Unit
 yrs and the
bia’s popu
1.3 million
5 year-old
those over
n and the p
n of Popul
nt of Statistic
orrying fac
n to the s
ed Nations
 percentage
lation is yo
) of the Sau
s constitute
 65 years 
rojected fi
 
ation Densi
s for the Min
tor for the
peed of d
 estimated 
 of over 65
ung. The a
di populat
s 7.1 milli
of age. Fig
gures of the
ty in Saudi 
istry of Plann
 present an
emographic
the populat
yr olds as 
ge group o
ion (SDC 2
on or abou
ure No: 3
 labour ma
Arabia 
ing, 2001 
d future of 
 shifts is 
ion in 198
relatively s
f under 30
001, SAMA
t 45 percen
below high
rket entrant
the labour 
the age p
0 to be 44 
mall (Alfar
 years acco
, 2002). T
t of the to
light the p
s. 
market in 
rofile of 
percent und
sy, 1982). 
unts for 7
he populati
tal populati
opulation a
47 
 
the 
the 
er 
2.6 
on 
on 
ge 
Figure 2:4
 
Source: Cen
Saudi Ara
in 1974, a
threefold 
annum (R
 Saudi Ara
tral Departme
bia today b
ccording to
from 1975 
amady, 200
bia’s Popu
nt of Statistic
ears little r
 the most 
from 7.3 m
5).  
lation: Age 
s 2001, SAM
esemblanc
recent figu
illion to 2
and Gende
A 2002 
e to the pro
res by SAM
2.67 millio
r Distributi
jected pop
A and CD
n in 2003 
on. 
ulation gro
S. The po
at a ratio 
 
wth estima
pulation gr
of 3.4-3.8 p
48 
ted 
ew 
er 
Employm
According
2007, the 
above the 
The relativ
large port
education 
rural areas
Figure 2:
Population
NCB Repo
Source: Wor
The Saud
reinforced
discrepanc
the latter i
ent 
 to the SAM
work force
age of 15 y
ely low rat
ion of the 
and a high p
, as well as p
5 NCB Re
 
rt on the W
ld Economic
i work forc
 this obse
y in benefi
s nearing th
A (2008) 
 totalled 8,2
ears of age 
e of overall 
population 
roportion o
eople who 
port on the
orkforce A
 Outlook & M
e generally
rvation. Th
ts and work
e point of 
report on th
29,654 mi
currently w
manpower 
is currentl
f housewive
work in agr
 Workforc
s a Percent
inistry of Fin
 favours w
is could 
ing condit
employmen
e work for
llion with a
orking.  
participatio
y engaged 
s, people em
iculture go 
e as a Perc
 of the Eco
ance and Nat
orking for
be related 
ions betwee
t saturation
ce in Saudi 
bout 50.9 p
n (Figure 2:
in seconda
ployed in 
unreported i
entage of t
nomically A
ional Econom
 the gover
to the fa
n the priva
. The CDS
Arabia in t
ercent of t
5) is due to
ry and tert
the tradition
n official st
he Econom
ctive Popu
y, 1998 
nment and 
ct that the
te and the p
 report of 2
he first part
he populati
 the fact tha
iary stages 
al activities
atistics. 
ically Act
lation. 
the data h
re is such
ublic secto
007 indica
49 
 of 
on 
t a 
of 
 of 
ive      
 
ere 
 a 
rs; 
tes 
that the m
(43.1 per 
while only
sectors. Th
real estate
breakdown
any physic
Figure 2:6
Source: Cen
This distr
estimated 
reported th
estimate p
sectors; th
females s
(Saiidah K
is highest
female wo
with high 
ajority of 
cent), 19.7
 0.9 per c
e rest of th
, farming 
, highlight
al labour a
 Workforc
tral Departme
ibution diff
at 565,000
at 50 perc
uts nearly
e remainin
uch as fem
hdija Bint 
 amongst t
rkforce) an
school or h
the register
 per cent a
ent are inv
e Saudi wo
and herdin
 the Saudi n
rea of occu
e Distributi
nt of Statistic
ers, howev
, representi
ent of all w
 86 percen
g 14 perc
ale branch
Khwailed E
hose who h
d peaks at
igher levels
ed Saudi w
re in the s
olved in th
rkforce is i
g. The da
ationals’ s
pation. 
on per Eco
s 2007. 
er, in the 
ng 5.5 perc
orking nati
t of the fe
ent are inv
es of bank
conomic F
old teache
 20 percent
 of educatio
ork force 
cientific, te
e industrial
nvolved in
ta, althoug
mall presen
nomic Sect
case of the
ent of the 
onal femal
male work
olved in b
s, small re
orum, 200
r-training 
 in the age
n (Cordesm
are current
chnical and
, chemical 
 other unreg
h not deta
ce in indus
or 2007 
 female Sa
total Saudi
es are univ
force in th
usinesses 
tail outlets
7). The par
diplomas (7
 group betw
an, 2002; 
ly in the s
 the huma
and food m
istered act
iled in eco
tries, techn
udi workfo
 work forc
ersity gradu
e educatio
that cater 
 and priva
ticipation r
8.5 percen
een 25-34
UNDP, 200
ervices sec
nities secto
anufacturi
ivities such
nomic sec
ical fields a
rce, which
e. It has be
ates. Anoth
n and hea
only to oth
te busines
ate of fema
t of the to
 among tho
3). 
50 
tor 
rs, 
ng 
 as 
tor 
nd 
 is 
en 
er 
lth 
er 
ses 
les 
tal 
se 
51 
 
Efforts to rectify the general low participation of Saudi women in the labour force in Saudi 
Arabia are represented by the Royal Decree (120). Issued in 2003, it invites all ministries and 
the high counsels to promote, facilitate and remove obstacles facing women in the labour 
market and to create new jobs. So far, this decree has faced resistance through logistical 
impediments. The increasing numbers of educated females coupled with the rising cost of 
living raise the expectation that female employment participation rate will increase in the 
labour market over the next decade in spite of some cultural and religious resistance. 
As for the expatriate work force, the General Census Department’s estimates of 1999-2000 
refers to a 79.76 percent expatriates involved in the labour force, divided as 67.89 percent 
males and 11.87 per cent females mostly 25-44 yrs of age. 
The table below, divides the total workforce in the Kingdom (15 years +) according to 
educational level, nationality and gender for the Year 2008. 
Table 2:2 Patterns of participation in the labour force according to Gender, Nationality 
and Educational Level. 
Education 
Status 
 
Saudi 
 
 
Non Saudi 
 
 
Total 
 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Illiterate  131,325 9,945 141,270 324,470 31,774 356,244 455,795 41,719 497,514
Read & 
Write  111,058 3,759 114,817 608,070 176,378 784,448 719,128 180,137 899,265
Primary  446,288 7,613 453,901 637,530 171,101 808,631 1,083,818 178,714 1,262,532
Intermediate 626,781 11,761 638,542 850,388 125,682 976,070 1,477,169 137,443 1,614,612
Secondary 
or 
Equivalent  
1,010,102 54,551 1,064,653 584,057 34,067 618,124 1,594,159 88,618 1,682,777
Diploma  264,103 86,327 350,430 175,514 16,002 191,516 439,617 102,329 541,946
Bachelor 
Degree  633,777 298,454 932,231 444,020 23,035 467,055 1,077,797 321,489 1,399,286
Higher 
Diploma 
OR M.A. 
35,149 4,323 39,472 34,191 2,440 36,631 69,340 6,763 76,103
Doctorate  15,773 5,580 21,353 19,242 2,670 21,912 35,015 8,250 43,265
Total 3,274,356 482,313 3,756,669 3,677,482 583,149 4,260,631 6,951,838 1,065,462 8,017,300
Source: General Census Department. Publication of Work Force 2008 
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Trade and profession based distribution reveals that almost half of the expatriate work 
force (48.25 percent), work mainly in the production and construction fields, (23.81 
percent) work in the service sectors, (23.14 percent) work in retail while only (0.62 
percent) serve in the administration sector. The UNDP report of 2003, however, divides 
the expatriate work force equally between the services sectors (46.5 percent) and the 
producing sectors (48.3 percent). 
The CDS report of 2000 reveals that 17.98 percent of the female expatriate workforce are 
employed as domestics and 9.33 percent work in the health and social services. There is no 
record of female housewives’ economic activities since they hold no work permits. 
The work force in Saudi Arabia (both nationals and expatriates) is divided mainly over 
three major sectors: the Government sector, the oil sector and the private sector. According 
to an unpublished article by Tawati in 2007, the Saudi Government employs about 14 
percent of the total labour force, the oil sector’s share of that is less than 5 % and the 
private sector leads with 86 % employment of the labour force. Additional information 
about the distribution of the work force in different economic sectors is detailed in table 
2:3 and Figure 2:6. 
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Table 2:3 Work Force Distribution by Economic activities and Professions (Saudis and 
Expatriate) 
 
Total 
Employment 
Saudi 
Participation 
Non-Saudi 
Participation 
Oil & Mining 4.19 9.3% 90.7% 
Manufacturing 19.7 11.5% 88.5% 
Public Utilities 0.7 55.7% 44.3% 
Construction 17.07 9.8% 90.2% 
Wholesale & Retail 31.66 13.4% 86.6% 
Hotels & Restaurants 5.55 4.7% 95.3% 
Transportation & Storage 6.59 28.8% 61.2% 
Banking & Insurance 1.64 52.4% 47.6% 
Real Estate & Business 7.14 25.4% 74.6% 
Education 1.36 16.9% 83.1% 
Health 2.05 9.8% 90.2% 
Community & Personal Service 2.36 13.1% 86.9% 
Source: NCB 2002, SAMA 2002. 
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organizations now estimate Saudi unemployment stands at 25 percent. It is evident to the 
researcher the pronounced discrepancy between the Saudi government figures of the 
unemployed and international estimates such as the example given of the CIA’s. Perhaps 
this could be best justified by the fact that the CIA relies on the ILO methods of measuring 
unemployment and takes no account for political or national considerations in measuring 
the phenomena. The mere idea that there is no unemployment compensation in Saudi 
Arabia makes reporting to the labour offices by the unemployed random and at times 
futile. Thus, the unemployed will only seek employment via the government agents if they 
fail in finding one through family, friends, knocking on private organizations doors for job 
vacancies and responding to ads. The researcher also acknowledges that female 
unemployment figures are subject to relativity and cannot be easily estimated for the grave 
limitations on areas women are welcomed to work in the kingdom as mentioned earlier in 
this chapter. 
For clarification, this research is majorly focused on male employment and not female 
unemployment because the latter is primarily subject to social and religious restrictions 
that severely hinder women’s further involvement in the Saudi labour force. 
The nature of the Saudi economy (and therefore the nature of Saudi unemployment) is 
unusual for three reasons: 
1)  The Government owns all the natural resources and the rights to exploit 
them. It also is the sole controller of all educational and training 
organizations for the mass. Private educational entities are responsible 
for a small percentage of educational output and are still largely dictated 
by the government’s national curriculum. 
2)  The type of economy in the Kingdom is largely dependent on oil 
revenues. Therefore the correlation between GDP and unemployment is 
not helpful in measuring or solving the problem of high unemployment 
amongst nationals. 
Unemployment is often split into different types to help analyse the causes. The most 
common types of unemployment are Cyclical Unemployment, Seasonal Unemployment, 
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Frictional Unemployment and Structural Unemployment (Sharp, Register and Grimes, 
2003). 
Unemployment in Saudi Arabia is involuntary, visible and best described as structural. It is 
a case of a young work force that is not suited to the demands of the market for many 
reasons. It is not however a result of the usual causes of structural unemployment. In other 
words, there were no major shifts of use of new technology, shift of certain industries to 
new geographical locations or the evolution of a new need for new expertise required for 
the production of new products or services. Saudi unemployment is indeed an imbalance of 
supply and demand in that it arises from a mismatch between labour force expertise and 
the jobs available. 
The situation is made worse due to the high number of new entrants to the labour market in 
Saudi. 
As mentioned earlier, unemployment among nationals reached 11 percent in 2007. The 
fact that 7 million expatriates work in the kingdom, while many nationals with similar 
skills remain unemployed but their jobs cannot be Saudized, demonstrates the scale of the 
problem.  
The situation is compounded by: 
1. Forty-five percent of the population being under the age of 18 yrs of age. 
2. Projections of increasing numbers of future labour entrants graduating 
from high schools and universities yearly. 
3. Specific problems in the labour market unique to Saudi Arabia such as 
the desire for new entrants to the labour market to seek an initial salary 
higher than is justified by his qualifications whilst at the same time 
wishing to remain geographically close to his dependents. 
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4. Poor outcomes of the measures taken so far by government organizations 
to deal with the root problem of present and future unemployment. 
5. The absence of an efficient jobs database, and the poor reputation of the 
Civil Service Labour offices, making finding employment harder. 
6. The fact that the majority of unemployed Saudis seem to put the blame 
primarily on elements like poor luck, favouritism and the fact that they 
cannot compete with their rival non-nationals. Only a small percentage of 
the unemployed are reported to mention reasons that indicate an insight 
into their real problems: i.e. unsuitable qualifications for the job/salary 
they want or else their personal attitude and work ethic(Champion,1999). 
7. The large gap between government and private sector wages especially in 
the absence of a minimum wage regulation. 
In the case of the kingdom, the importance of measuring the true size of the phenomenon 
of unemployment becomes ever more important as this has economic, social and even 
political ramifications especially at times of economic recession (the ‘credit crunch’) with 
the resulting possibility of social unrest. It is crucial here to clarify that Saudi Arabia’s 
unique welfare system falls short to international standards regarding, as mentioned earlier, 
measuring unemployment and providing aid to the unemployed. The government provides 
free health, education/ higher education, reward salaries for university students, marriage 
loans and limited housing projects to the poor but has no compensation program to the 
unemployed is in effect. Familial support effectively plays the full role of welfare to the 
unemployed. 
However measuring unemployment in Saudi Arabia is difficult in the absence of reliable 
data sources. It is hard to come by data that measure unemployment in the kingdom even 
in its totality let alone broken down by gender, educational level, age group or 
geographical area. Moreover, most existing studies are either outdated, inaccurate or based 
on small samples, as data sources tend to be produced by private consultancies hired by the 
private sector: not by the state. 
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Data on Saudi Census in 1992 states that the number of unemployed in the kingdom has 
reached 306.6 thousand (283.6 thousand are males and 23 thousand are females). If that 
were true, the percentage of unemployed in the total labour force was about 13.4 per cent 
of the total population. The central Department of Statistics gathers information on the 
unemployed through labour offices, as Saudi Arabia has no unemployment compensation 
programme. Hence, figures supplied by the Ministry of Labour are at best close estimates 
subject to a large margin of error. 
Other sources, such as the report for the Arab Human Development for the year 2002 
which relied on some local reports, indicate that the ratio of unemployment in the kingdom 
in the year 1996 was about 15 per cent amongst Saudi males with a ratio of growth of 
unemployment by about 3.3 percent yearly. As for the Ministry of Labour, it indicates that 
the unemployment rate amongst Saudis is 9.66 per cent for the year 2004. 
Below is a table calculating the ratio of unemployment in the kingdom depending on the 
(Central Department of Statistics) data and a fieldwork study by the Sajini consultancy. 
 
Table 2:4 Ratio of Unemployment (1999-2001) 
Saudi 
Unemployed as 
percent 
Saudi 
Unemployed 
Non Saudi 
Workers as 
Percent 
Saudi Workers 
as Percent 
Total 
Workers 
Year 
8.10 percent 228,625 43.6 per cent 46.4 percent 5,592,854 1999 
8.15 percent 239,851 42.7 per cent 47.3 percent 5,713,345 2000 
8.34 percent 252,699 42 per cent 48.0 percent 5,808,615 2001 
Source:  The Central Department of Statistics, GAP 
The above table suggests a chronological increase in the ratio of unemployment amongst 
Saudi Nationals between the years 1999 and 2001 in spite of the increase of the Saudis 
involvement in the labour market (this could be caused by the policies and programmes of 
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Saudization). However, the percentage of unemployment amongst Saudis continued to 
grow in the Saudi labour market between 1999 and 2001. 
In a nutshell, despite the increase in the number of Saudis joining the labour market 
between 1999 and 2000 by about 108.2 thousand workers, and between the years 2000 and 
2001 by about 73.6 thousand workers, this did not help shrink the percentage of 
unemployment amongst Saudis. Unemployment actually increased from 8 percent in the 
year 1999 to about 8.34 percent in the year 2001. This happened in spite of the issue of 25 
decrees and labour laws supporting Saudization before the year 1999 - which actually 
constitutes about 68 percent of the total decrees promoting the Nationalization of jobs 
issued until that date. 
In reaction to these figures the government of Saudi Arabia has enacted several measures.  
The most effective methods in practice at present is Saudization, the provision of more 
training and funds, re-evaluation of the educational programme and better career planning, 
diversifying resources, promoting industries and privatization creating a more balanced 
economy and more jobs. 
Other private initiatives and funds exist and offer affordable good-quality training, private 
on-the-job training programmes and loans for small businesses. 
Skill And Human Capital  
Contrary to popular belief, the educational level of the majority of expatriates is not 
significantly higher than that of their Saudi counterparts (see table 2:2 ) . The table clearly 
illustrates that expatriates in the majority are not recruited because of superior educational 
qualification. If that were the case, numbers of expatriates ranging from (read and write) to 
under (bachelor degree). This begs the question, therefore, of why high school and 
university graduates of such a rich country struggle to find quality employment in their 
own country. Further more, it highlights the issue in discussion namely the expatriates’ 
advantageous position of owning soft skills, the right work attitude and work ethic the 
majority of young nationals do not possess. Those qualities also make the expatriate 
indispensable to the employer when it comes to their replacement with the national worker 
the way Saudization works. 
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The answer to this question, yet again, lies in the specifics of Saudi economic history. Like 
all aspects of Saudi industrialization, Saudi human capital was built up in a phenomenally 
short period of time. Departing from traditional economic roles and adapting to structured 
education in a modern life context was challenging for policy makers as well as the people.  
According to the UNDP, the definition of human development involves four components: 
Equality, productivity, sustainability and empowerment. 
Those components are crucial for the peoples’ wellbeing and betterment of life. Although 
evaluation of the importance of one component compared to another differ among nations, 
the basic principles apply to all. 
Human capital, then, is a major focus for any developing nation. Providing health care, 
social care, and an effective education system is an investment inseparable from building 
the nation’s infrastructure, industries and advanced transport and telecommunication 
systems. 
“That is because they raise earnings, improve health, or add to a person's good 
habits over much of his lifetime. Therefore, economists’ regard expenditures 
on education, training, medical care, and so on as investments in human 
capital. They are called human capital because people cannot be separated 
from their knowledge, skills, health, or values in the way they can be separated 
from their financial and physical assets” [Becker, 1992 n.p.] 
Many studies in the field of human capital have concluded that education and training are 
the two most important investment areas. Research in the USA and hundreds of other 
industrial and developing countries concluded that education, training and on the job 
training are beneficial for employment, better performance on the job and higher income. 
As soon as it was possible, the Saudi economy began rapidly to invest in education. It is 
the quality of this education and its suitability for the developing economy that we will 
now look at. 
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Education 
Education in Saudi Arabia had a late start. Other than the Hijaz region, where formal 
education was reported in the late 1800’s, most of the other region’s education consisted of 
Quranic teaching and Islamic studies taught by religious scholars. It was estimated in 1965 
that no more than 10 percent of the labour force, close to 1 million people, had completed 
primary education. 
It was in the late 1940’s and the 1950’s that Saudi Arabia had the real funds to start 
building schools. Girls’ schools followed nearly 20 years later. Saudi Arabia resorted to 
importing the curriculum from other neighbouring Muslim countries such as Egypt, Syria, 
and Lebanon together with teachers from those countries. 
The educational system, except for minor changes and more Islamic additions, was not 
customized later to suit the local needs of the Saudi economy and labour market future 
demands. 
Nevertheless, expansion in education continued and by the mid-70’s, the number of 
schools for boys and girls had increased tremendously totalling 8,900 schools for boys, 
4,417 schools for girls with approximately 2 million pupils in total (Al Khatani, 1991). In 
addition, in the 1970’s, thousands of students were sent for higher education to Lebanon, 
Egypt, Europe and the USA. Allocations for education and geographical expansion of 
coverage throughout the Kingdom continued to grow with every fiscal year budget and 
five-year development plan.  
The rapid increase and growth in the educational system was an obvious response to the 
rapidly growing population and was reflected in the fiscal increase of the government’s 
allocations for building schools and universities. 
It is clear that Education in Saudi Arabia has always been a part of a general development 
plan of modernization. The government has also supplied rural areas with at least primary 
and secondary schools.  However, universities were always built in the major cities which 
compounded the population shift from rural areas to the city. 
Therefore 
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fact that the religious influence restricts female educational institutions from offering 
physical education and performing arts. 
The Saudi educational system is further criticized because career planning is not an 
integral part of education. Realistically, this could be responsible for many Saudis 
graduating from high schools and universities unaware of what is available to them in 
terms of employment, and for lacking the practical knowledge that may be helpful in 
empowering them to meet the demands of the labour market. Fieldwork conducted for this 
thesis (see chapter six) suggests masses of university students graduate in specialties that 
are not in demand by the labour market and end up accepting jobs in other areas, 
frequently at a lower salary grade. Figure 2:8 above illustrates the imbalance between 
science and technology and the humanities  
Finally, the Saudi Educational system is criticized for lack of realism in the way the 
government attempts to develop and promote an effective work ethic (Cordesman, 1997b).  
Inspite of the present expansion in schools, universities and vocational institutes, it is 
questionable whether the Kingdom can make a real, radical move towards a qualitative 
improvement in the Saudi education system given the current Saudi socio-political context 
(as described in chapter one) Such qualitative improvement of education is not as simple as 
the quantitative provision of schools and educational bodies especially in a traditional 
country.  “Change as a process is neither straight forward nor simple”(The Emirates Centre 
for Strategic Studies and Research 1999, p.272-3). 
Conclusion 
This chapter was dedicated to the Saudi modern labour market. The chapter started with an 
overview of the Saudi economy. The roles of oil and its related industries as well as the 
other underdeveloped sectors of the economy such as agriculture and fishery were 
presented in relation to their contribution to Saudi GDP and employment rates. The chapter 
described the quantum leap the Saudi economy underwent due to the oil boom of the 
1970’s and the speed with which it has had to adapt to economic change. This rapid growth 
of the economy in the absence of other developed industries forced Saudi Arabia into 
becoming dependent on the oil exports as the main source of income. Saudi Arabia’s high 
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birth rate and the increasing realization that a future had to be found for the increasingly 
youthful population obliged the government to invest in patriarchal trickle-down 
government structure that put no real pressure on young Saudis to participate in the 
economy. There was sufficient wealth to import cheap far eastern labour for menial and 
domestic work, much of what was needed to survive was subsidized and life was relatively 
easy. The building of the infrastructure, educational system, health care, ports and utilities 
needed expertise, professionals and non-skilled labour. Saudi Arabia as a country imported 
millions of expatriates to fill the gap in human resources. 
Over the thirty years 1970’s and 1990’s the expatriate workforce measured to three fold its 
indigenous workforce. Meanwhile, the country experienced a long period of unexpected 
growth in population. By the late 1990’s unemployment among Saudi nationals was as 
high as 13 per cent with a drastic drop of the country’s GDP and a concomitant inability to 
extend welfare advantages as it did between 1975 and 1983. 
It might be possible to summarise four basic reasons to explain the apparent contradiction 
of an immensely rich economy having high unemployment rates. 
1: The Saudi Labour market never had the time needed for a gradual transformation in 
order to build the required skills and work ethic amongst its population.  
2:  The suddenness of oil revenues (highly technical but not labour intensive), led to near 
immediate reliance on imported labour on all skill levels as the indigenous population 
lacked key skills.  
3:  In addition, the Saudi educational system and development plans were not tuned to the 
changing needs of the labour market. Thus, graduates of different levels of education 
enter the market unprepared for the jobs available and struggled to perform at the same 
level as their expatriate counterparts.  
4:  Last, social and religious barriers face Saudis in making career choices that are different 
from the norm (i.e. non-traditional) limiting their options of finding jobs.  
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The Saudi Government’s concern over the rising rates of unemployment has led to it 
taking several steps to re-evaluate some of its existing policies to reduce unemployment 
and create new jobs. Plans to diversify reliance away from oil developing other industries, 
privatizing of public companies and inviting foreign investments are some of the discussed 
efforts. However, the most prominent initiative to reduce unemployment among nationals 
has been since the late 1990’s: Saudization. Chapter four will provide a full description of 
this process before moving to explain, supported by the fieldwork conducted for this thesis, 
why the policy makers engineered this concept and how they hope it will achieve its key 
goal of reducing unemployment among Saudis. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
Introduction 
The main aims of this thesis have changed over the course of research and evolved to best 
serve a wider perspective of the Saudi unemployment scene and what is being done to 
rectify the situation. The researcher started with the intent to study the Saudi unique 
unemployment situation with emphasis on the work ethic, or the lack of it, generally 
believed to be the cause of young Saudi’s high unemployment figures. Additional interest 
intended to study the effects of the oil boom of the 1970’s transforming the entire economy 
of Saudi Arabia in a relatively short period of time beyond the capacity of both the 
government institutions and the Saudi people to adapt sufficiently to the new demands of 
that new economy. That rapid socio economic leap is often blamed for disturbing an 
otherwise traditional transformation of work culture (over a much longer period of time) 
thus affecting Saudis work culture and economic expectations.  
As the initial phase of research unravelled, the researcher became increasingly convinced 
that producing an academically thorough study of the Saudi labour market would not be 
complete without looking at the policy of Saudization designed by the government to solve 
the problem of rising unemployment figures. Further more, it became important for the 
study to look closely at not just the policy as intended for a primary solution but also to 
present a realistic and unbiased account of all the stakeholders involved in the execution of 
such a policy. 
The main aims of this thesis, then evolved to investigate the complexities of the process of 
Saudization, and examine whether this approach has the potential to reduce levels of 
unemployment among the indigenous Saudi population. While it may be possible to 
increase the opportunities open to Saudi citizens by removing migrant labour through new 
visa restrictions, it is not clear that the indigenous population have the skills necessary to 
fill such vacancies, nor is it clear that an effective training infrastructure is in place. 
Moreover, employers may be reluctant to change their hiring practices and may respond to 
the new policy environment by trimming their business activities, while indigenous 
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workers may have little appetite to play a more active role in the labour market. This 
became even more essential for most existing literature on Saudization as a policy 
targeting unemployment tends to be heavily biased towards a government perspective and, 
generally speaking, praises government policies, even when they are obviously failing to 
deliver.  
Methods and Scope 
To provide the necessary supporting data for the argument defended in this research labour 
market statistics, unemployment records and related available material were collected from 
a variety of sources, including discussions with academics in relevant fields, searching in 
King Abdulaziz University library and JCCI database, the Manpower Council, and the 
archives of both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Labour. All published 
materials on the subject of Saudization throughout the period 2004 - Dec 2008 were 
closely scrutinised, analysed and incorporated into the planning of this research and the 
path of empirical work. The preliminary literature review revealed the severe shortage of 
documentary research on Saudization. This is why we needed to rely heavily on reading 
through the relevant policy literature and designing a plan to acquire empirical data via 
fieldwork. The intent throughout was to be able to present both academic and practical 
research influenced neither by the policy makers nor the private sector. Instead, the 
intention was to analyse the high unemployment phenomenon among young Saudis and 
the views of all stakeholders on Saudization in a holistic manner.  
The majority of the fieldwork was conducted in the city of Jeddah. The city of Jeddah was 
chosen to conduct this research for many reasons. First of all for being very accessible to 
the researcher, secondly, as it represents a rich mix of expatriates and Saudi nationals 
working across all industries, thirdly because of its open working culture. In fact Jeddah, 
being the most liberal city in the kingdom, allowed the researcher to move freely as a 
female in most male dominated work environments and organizations were more 
susceptible to accept granting her interviews. Furthermore, since Jeddah has already leaped 
into a more modern economic structure and had incorporated more of a female workforce 
than any other city in the kingdom, the researcher saw great benefit in studying Jeddah as a 
representation of the Saudi labour market in its most recent stage of development. Finally 
Jeddah was chosen because the researcher is a Board Member of a leading health 
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organization, a board member of the HR Committee at the JCCI, and serves as Deputy of 
the National High Council of Women Employment representing the National Chambers of 
Commerce at the Kingdom level, These factors made it possible to use personal 
connections and a network of contacts to best serve this research. 
Sampling 
To gather the data needed, a variety of qualitative research tools and procedures were 
utilized. The initial sampling was based on random selection of interviews with HR 
managers representing a wide range of industries available for interview and open 
discussion with the researcher. This Exploratory phase with HR managers was 
characterized by open discussions of aspects of employing young Saudis, departing with 
expatriates and the implications of “Saudization” as the proposed solution for the current 
national labour market’s problem on variable national private industries. This phase 
contributed pronouncedly in identifying the path for completing data collection and 
obtaining a 360-degree study. A follow up of evaluating the range of businesses covered 
led to further interviews with HR managers in areas that were crucial to complete the range 
of views on the existing work force in industries that affect the evaluation of young Saudis 
employment because of their specific nature such as education and high tech industries 
which were not covered in the first set of HR interviews. Therefore, although the initial 
selection of interviews was convenient in terms of accessibility and somewhat random, the 
follow up interviews were carefully placed to fill in any area of information and views 
missing that are essential to have a full picture of the labour market. The second phase of 
fieldwork consisted of semi structured interview survey of employers and private 
businesses. The target was to obtain a full representation of the private sector’s different 
industries views of the policy of Saudization at a larger and a more detailed level. The 
selection of industries at this phase served the purpose of how different businesses and 
specialities are being affected by the policy and to what level are they realistically abiding 
by the laws of Saudization and meeting its objectives. The fieldwork then examined the 
workers view of what and how they regard the policy of Saudization and how that affects 
their present and prospective employment. Here we covered a sample of chronically 
unemployed young Saudis, rejects of the job market fair and workers of different skill 
levels of both nationals and expatriates. The last phase of interviews targeted the policy 
makers. The attempt was to discuss the many aspects of the policy’s implications, its 
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targets, methods and how they evaluate the outcome thus far. The interviews sought were 
with government officials in government organizations where they are either part of the 
policy making process or in direct contact with the other stakeholders the employers and 
the employees personifying the day to day different aspects of the policy enforcement. 
Interviews subjects and schedule 
• Eight in depth interviews with HR professionals in private organizations varying in 
speciality and size (for an overview of the situation in practice). Those interviews 
were usually requested via a phone call to brief the HR manager on the nature of 
research and the type of information the researcher is aiming to obtain. This was 
followed by a formal written request through email or fax to the head of the 
organization for approval and an appointment. The interviews were carried out in 
each organization according to date and varied between 90 minutes to a little over 
two hours. Although the areas covered in the interview were mainly the points 
specified in the letter of request, the interviews took an informal path where in the 
interviewees spoke at liberty in the areas of their preference or specific concerns 
more than others. The researcher often asked permission to extend the interview to 
cover points that were not covered so far in the interview.  
This was followed by another round of interviews with 18 representatives of the private 
sector in a variety of industries to further understand the implications of the policy for 
different industries. At this stage, the selection process was well studied to cover the 
different aspects of employment needed by the private sector. Considerations of type of 
business, the size of the organization and its Saudization records were an important aspect 
in the sampling process. These interviews covered areas such as: health care, heavy 
industry, hi-tech industry, retail and food produce, cosmetics and toiletries, hospitality, 
jewellery and gold, limousine and taxi services, and education. Although a structured 
interview was prepared, an unstructured approach was taken which meant that not all 
questions were addressed by each of the subjects. However, some subjects spoke at length 
on topics they were concerned about. In allowing them to speak freely, I was provided with 
a deep account of their point of views on the issue, as well as insights into their 
understanding of different socio-economic aspects of the labour market. In one third of 
those interviews the researcher needed to meet other personnel through the advice of 
70 
 
management because of their specific area of knowledge and experience either in dealing 
directly with new Saudi recruits or their experience in dealing with the Ministry of Labour 
and the application of the quota and visas restrictions aspects of the policy. Those 
interviews were lengthy, interrupted and required diplomacy and tact in extracting the 
information needed from the private business representative with candour unlike what they 
have adapted to with media representatives and government officials to appear compliant 
and politically correct. In many cases an informal approach replaced a formal/structured 
pre planned approach to insure collection of data and covering the areas needed for a 
satisfactory informative interview. In addition several phone interviews were carried out 
with private business representatives and friends in different industries whenever a face-to-
face interview was not feasible to verify new points that emerged during transcribing the 
interviews and analyzing the data collected.  
• To complete the 360 degrees data collection, in-depth interviews with 23 workers 
including both Saudis and expatriates were designed and conducted. The categories 
of manpower covered were to get a clear overview of how Saudis and expatriates 
of all skill levels regarded themselves, their counterpart, the policy (Saudization) 
implications, how the private sector is dealing with the policy on day to day basis 
and their general view of the workforce scene. The selection of Saudi and 
expatriate candidates at the same skill level was difficult because many areas of 
expertise were not available among nationals. The choice then was made according 
to a similar skill level in a close speciality/occupation. Some of the candidates were 
excluded for one of several reasons ranging from their reluctance to speak freely 
after consenting to take part in the research which ethically disqualified them or 
their inability to communicate properly in neither Arabic nor English (this was 
most common at the lowest of skill levels such as builders and genitors from the 
Far East) and other times because the researcher sensed a lack of honesty and an 
exaggerated fear of management. 
• Eight additional in-depth interviews were conducted in collaboration with an HR 
private consultancy, as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility programme, 
with unemployed individuals at different levels of qualification. The candidates 
ages ranged between 23-28 years, university or high diploma certified and share a 
common state of an inability to find employment. The interviews were carefully 
71 
 
researched and designed to put the candidates at ease and to generate a casual 
atmosphere of trust so that they can express themselves with dignity and candour. 
The purpose of those interviews was gathering enough background information on 
the interviewees regarding their family upbringing, support system available to 
them, educational level, and their experience in search for employment as well as 
the duration and what they regard thus far as obstacles facing them in attaining 
successful and lasting employment. Only six out of those eight interviews were 
used as quotes and in analysis for reasons of absence of consistency and coherence 
with the two excluded. Those interviews lasted 60 minutes to two hours each and in 
two of the interviews the researcher accommodated the request of the CSR’s social 
worker to attend because it was also the request of the interviewees and at their 
consent. 
• The research also incorporates the views of a large number of applicants to the Job 
Market Fair conducted periodically at the JCCI. In addition, eight casual interviews 
at the Job Market Fair at JCCI in Jeddah were conducted. In this case, the 
researcher found herself shift from being a regular observer to the Job Market affair 
to a part in an informal conversation among rejects of the third day. The candidates, 
allowed me to participate in their conversation and as I informed them of my 
research causes and how it could benefit from their views, they were enthusiastic 
about continuing the discussion and competed on voicing their opinions about the 
Saudi labour market, the limitations they face and their view on the job market 
fairs. They were assured of their anonymity as they volunteered their contacts for 
future discussions if needed. 
• Face-to-face interviews with five government officials at different levels in Jeddah 
and the capital Riyadh were requested via friends and personal connections, 
followed out by a written brief of the purpose of this research, what is expected of 
the interview, the time needed and a copy of the questions to be addressed. 
Interviews were then carried out according to pre-set schedule to assess the policy 
makers’ views on the situation of unemployment and to help explain their intake on 
the issues raised by the private sector regarding the policy of Saudization. Although 
a formal and structured interview was planned, the researcher needed to follow an 
unstructured approach by changing the order of questions and going back several 
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times to points where the government representative cut short or eluded answering. 
For clarification, although permission was always sought coupled with a written 
sample of the questions to be asked, some government officials were hesitant to 
reply candidly because of the habitual and cultural norms in the Saudi Arabian 
context that discourage discussing or criticizing any government policy. Those 
interviews were generally no more than 90 minutes and were formal in nature. The 
researcher found it especially hard o keep the interview committed to answering all 
the questions either because they elaborated in areas of irrelevance or because the 
government official was trying to evade replying to a specific question. During the 
evaluation and analysis of data gathered, the need arise for some more answers 
from the policy makers (to answer to the points raised by the private sector 
representatives or complete missing public data on the policy). Therefore, five 
additional telephone interviews were made ranging between 5 to 10 minutes and in 
most cases the government official referred the researcher to a published data or 
eventually provided a table or the figures needed by fax. In a few cases, an official 
would continue to ignore the query and would not provide any help. 
- Furthermore  since  the  research  fieldwork  needed  more  information  on  the 
policymakers’ response to some of the private sector and worker’s views, we 
decided to verify those points through consultations with higher authorities in 
government. This entailed travelling to the capital city of Riyadh for a personal 
interview with  the  Deputy Minister  of  Labour  and  as  a  short  interview was 
granted.  The  other  four  interviews  were  carried  out  in  Jeddah  with 
government  officials  including  His Excellency the Mayor of Jeddah, The 
president of the Jeddah Chamber of commerce and Industry (JCCI), The 
representative of the Saudization committee of the JCCI, The HRDF representative 
in Jeddah. Another sixteen phone interviews and queries to different lower ranking 
government officials were needed to produce a comprehensive over view of the 
policy makers. 
While there were inevitably some contradictions between the different perspectives, in 
general each of the perspectives reinforced the other, suggesting a high degree of reliability 
and validating the approaches taken.  
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Figure 3:1 Interviews Conducted for This Research Outline 
Private Sector interviews 
 • 8 in-depth interviews with HR professionals varying in specialty and size of organization. 
- 2 in healthcare, 
- 3 represent industries,  
- 1 in education  
- 1 in Gold retail market  
- 1 marketing firm. 
• 18 Interviews with Private business representatives (face to face and phone interviews), in 
the areas of: 
- Health care 
- Heavy industry 
- Hi-tech industry 
- Retail 
- Food produce 
- Cosmetics and toiletries 
- Hospitality 
- jewellery and gold 
- Limousine taxi services 
- Education 
Workers interviews (Saudi/ Non Saudi):  
 • 8 casual interviews with rejects in Job Market Fair at JCCI in Jeddah 2007. 
• 8 in-depth interviews with unemployed individuals. 
• Interviews with workers in 23 different categories representing both the Saudi and the 
expatriate’s personnel at all skill levels. 
Policy Makers Interviews: 
 • Personnel Interviews with: 
- The Deputy Minister of Labour 
- His Excellency the Mayor of Jeddah 
- The president of the Jeddah Chamber of commerce and Industry (JCCI) 
- The representative of the Saudization committee of the JCCI. 
- The HRDF representative in Jeddah. 
• Several  (amounting to 16) phone interviews were carried out with governmental officials. 
 
Analysis of Data: 
This research relied on especially designed qualitative interviews and was not limited for 
time or financial constraints. Therefore, the analysis of the data arriving from three 
different groups of interviewees coupled with an extended review of all published 
literature on the subject was not a straightforward task. After consulting with several 
academics in King Abdul Aziz University and my supervisors, I was comfortable with my 
intended approach. All transcripts were studied carefully to highlight the areas crucial for 
the analysis. Sensitive and ethical grouping of views of all-important points were recorded 
and I re-evaluated the validity and accuracy of my findings. Analysis were then completed 
and double-checked with the list of initial grouping as a method of verification   
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Ethical Considerations 
Approval and permission of the Glasgow University Ethics committee were sought and 
granted before any of the fieldwork process started and their guidelines were followed 
throughout the research process. A climate of respect to human dignity and right to privacy 
was guarded closely and the researcher made every participant aware of his right to 
privacy as well as ensuring that data was protected at all times. Furthermore, whenever 
questions broached an issue of cultural sensitivity, the researcher reminded interviewees of 
their rights and her ethical obligation towards them. 
While recruiting participants, the researcher took the time to explain the purpose of the 
interview and informed each participant of his/her right to withdraw at anytime. In the case 
of a group discussion with part of the job market fair rejects, the researcher informed them 
after a long discussion of her background and the reasons for the research. They were 
enthusiastic and decided to consent provided their identities were not revealed. To further 
ensure confidentiality and accuracy, the researcher herself translated all the transcripts. 
As mentioned, this study was submitted to, and approved by, the Ethics Committee of the 
University of Glasgow. Guidelines for recruiting subjects, storing of data and maintaining 
the confidentiality and right of the subject to withdraw at anytime were maintained. In 
particular, confidentiality of participants was a priority to assure them that there was no 
connection to any agency through which the interviews had been arranged or the 
possibility of commercial gain by a third party. 
In conclusion, the subject of Saudization is a sensitive issue to all stakeholders: the policy 
makers, the private sector representatives and the workers themselves. Gathering the 
information required was never a straightforward process and it required tact and 
resourcefulness. Government officials are reluctant to discuss the policy especially in 
terms of its shortcomings or the possibility of its modification for better results. Staff in the 
private sector has learned not to express an honest opinion given the fact it is politically 
incorrect at present to criticize Saudization. Disclosure of their views and accurate 
numbers (regarding quotas enforced by the policy of Saudization) of Saudi workers, is a 
concern for realistically this puts them in a critical position with the labour Office, 
jeopardizes their future dealings with the Ministry of Labour when obtaining visas and 
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might even lead to hefty financial fines.  The workers on the other hand have cultural and 
social inhibitions regarding their reality as unemployed. Saudis are not generally open to 
expressing personal views or trusting especially when discussing sensitive issues such as 
an inability to find employment, better qualify or criticizing government initiatives and 
policies. The process of this research certainly points out to the benefits expected from the 
Saudi government encouraging future research of the Saudi Labour market and disclosing 
findings to the public, academics and the society to promote insight and enhance honest 
participation of all stakeholders involved. Furthermore, this research process invites better 
transparency and accessibility to government statistics (via all media and government 
websites) to enable both economists and academics to contribute with their research to 
improve the current and future of the Saudi labour market. The field research was 
restricted by the reluctance of a few senior officials in the Ministry of Labour to grant an 
interview for this research. In Saudi Arabia, officials are often worried about being 
questioned since they may end up losing their positions if they reveal their personal views 
as opposed to that of policymakers. In many interviews with representatives of the 
government or policymakers, the interviewee was willing to share valuable information on 
policy application, its limitations and how it might be improved upon: however, only off 
the record. In other cases, they were happy to voice their opinion candidly provided their 
entire title and name was anonymised. Every participant was then consulted on the 
transcript of his interview and consented to the quotes intended for use in this thesis. 
Again, where requested and agreed, the researcher hence respected anonymity where 
names appear in this thesis, they do so with the agreement of the interviewee. Indeed, some 
interviewees were very keen to have their names listed as they wanted to make a public 
statement on a subject that concerned them. In such cases, it would be wrong to deny a 
respondent their ‘voice’. Further limitations severely affected the gathering of accurate 
data about Saudi Arabia’s population figures, unemployment figures, graphs and tables due 
to the relative inaccessibility of government websites and also due to the fact that, even 
when accessed, the contradictory nature of the data provided questioned their reliability. 
 A part of my research, which could have been made easier and more productive, was the 
way I approached my earlier parts of research as in terms of reading, writing, data 
collection and labelling. In my first stages of research I lacked the ability to record data for 
easier retrieval. I believe I would have benefited from learning some research methodology 
and applicable organizational skills prior to starting the DBA. 
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Another area that could have made my research easier perhaps would have been the way I 
went about translating all the interviews transcripts. In retrospect, being a native Arabic 
speaker it might have been better had I transcribed all the material in Arabic and translated 
it later, as it was needed; although translation did mean that my supervisors could assess 
interview quality 
On the other hand the fact that I have come to this DBA from a Social Sciences 
background and having been involved throughout my career to working with people and 
managing human resources, came in very handy. I was alert to all the social and cultural 
aspects of my research as well as being prepared to deal with the wide variety of people 
and situations involved without real difficulty. 
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Chapter Four 
Saudization as a Solution for Unemployment 
The Governmental Perspective 
Introduction 
For reasons alluded to in previous chapters the Saudi government needed a rapid and 
effective solution to the problem of high structural unemployment. The solution they came 
up with was ‘Saudization’. Saudization is essentially the progressive replacement of 
expatriate labour in the kingdom, across all skill levels, with unemployed Saudis. 
Saudization has two main aims: first, to immediately reduce unemployment levels, and 
second to ensure that new indigenous arrivals to the Saudi job market have a coherent 
career/job path available to them. 
The rationale of the Saudi government and its policy makers is clear. Saudization is 
desirable because there are nearly five million jobs currently occupied by expatriates in the 
Saudi workforce and those jobs could theoretically be vacated for unemployed Saudi 
nationals. This rationale is justified by reference the success of similar programmes in the 
Gulf area such as in Oman and the United Arab Emirates, described later in this chapter. 
This chapter aims to describe the process of Saudization in order to better understand why 
the government’s efforts in solving unemployment focuses primarily and aggressively on a 
single solution in the short term, even when this solution has been opposed by some in the 
private sector. Using the slogan Let’s Put the ‘Saudi’ in Saudization the government has 
single-mindedly pursued this as the only realistic solution(Ahmed Al-Omran, Arab News -
22 August 2007).In the chapter I will describe the history of Saudization, the different 
methods applied by the government to enforce it and the barriers it faces despite of its 
being heavily supported and well funded by policy makers. Last and most importantly, 
through primary empirical evidence the chapter aims to shed light on how the Government 
and the policy makers evaluate Saudization. All aspects of the programme, its goals, 
methods, and the problems it faces, if any, will be examined in the context provided by 
fieldwork and data gathered for this thesis. 
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The chapter starts by defining Saudization, and goes on to provide background on Saudi 
Arabia’s plan to build and maintain a labour force of nationals able to sustain the modern 
Saudi labour market. It goes on to describe the policy of Saudization’s objectives and goals 
and the methods used to achieve them before offering a brief evaluation of similar 
programmes in neighbouring Gulf countries. 
This chapter will focus on the Saudi government’s perspective illustrated by fieldwork 
quotes collected via in-depth interviews with authorities in Government positions, up to 
date reviews of articles and decrees as well as information published in local and 
international journals and periodicals. The chapter ends with a short discussion what the 
Saudi government is doing to improve its labour market disequilibrium and a brief 
evaluation of how successful these efforts are likely to be.  
Saudization 
Saudization simply put, is the replacement of the expatriate work force in the Kingdom by 
Saudi nationals. Saudization translates in Arabic as ‘nationalization (as in ‘reclaiming 
ownership’) of the Saudi labour market’. In fact, the case of cultural homogenization 
(Saudization) in the labour force of Saudi Arabia requires that the existing expatriate 
workforce be reduced and then removed thus creating vacancies for indigenous Saudis.  It 
is the government’s immediate means of ensuring that unemployment levels are reduced 
by this replacement and that the economy maintains a healthy cycle of a productive 
national workforce that is active and contributing to wealth generation, and that both the 
indigenous workforce and the Saudi economy profit from reducing the financial remittance 
by expatriates working in the kingdom. 
Although the concept (of building a Saudi pool of qualified labour) is not new and was 
introduced in the first five year plan 1970-1975, it became a priority as of the late 1990s 
when the policy makers faced budget deficits, high rates of unemployment and realized 
that 56% of its rapidly growing population was under the age of 20 (Saudi Arabia 
Information Resources, 2008). Since five million jobs are currently occupied by 
expatriates, the policy makers decided they could and should be made available to 
nationals as an immediate remedy for unemployment. 
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In its first 5-year plan 1970-75 the Government decreed that 75% of workers should be 
Saudis and 51% of total salaries paid should be to Saudi workers in all businesses as a 
target to be met by the end of the plan(Ministry of Economy and Planning – Developments 
Plans). As the Saudi population grew, the government recognized that correcting this 
imbalance would be more difficult than they had first thought. In 1995, the Government of 
Saudi Arabia started an aggressive campaign to increase the number of Saudi nationals in 
both the public and private work forces but with much more emphasis, on the latter as the 
public sector has always achieved satisfactory national employment levels.   
Consequently, the Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000) targeted the creation of nearly 
319,500 jobs for Saudis through the replacement of expatriate workers (Looney, 2004). 
However, instead of a reduction in the foreign workforce, the number of expatriate workers 
in fact grew by 58,400 (Labour Force Survey 2000). The government, realizing that all 
previous five year plans had been ineffective, thus under took more measures such as 
restricting the recruitment of expatriates to some job categories, increasing fees for some 
types of work visas, and setting minimum wages for some job categories in order to 
increase the cost of employing non-Saudi labour. Appendix one contains a table of all jobs 
restricted to non-Saudis under the sixth development plan.    
Six years after the Sixth Development Plan, in 2001, the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs set a new, more realistic, goal of 25 percent Saudization in the private sector for the 
year 2002, a figure consistent with the target set in the seventh Five Year Development 
Plan of (2000-2005) (Looney, 2004). The Plan sought to provide 817,000 jobs for Saudis 
by both creating new job opportunities and by replacing expatriates with Saudi citizens. 
The move was also in line with a government policy which called for increasing Saudi 
manpower in the private sector by five percent annually.  
In January of 2003 the Shura Council began to apply Saudization metrics to companies 
working in the kingdom that are directly owned by Saudi Aramco, as well as those 
implementing Aramco projects. This meant that wider ranges of government-supervised 
contracts are now serving further implementation of Saudization. While this may have 
increased the complexity of foreign competitive bids for oil and gas projects, from the 
Council's perspective, the measures have moved bid selection toward achieving the 
country's national labour force interests (Looney, 2004).  
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In the following year, 2003, the Saudi Labour Ministry ordered the accelerated Saudization 
of 9,771 banking Jobs held by expatriates. In July 2003, the government announced its 
decision to reduce the number of expatriate workers to 20 percent of the total population in 
a decade, in order to increase the availability of jobs for its nationals. This decision also 
stipulated a quota system for foreign nationalities in which any single nationality must not 
exceed 10 percent of the total number of expatriates. Such a system would particularly 
target Asians from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, in addition to Arabs 
from Egypt, Sudan and Syria, all of whose numbers exceed the required 10 percent 
(Looney, 2004). The table below illustrates the numbers of expatriates from different 
countries working in Saudi Arabia in comparison to neighbouring countries in 2006. 
Table 4:1 Expatriate community in Saudi Arabia compared to other Gulf nations 2006. 
 
Source: Ramady 2006 
The targets of Saudization are clear. Saudization aims to reduce unemployment, increase 
the indigenous involvement in active economic roles and sustain the wealth of the country. 
Those aims are intended to revive the labour market and the economy by also reclaiming 
the funds being remitted by nearly 8 million expatriates of all skill levels living currently in 
the Kingdom (Ministry of Economy and Planning, Labour Force Survey, 2008).  
 
Expatriate 
Communities 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE 
Indians 110 262 300 90 1,250 1,000 
Egyptians  271 35 29 1,200 100 
Pakistanis 70 100 70 60 800 400 
Filipinos 25 60  40 500 100 
Yemenis     500  
Sri Lankans  167 25 30 150 125 
Jordanians/ 
Palestinians 
    
40 
 
270 
 
100 
Syrians  95   170  
Indonesians     250  
Sudanese     250  
Kuwaitis     120  
Turks     95  
Iranians  69  20   
Total Expatriate 
Population 
 
242 
 
1,409 
 
614 
 
365 
 
6,000 
 
2,038 
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Saudization in the view of the Saudi policy makers is an economic necessity. Unemployed 
Saudis cost the Saudi economy dearly in many ways. One, the economy loses by having 
invested in social capital without return. Two, the unemployed burden the Government 
welfare system. Three, the expatriate body of the Saudi work force deploys nearly 60 
billion Saudi Riyals annually, which is considered a great loss to the national economy.  
Saudization also represents a developmental necessity. In fact, all possible solutions to the 
Saudi high unemployment problem require short and long term planning for its human 
resources, restructuring of the educational and training product of responsible institutions, 
a change of society’s views, and the creation of more jobs. In other words, it requires the 
Government to commit and demonstrate keenness in proving to its nationals that they are 
more deserving of government attention and action than their counterpart, the expatriates. 
In addition, there is no doubt that the Government considers the cultural homogenization 
of its work force a top social and national security necessity. Social unrest and higher rates 
of crimes are real concerns for a Government dealing with a culture that has always taken 
for granted the notion that the government will provide well paid jobs for them. Providing 
unemployed Saudis with jobs is assumed to reduce the impact of short and long term  
consequences of high rates of unemployment: namely poverty and crime. Crime rates 
amongst the unemployed and social unrest are cause for increasing concern for Saudi 
Arabia internally and, internationally, after the September 11th bombing. In a study done 
by the Council for the Work and Labour in collaboration with the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, it has been reported that 83.92 percent of offenders who were unemployed blamed 
unemployment for their crimes (The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Labour Council, 
1999).  
Saudization, as clearly stated in the seventh developmental (5 year) plan 2000-2004, is 
executed via seven different but complementary policies that vary in aim, time 
expectations and direction (Ministry of Economy and Planning – Seventh Development 
Plan). Below are the seven different strategies with a brief description of their intentions. 
The first policy aims at the replacement of the expatriate labour body and increasing the 
national involvement in the work force. It is made up of a total of nine goals that aim to 
take effect in a specific time frame. The policy makers with regard to various activities and 
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sectors specify a percentage of required Saudi employment per size of organization, 
industries, sectors, indirect employment (sub-contracts) as well as long-term total 
replacement of certain activities in the work force.  
The second policy aims at the restriction of certain jobs and economic activities with a 
time frame varies according to sectors but its general aims are evidently restricting the 
(high volume)retail sector in three years to Saudis only. The policy targets the private 
education sector to increase its present employment of Saudis by 10% and to block current 
and future employment to nationals. Technically oriented jobs like TV satellites and 
assembly, audio sales and office services, custom release of imports and transportation in 
King Khalid Airport in Riyadh were given a 6-month to a year grace period to terminate 
employment of expatriates. Other sectors ordered by this policy to close to expatriates 
were, religious tourism sales and services, sales of farm animals, real estate, air travel 
tourism and cargo industry, used furniture, taxis, transport and distribution, the fresh 
produce market, small sized inner Cartier grocery stores and street markets. Although the 
selection of this particular group of jobs may seem ad hoc, these sectors of the labour 
market were perceived as being the easiest to Saudize quickly.   
The third and the fourth policies of Saudization, focus on human capital development and 
raising the efficiency of Saudis presently involved in the work force or approaching the 
labour market in the future. Both policies are linked to replacing the existing expatriate 
work force with nationals. To aid in the implementation of those policies, several 
programmes came to existence: the HRDF, the Co-organization for Training, the National 
Training and Employment Programme (championed by the late HRH prince Abdulmajeed 
bin Abdulaziz, the Amir of Mecca region), the Public Organization for Employment and 
several private employment firms. 
The fifth policy is aimed at organizational improvement in all bodies involved with the 
labour market and the labour force, specifically by means of modernizing their 
management, unifying databases, simplifying the bureaucracy, and restructuring and 
harmonizing laws and regulations concerning the unemployed.  
The sixth policy aims primarily at balancing the gap between the affordable cost of 
imported labour and that of national hire. This policy takes effect via two schemes. The 
83 
 
first reduces the gap in wages between the expatriate and national requirements by 
increasing the minimum wages in certain job groups and within certain sectors for 
nationals but, to date, nothing solid has come out of this attempt. The second scheme 
consists of increasing the imposed fees on expatriate labour imports. 
The last policy of Saudization serves the objective of lessening, then completely 
eliminating, the presence of all illegal workers in the Kingdom. The researcher confirms 
that although this policy may appear to be unimportant because of the low calibre of jobs 
currently occupied by those illegal expatiates, it is in reality a matter of national security. A 
straightforward justification is the fact that nationals will not consider replacing those 
illegal workers who work mainly in menial jobs. Nationals do, not desire the range of 
economic activities occupied by illegal immigrants, as it is domestic and labouring in 
nature. Illegal labourers are paid modest wages and often mistreated or unpaid without 
rights or access to the law. Illegal immigrants are usually those that enter the Kingdom 
through a visa restricted to three months to perform religious duties but they remain in the 
kingdom past their entry visa expiry and tend to exist on low paid unregistered jobs for an 
unlimited time. Their existence (many with wives and children) without the ability to be 
registered with the government and the labour force allows them to engage in any mean to 
generate a living (if they fail to find work underground) living in unsanitary conditions and 
receiving no medical care or education. Those illegal unregistered expatriates do, however, 
threaten the kingdom’s national security and find means to survive by all sorts of illegal 
activities that range from begging in the streets to drug trafficking. (The Protection Project, 
Human Rights Report – Saudi Arabia, 2009). 
Overall, the Saudization plan is mainly enforced via three methods. The first is the quota 
system. The second is tightening or restricting issuing visas for certain jobs while 
increasing their cost (i.e. the cost to employers of employing expatriates), and finally the 
complete closure of listed occupations across sectors and the complete closure of certain 
sectors to expatriates. 
The quota system is designed to ensure that employees in the private sector increase their 
percentages of Saudi Nationals yearly and retain the nationals on board. 
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The second method of Saudization enforcement is the scrutiny and ban of visas to 
expatriates. The philosophy behind this method is straightforward. The government 
assumes that if expatriates are less available and accessible to the private sector, it will be 
forced to depend on and train nationals to fill its labour needs. 
As for the third method of enforcing Saudization, it can be summarized as applying strict 
laws of closure per occupation and sector. Occupations closed to expatriates have 
expanded over the years and continue to do so. They are embodied in the Council of 
Ministers’ decree # 50 which sets an annual increase of 5% of Saudis (hired and retained) 
per any organization employing 20 persons or more adjustable according to availability 
and demand, and which also limits specific occupations to nationals. Those occupations 
named in decree 50 are personnel officers, receptionists, inter- Governmental affairs 
liaison officers Muageb, cashiers, security guards, operators, procurement officers, public 
relations officers, postmen, tourist guides and several retail jobs. (See Appendix I for 
detailed listing of jobs restricted to nationals). More information about the methods of 
application is detailed as part of the empirical part of this chapter, as well as in chapter five 
and six that represents the private sector and the worker’s perspectives on Saudization. 
Since the early 1990s, Saudization regulations have been enforced by high-level agencies. 
The Council of Ministers is involved in dealing with the issues of Saudization in 
presenting decrees and drawing up policies and is the highest authority in this process. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, in collaboration with the Workforce Council, is considered the 
most powerful entity dealing with the issue of Saudization, having issued more than half 
the decisions and decrees concerning Saudization over the past 13 years. The Ministry of 
Labour’s role is supporting the plan through monitoring to verify compliance and 
modification of laws as of 2006. The Labour Office licenses career centres that receive 
requests for employment as well as monitoring performance quality. Among the Regional 
Governorships, the governors of Riyadh, Medina and Mecca are some of the most active in 
terms of Saudization programmes. In addition to these five agencies, other entities 
contribute to the process of Saudization, like the High Council for Nationalization of Jobs 
and Saudization committees in the Chambers of Commerce and Industry nationwide. It is 
worth mentioning the role of the Human Resources Fund for Development. The HRDF, 
founded in 2000, aims to grant subsidies for the rehabilitation and qualification of national 
manpower by sponsoring and bearing all costs for training in the private sector. It 
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represents the Government’s answer to the private sector’s complaints of poor 
qualifications and the lack of preparation of Saudi graduates for the labour market as well 
as the private sector’s inability to carry the financial burden of training. The HRDF 
currently reimburses part of the wages paid to aid the private sector in dealing with this 
training cost: this is necessary given the high turnover among nationals even while 
training.  
It should be noted that other countries in the region have commenced programmes similar 
to Saudization. These plans, however, would appear to have avoided many of the problems 
that Saudization has encountered. The motives behind these programmes varies from 
political/ national security concerns as in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) Ibdaa 
programme part of their Emartaization endeavour, to dealing with rising unemployment 
figures as in the Omani example.  
Eighty per cent of the UAE’s population are expatriates, according to the CIA World Fact 
Book, (2008). Considering a high foreign presence, yet acknowledging the economic need 
for their being there, the UAE has launched programmes that incorporates the efforts of the 
Ministry of Presidential Affairs, in cooperation with Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry and Higher Colleges of Technology (HCT) to design programmes that fill the 
knowledge gap suffered by their national graduates and to re-enter them in jobs in the 
private sector. The strength in this approach is that it is based on the market’s needs and 
maintains an awareness of the areas of shortage in qualifications. The government takes 
full responsibility for the cost, guided by the private sector’s needs, to re-qualify its 
nationals for the present labour market. 
‘Omanization’ was commenced by the government of Oman in 1988 aimed at replacing 
expatriate workers with trained Omani staff. The example of Omanization is interesting 
given how it contrasts with the Saudi policy. Oman’s population is 2,018,074, 73% of 
whom are national and the rest expatriates (Cordesman, 1997b). Oman started suffering 
from rising unemployment in the late 1980s. Faced with this imbalance in their workforce, 
the government drew a clear vision and a set of realistic objectives that were implemented 
almost immediately. In 1993, the time of the first Omani census, more than a quarter of 
those living in Oman were expatriates. Since then, however, through the efforts of 
Omanization, qualified nationals have replaced many expats. Omanization has similar 
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goals to those of Saudization but the design of the policy and methods of enforcement are 
different. The methods used mainly relate to their emphasis on education and training 
while setting realistic differential goals for each  industrial sector and applying a system of 
incentives for the private sector. Moreover, the Sultanate encouraged several universities 
and vocational centres to train Omani workers in the numbers needed to fill the labour 
market’s gap of qualified nationals. Lastly, the Omani experience seems different from 
Saudization in the aspects of issuing policy in tandem with a plan, the policy’s 
acknowledgement of the requirements of the different industries and finally in the reward 
system (part of the policy) that acts as an incentive for the private sector to ensure 
maximum cooperation (Ministry of Information – Sultanate of Oman). 
Table 4:2 shows the Omani targets for increasing the employment of its citizens in 
different occupational groups between 1995 and 2000, while Table 4:3 highlights the 
percentage achieved.  
Table 4:2 Degree of Omanization achieved by labour market sector 1995-2000 
  Percentage of Omanization 
Category  1995 2000 
Specialists/University Graduates 30.6 36.5 
Technicians 45.5 49 
Skilled office Workers 64.8 64.7 
Skilled manual workers 73.3 70.7 
Semi skilled office workers 6.7 7.8 
Semi skilled Manual workers 4.3 51.6 
Other semi skilled and unskilled workers 30.5 51.6 
Total 36 41.6 
Source: (Cordesman, 1997a) 
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Table 4:3 Percentage of achieved per sector Omanization between (1995) and (2000) 
Sector Percentage Achieved 
Finance, Insurance, and real estate  45% 
Transport, Storage and Communication 60 % 
Industrial  35 % 
Hotels and Restaurants 30 % 
Wholesale or Retail Trading  20 % 
Contracting 15 % 
Source: www.gulfindustryonline.com, www.odci.gov/cia/publication/factbook/index.html 
Note: Many of the government ministries have already reached 100% Omanization 
 
The views of Policy Makers 
The preliminary literature review led us to design the work for the empirical aspect of this 
chapter to reflect best Saudi policy makers’ view on Saudization. An important aspect in 
the selection of materials used and interviews selected was to verify how the policy makers 
evaluated Saudization. The interviews targeted two levels of government officials, a high 
level to effectively represent an insight on the government’s view and an intermediate 
level, selected because of their involvement in the day-to-day application of the process 
and because of their direct involvement with both the unemployed and the private sector’s 
representatives. 
Although the policy makers in Saudi Arabia have been actively pursuing plans to increase 
the representation of Saudis in the active workforce, it is evident from figure 4:1 that the 
proportion of non-Saudis in the workforce has continued to grow since the mid 1970’s. 
Figure 4:
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Of course a government official will not admit that the government did not 
foresee the deficiency in its planning. Some high officials will confess they feel 
they did their best, others will blame limitations created by overly fast 
implementation of the policies and maybe a few will note that the plans were 
good but the follow up wasn’t! 
Year after year and development plan after development plan, despite the fact that the 
government put up the resources to build schools, universities and sponsor thousands of 
graduate and post graduate Saudis to study abroad, the gap between the supply and demand 
in the labour market has widened (MENAFN, 25 February 2009).  
The reason for this becomes clearer with a closer look at the time line of the Saudi five-
year plan objectives and their focus on social and human capital investment. This makes it 
clear that serious interest in quality human capital development particularly in reference to 
their role in the labour market has only become evident in the last decade. 
It is only by the mid 1980’s that the government realized, with the fourth development plan 
(1985-1990), the labour market’s imbalance and the urgent need to improve delivery. The 
fourth development plan aimed at reducing the foreign labour force by 600,000 men by 
1990. Unfortunately this target was not achieved and the foreign labour force increased by 
200,000 within that period, even though large numbers of Saudis were hired (Cordesman, 
2002). No concrete progress was achieved under the Saudi Fifth Development Plan (1991-
1995) either, the number of foreign workers employed in Saudi Arabia actually increased 
at the rate of 8 – 10% per year during 1993 - 1994. It is evident here that the influx of 
expatriate labour continued despite efforts to secure a reduction. Two reasons may be 
responsible: one the growing industries were not properly monitoring labour imports in 
accordance with the development plans aims. Second, a gap still existed between supply 
and demand that could not be filled by national workers. 
As a result, the Saudi Sixth Development Plan (1995-1999) called for accelerated 
Saudization. It aimed at replacing expatriates by national workers and creating more than 
660,000 new jobs for the nationals in the private sector. Achievements made under this 
plan were again very limited according to all standards. The research here emphasises two 
points. The first point is that the Saudi economy was witnessing a revival period in which 
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many infrastructure and expansion projects were implemented after the bust of the 1980s. 
During the expansion, the labour market again bounced back into the old habit of labour 
import. The second point is that, even by the six Development plan, the policy of 
Saudization was not coupled with clear plans or set in a logical framework. 
The Saudi Seventh Development Plan (2001-2005) placed a special emphasis on the 
development of human resources and the provision of adequate job opportunities. It 
focused on strengthening the Saudi economy to confront the challenges of the next phase 
of the development process. Thus, it adopted a set of economic policies that fitted into a 
long-term perspective, designed to develop human resources, raise the efficiency of 
manpower, and increase employment through the generation of new jobs and replacement 
of non-Saudi manpower by Saudis. The long-term perspective also involved qualitative 
improvements in state-provided services such as education, health, social, and municipal 
services, as well as expansion in the provision of water, electricity, transportation, and 
telecommunication services with a view to keeping pace with increasing demand. This 
plan placed special emphasis on the privatization programme as the kingdom's strategic 
option for increasing the private sector’s participation in the socio-economic development 
process. By the early 2000s the research confirms a real change as it is in this development 
plan that the government sets clear targets coupled with logistics and assigned 
responsibilities to designated government entities, and introduces measures to apply and 
evaluate outcomes. 
The focus on Saudization and social capital building peaked with the Eighth Development 
Plan (2005 – 2009) which aimed at improving the standards of living and job opportunities 
for Saudis, continuing development in the areas of education and training, and expanding 
the applied sciences and technology sector. In this plan the most important difference from 
all others proceeding is that it identifies the need for education and employment as the 
pivotal link and sets superior goals towards increasing Saudi women’s participation in the 
work force. Indeed, women’s participation in the labour market increased from 5.5% in 
1990 to 10.3% in 2003 (Al Humeid, Saiidah Khadija Bint Khwailed Economic Forum, 
2008). Still, this remains one of the lowest rates in the world, even in comparison to that of 
other Arab and Islamic countries. Figure 4:1, below shows the allocation of female 
workers among the various sectors. The Eight Development Plan targets regarding women 
were also supported by the Royal Decrees 120 and 187 that were issued to permit and 
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the private sector, and the Ministry of Labour has responded by repeatedly lowering or 
postponing quota enforcement. In August 1998, the Government announced that citizens 
had to constitute at least 5 percent of the work force in private sector companies by 
October 1998, a number that, according to a 1995 ministerial decree, should have been 15 
percent.  Despite a crackdown on illegal workers and citizens who employ or house them, 
the programme has continued to fall short of its goal of increasing the Saudi percentage of 
the work force by 5 percent each year (BBC News, 2004).  
The quota system also specifies a minimum number of nationals required per sector and 
profession. In other words, it assumes that certain job categories or sectors are easier to 
Saudize because the skills they require are available among Saudi nationals(because the 
relevant skills are so easy to acquire); for example in the gold industry, fresh produce 
markets and taxis. The quota system, although intended for record keeping and to facilitate 
supervision over how the private sector abides by the laws of Saudization, is the aspect of 
the policy most strongly criticised by the private sector. The Ministry of Labour is 
constantly bombarded by requests for quota reduction and constantly receives complaints 
from the private sector that it is an unrealistic and unjust method of measuring intentions to 
participate in Saudization. When asked repeatedly about the wisdom behind this action and 
the constantly increasing quotas, the Ministry of Labour answered thus: 
We never assumed 100 percent Saudization! I think if we reach 75%, we will 
have succeeded. [Minister of Labour, Al-Riyadh newspaper 2006] 
When the present Minister of Labour, Dr. Gazi Al Quaisbi came to office, Saudization 
laws were tightened and visas to import labour became almost impossible to secure. This 
was not a popular move. As he is serving his second four-year term at present he has 
gained more insight on the reality of the labour market needs and perhaps a better 
understanding of the suffering of the private sector trying to comply with the now even 
tighter laws of Saudization. As a consequence he has altered some of the quotas, given 
more time to struggling sectors and publicly commended private initiatives to Saudize.  
The present Minister, Dr. Al Qusaibi, has added a serious dimension to the 
process of Saudization. Throughout the 1990’s, the process remained on paper 
and was subject to abuse. I think he isn’t actually a believer in the quota 
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system; he kept it but adjusted it and created the shared programme and the 
HRDF. [Jeddah’s CEO of JCCI, March 2008].5 
The Minister in turn has made several adjustments, to the quota system between 2006 and 
the present (2009).  
Saudization was reduced in his time and don’t forget he tied it up with a plan. 
Companies that produced decent figures of Saudization coupled with a five-
year plan to further their contribution to Saudization through training and better 
use of human resources departments were granted cooperation from the 
ministry. [Jeddah’s CEO of JCCI, March 2008]. 
The policy makers tend to view the quota system as a tool to compel the private sector to 
participate in Saudization; it is used to ration work visas pending proof of compliance and 
bars the renewal of existing contracts. Failure to abide by the percentage of Saudization 
implemented per profession or sector at present is punished with heavy fines, a ban of 
renewal of working permits, and/or closure.   
As far as the second method is concerned, namely the scrutiny and ban of visas to recruit 
expatriates, it is worth mentioning that the government is aware that the private sector will 
face difficulty replacing and hiring qualified Saudis if they are prevented from recruiting 
from abroad. It is also aware that the cost of hiring nationals is higher than the cost of their 
rivals, the expatriates. However, the government apparently believes that HRDF will deal 
with the hiring cost issue and would also appear to believe that in the future Saudis will be 
better qualified and more prepared to meet the labour market’s demands than they have 
been in the past. The argument the government posits is valid insofar as it acknowledges 
the shortage of skilled Saudis. However the Saudi government is very clear in stating their 
belief that the real cause of unemployment is the expatriate community. As one official put 
it: 
 
5 Although in many countries the CEO of a Chamber of Commerce would be considered to 
be a representative of employers rather than government, in SA the Chamber of Commerce 
can be regarded as a QUANGO 
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If recruitment of foreign workers were put on hold for six months, not a single 
Saudi would remain jobless/ [Minister of Labour Al-Qusaibi’s 7th National 
Dialogue in Buraidah April 2008 on Saudization].  
The Minister of Labour has consistently referred to the expatriate work force as “…the 
flood that is behind the increasing unemployment among Saudis”. Moreover the 
government has gone on to argue: 
In the 1970’s the foreign work force constituted 15 % of the work force, but 
within a decade, the Saudi labour market received millions of expatriate 
workers causing this abnormal and significantly imbalanced work force. In the 
last four years 2002-2006, Saudi Arabia has imported nearly a million workers 
annually. Our statistics show that today, Saudis constitute only 15 % of the 
work force in organizations of 30 employees and only 3% in organizations of 
20 employees and less. [The Alyoum Newspaper, 09/01/2006 issue # 11896]. 
The intentions of the Ministry of Labour are clear on the matter of depriving the private 
sector of expatriate recruitment by making it unaffordable. The policy makers see no 
reason to justify their decision. They believe that Saudization is, as a policy, failing 
because there is unfair competition to the nationals from expatriates and that restricting, 
then banning visas to expatriate labour is the logical thing to do. Meanwhile, the present 
Minister of Labour repeatedly promised that this would happen gradually so it would not 
affect the economy, and that given enough warning, the private sector would be able to 
‘take up the slack’ in terms of employment for Saudi nationals. The ministry also 
acknowledges that the policy of reducing and tightening foreign labour recruitment goes 
hand in hand with real and effective training for Saudis to increase their skills and 
standards to promote growth and create new jobs for newcomers to the labour market each 
year. In depth interviews conducted in 2008 with Government officials echo a deeper 
understanding on their part of the need to employ, qualify and hire nationals to raise their 
efficiency and better their qualifications instead of just hiring nationals by replacing 
expatriates. 
I don’t like the term ‘Saudization’. I need to think of it as the necessity to 
create jobs for Saudis on one hand and the need to not allow expatriates from 
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all over the world, to compete with Saudis in their own land indefinitely and 
without restrictions. Saudis are governed by many social circumstances, and 
for me to expect the nationals to qualify on a global level, produce the best 
quality of work at the lowest cost, compete with those who come from India, 
Bangladesh, Thailand… and give me the same output or else!!! This is his 
country; do you see this happening anywhere in the world? Nobody in the UK 
or the United States is subject to that! [His Excellency, Mayor of Jeddah, July 
2007 personal interview] 
The third method, which is embodied in the law issued on closure in occupations and 
industries, has experienced the same problems in reaching full compliance as the other two 
methods. In the years that followed the issuance of this law, the Ministry of Labour 
witnessed endless actions from the private sector to elude compliance. Even the simplest of 
jobs restricted to nationals, such as security guards, cashiers and receptionists, took nearly 
a decade to Saudize and even then the private sector kept the expatriates as a backup for 
national employees and ‘hid’ them when the labour office came for inspection. It is only in 
the last five years, 2003-2008, that the private sector truly came to accept this limitation on 
their choice of labour pool. The policy makers state that this is due to the fact that the 
private sector had improved at recruiting, and offering better benefits thus retaining the 
quality of nationals required to fulfil its requirement of employment in areas for which 
they are not able to recruit expatriates. 
Think of it this way, if you treat him right and pay him what he can fairly live a 
decent life on, as a Saudi national, he will eventually come through. I don’t 
accept the logic of the businessmen when they claim they can’t find quality 
employees among nationals. [Deputy Minister of Labour personal interview 
2008] 
Complete closure of specific industries to expatriates is the other method used to 
drastically reduce unemployment among Saudis: closing sectors that seem to present fewer 
barriers to transition. Al Riyadh newspaper article issue 14165 referred to this total closure 
of the three sectors by colour. It designated the three main sectors’ closures to expats as 
green Saudization (for the fresh produce market), white Saudization (for the white 
limousine cars for hire) and yellow Saudization (for the Gold retail market). 
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In 2002 the Ministry of Labour issued a law dictating that within the year, the Gold 
market, which is estimated to contribute 15 billion SR to the GDP according to Arab 
News, 22/2/2004, would be 100% Saudized. Privately owned jewellery and gold shops are 
expected to rid themselves of all expatriate workers, mainly Yemenis and Indians, without 
any exceptions, leaving the way open to nationals. The law was postponed for a year to 
take effect on February 1st, 2004. It is worth mentioning that not only did the plan to fully 
Saudize the jewellery and gold market did not include provision for training inexperienced 
Saudi newcomers to the field, but it also ignored the fact that gold and jewellery represent 
two different sectors with different characteristics and needs. 
The Saudization process unjustly combines both the gold and the jewellery 
sectors thus assuming these sectors have the ability to Saudize 25,000 jobs. 
[Leading national gold and jewellery retail and manufacturing business owner]. 
Critique in the press about how this decision would lead to negative results and would 
encourage the black market to flourish were countered by the Deputy General of the 
Manpower Counsel, Abdulwahed Al-Humeid: 
These are merely fears, speculation, bearing in mind that no country is 
unaffected by the black market. [Arab News Sunday February 22, 2004]. 
Saudization enforcement is a mere reflection of the Saudi government‘s keenness to 
expedite employing jobless Saudi nationals. Those factors responsible for impeding 
Saudization from the Government side, this research fieldwork confirms, are related to the 
strategy, speed and cost related to the process of Saudization being enforced since its 
commencement. Policy makers do not necessarily take responsibility for much of what 
hinders the progress of Saudization, at least publicly. However, off the record, many 
government officials are prepared to share their concerns. There are five major points 
worth discussing here.  
Firstly, it is possible to argue that a project of cultural homogenization of the labour force 
across all sectors of such magnitude ought to have been planned decades ago. The mere 
fact that more than half of the work force (more than four million) are currently expatriates 
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is a clear indication that there was little planning concerning the influx of foreign labour in 
the past decades.   
The second impeding factor is related to the seriousness of the programmes’ image and 
how it has been regarded since the early 1980s by the private sector. When the Saudization 
programme started, few national organizations acknowledged its necessity or envisioned it 
as a future reality. The Government launched a few programmes but did not see them 
through or allowed them to die out. 
Yes, there were some early attempts in terms of Saudization. For example the 
Royal Commission and the Ministry of Communication are two early examples 
of positive image setting for Saudization. The latter was successful and 
contributed positively to an achievable Saudization programme. Both had 
funds, and the Ministry of Communication did excellent work in recruiting, 
hiring, training and retaining nationals. However, eventually, both programmes 
were cancelled. [CEO of JCCI 2008] 
The government is criticized evidently for not demonstrating the seriousness of the 
programme. Government organizations such as the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Higher Education have not been effective in paving the way 
for Saudization. Efforts of the Ministry of Planning have also been severely criticized for 
not having coordinated with the other ministries in anticipation of the future labour market 
needs, especially in the light of current population growth projections. The Ministry of 
Labour represented by the Minister Dr. Al Qusaibi and his Deputy Dr. Al Humaied, rarely 
ever speak of this point in the media and was reluctant to grant interviews to answer to 
these particular questions. 
There is also the role of the media. Governed and censored by the Saudi Government, the 
media could have followed a plan of action in order to change Saudi youth’s views about 
work, and even promoted a sense of entrepreneurship and a better work culture. Yet there 
are a couple of privately funded campaigns at present to promote good ethics and practical 
Islamic applications in everyday life. If the government intended the programme to be 
taken seriously in the decade between 1980 and the 1990, massive public awareness 
programmes should have been monitored, closely integrated in all aspects of the school 
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curriculum to bring the public and the private sector closer in order to provide for the 
programme’s implementation.  
The third barrier impeding Saudization is the forcefulness in implementing it, especially in 
the mid 1990’s. By this the researcher refers to all the shortcuts that have been taken by the 
ministry and the HRDF to promote and subsidize mediocre training programmes for the 
more rapidly employable Saudis.  
No, we can’t say we’re happy with the standards or the outcome of many of the 
programmes we sponsored to train the unemployed. It pains me at times the 
limitation we face with local available training institutions and the time it takes 
to approve new better ones. But we approve of the best of what is available and 
continue to support and advise for improvement of standards. [Head of HRDF 
Jeddah] 
The government, in an effort to expedite young unemployed Saudi’s employment, 
accepted and acknowledged low standards of private educational and training facilities that 
might have not been accepted if it hadn’t been for the perceived urgent necessity of 
employing large numbers of jobless Saudis. When asked about the need to place 
unemployed Saudi females onto available private courses in Jeddah and whether or not 
they crossed checked the private sector’s need for these qualifications, the head of the 
programme answered: 
No, but this is what is readily available and it’ll have to do. [Head of the Health 
Care Development Committee, Jeddah, 2006] 
Although the Centre of Vocational and Technical Training is notorious for being slow and 
inefficient in approving new programmes and training proposals, the Ministry of Labour 
and the HRDF felt obliged to sponsor the placement of young unemployed Saudis to earn 
the most basic IT skills and English business technology at standards that will not fulfill 
the private sector’s needs and requirements. This jeopardizes the credibility of the HRDF 
because it is perceived to still carry out training that is below the standards required by the 
private sector. 
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It is up to the public organization for Education to ensure quality. [Deputy 
General to Ministry of Labour when asked to comment on the HRDF funded 
training] 
Due to all the above, especially the shortcoming of the Planning Ministry and the media 
role, Saudization has stalled for social reasons. The Saudization programme’s fourth 
barrier is society’s readiness. The need of young Saudis to gain employment is not coupled 
with a realistic view of the labour market demands of today. The Government’s efforts to 
open more doors to the unemployed are met with the reluctance of some sectors of society 
to accept them. According to Okaz Newspaper, Dr. Al Qusaibi has reduced the quota of 
Saudization enforcement from 30% to 10% in a list of occupations. Those occupations, 
which are all manual and technical in nature, include bakeries, tailoring, ironmongery, 
mechanics, carpentry, farming, poultry, heavy transport, Laundromats, carhops, optical 
shops and pharmacies. When asked the reason for the reduction in quota, the Minister of 
Labour replied: “there is not enough appeal for those jobs among unemployed Saudis”. 
Society’s lack of readiness and inability to modify its expectations and mobilize its youth 
in directions other than what has been the norm for the past forty years is preventing many 
unskilled Saudis from achieving employment in new areas of the job market. 
It puzzles me that I must work hard to persuade a young unqualified Saudi to 
earn a really good living by learning fishery and receiving all he needs to start 
from me, for example, instead of a minimum-paying job of a security guard or 
a driver. [Government official Jeddah] 
Although policy makers are aware that young Saudis are in favour of working for the 
government as opposed to private enterprise, they rarely address the root cause of this 
problem. Instead of addressing the deep-rooted problem of work culture, policy makers 
expect the private sector not only to tolerate and adjust to low standards of performance 
and productivity, but also to become more appealing to newcomers and make more 
attractive offers to them. 
It is a fact, Saudis still insist on working for the government. [Dr. Al Humaied, 
Deputy General of the Ministry of Labour] 
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This same attitude of the government leads them to ignore the different priorities and sense 
of obligation towards the unemployed that government organizations have, as opposed to 
private businesses. 
The Government is like this old man father of all the tribe. Sometimes he’s 
obliged to shelter all and carries the burden of feeding the strong and the weak. 
[Saudi HR consultant describing disguised unemployment in Governmental 
Organizations]  
Another societal barrier to Saudization is that many in Saudi society look down upon 
manual jobs and think of vocational training as a rank below a diploma or a university 
qualification. Furthermore, tradition and social ties hinder the social mobility of many 
young Saudis whose skills may be in demand in distant locations. Family obligations (in 
the sense that young new entrants are expected to remain close to their families specially 
their parents and look after them) frequently prevent mobility.  
Young men today, although suffering unemployment, are reluctant to seek 
good earnings via means that were quite acceptable a generation or two before. 
This is the effect of the boom. [Government official Jeddah] 
When pressed to answer the inevitable question: so what are the policy makers doing 
regarding this point? How are they changing society’s beliefs that hinder mobility and 
development? Some Government officials tend to provide sensible well thought out 
solutions: 
What we need are role models. The media and civil societies should diligently 
and purposefully identify role models, people with role model qualities in their 
area of expertise. We should catch role models doing the right things, point 
them out and celebrate them. [His Excellency the mayor of Jeddah] 
The last barrier to the Government’s efforts to Saudize is the vast gap between the public 
and the private sector’s work conditions and pay. Dr Al Qusaibi acknowledges repeatedly 
the element of cost to Saudization which burdens the private sector and hinders even the 
good intentions of a few. In his struggle to monitor, and increase the cost of importing an 
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expatriate work force, he is trying to lessen the gap in expenses between the (expensive) 
Saudi labour and the imported (less expensive) work force as an impediment to 
Saudization with regard to the private sector. He states:  
The average cost of hiring a Saudi monthly is 3495 RS, while his counterpart 
the expatriate’s average wage is only 1133 RS. Which businessman in his right 
mind will want to pay the higher salary? (Dr Al Qusaibi) 
The gap in working conditions in the public sector and the private sector, especially small 
to medium sized organizations, undoubtedly works to the advantage of the public sector. 
The private sector presents a lifelong career with benefits and retirement pensions that are 
structured and clear. Government officials are well aware of this and continue to support 
all efforts that promise to bridge this gap. 
We can’t continue relying on the government or the large few private 
organizations to absorb the unemployed and create new jobs. It is the middle 
sized and small organizations that are able to do so. This is why, we at the 
JCCI, and in the absence of a supervising entity on small organizations, are 
reaching out to fill this gap. We established logistics that can help provide 
employees of small organizations benefits and a type of insurance policy as 
well providing support to those organizations. [CEO of JCCI] 
Saudi youth in the main still prefer working the shorter hours of the Government. Many 
experts in the area of Human Resource Development expressed their opinion that the 
Government hides a de facto unemployment problem. A newcomer to the labour market 
views the private sector as a difficult, demanding and unrewarding option.  
A summary of why job seekers shy away from the private sector include 
reasons such as not wanting to work two shifts, low pay, going after clerical 
and security positions and never technical and manual positions and last, 
constantly comparing working conditions to the public sector’s. [Head of the 
Labour Office, Jeddah February 2007  
It is worth noting that the sluggish advancement of Saudization in has persuaded the 
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government, to consider other solutions. The policy makers seem to agree on the fact that 
Saudization alone will not suffice as a key solution to unemployment and more long term 
plans need to be developed to generate more jobs and provide better qualification for Saudi 
jobseekers. At this stage, the government’s main focus is to diversify the economy and 
resources away from oil, enhance economic competitiveness by focusing on strategic 
labour intensive industries, especially energy bi-products, and by building new industrial 
cities. In addition the Government is trying to eliminate obstacles to foreign direct 
investments and promoting privatization.  
Privatization, although slow, is also a part of the Saudi Government’s new trend to involve 
the private sector’s initiatives and investments to improve services (previously owned and 
run by the government) and create more jobs. King Fahd’s cabinet called for increased 
privatization to aid in this process (Cordesman, 1997b). Privatization and attracting foreign 
direct investment are both pivotal to the strategy of creating a better market and more jobs.  
It was the sale of 30% of the state telecommunications operator Saudi Telecom at the end 
of 2002 that represented the first big step in the Government's ambitious plans in which 
some 20 major economic sectors will be opened up for private sector participation. To 
date, privatization in the kingdom has remained an ambitious plan with very few steps 
having been taken towards becoming a tangible reality. Several structural points are 
impeding the transparency, logistics and speed needed to see real progress via privatization 
and foreign investment. 
Furthermore, the Saudi government realizes that achieving its ambitious economic goals 
requires a steady flow of technology and expertise into the country. Therefore, its policy is 
to welcome foreign capital and invite it to participate in economic development projects in 
cooperation with Saudi business’ (The Saudi Network, Foreign Investment Policy).  
From a macro point of view, Saudization is seen by many in the private sector as not only 
obstructing their freedom to operate according to the international trend of free markets 
and globalization, but as a policy that is hurting the economy of the kingdom by 
discouraging national investors and by deterring foreign investment’s trust in the system. 
The following graph 4:3 highlights the major inflows of foreign direct investment 
throughou
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and able to solve the problem of high unemployment rates. The government argues that 
Saudization is a key tool and believes that it is an economic solution for unemployment, 
for the present and immediate future Problems of Saudization Waheeb Soofi Al-Watan, 
Arab News, 18 December 2005).  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have explored the implications of the policy of Saudization and, through 
interviews with policy makers, have examined the ways in which they hope this policy will 
prove to be an effective solution to high unemployment rates among the indigenous 
population and looked at the various difficulties they predict. 
The process of culturally homogenizing the work culture, Saudization, is not new to the 
Saudi legislators. It had been mentioned (as a goal) as part of the five-year development 
plans in the 1970’s as a national priority. Somehow, amidst the flow of petrol money, that 
objective was deferred. A similar process has been successfully applied in other Gulf 
countries. However, the Gulf States differ from Saudi Arabia in the density of indigenous 
population, rates of unemployment and, most importantly, their non-restrictive laws 
regarding restructuring education, foreign ownership status and investment. The chapter 
pointed out the areas of strength in two programmes, Omanization and Emiratization. 
The Saudization programme is meant to ensure the reduction of national unemployment. 
Saudi Arabia, contrary to what is perceived by the outside world, has gone through a 
difficult economic time in the mid eighties followed by the costly Gulf War in 1990. 
Coupled with unanticipated population growth, the nation suddenly faced a real economic 
crisis consisting of a large yearly trade deficit and record levels of unemployment. 
Saudization then, as the Saudi government saw it, had to be introduced and put into action, 
if anything, to convince the hundreds of thousands of new graduates who could no longer 
be absorbed into governmental organizations, that they are a priority. 
The process has been enforced via three methods, the quota system, the closure of certain 
occupations and markets to foreign workers, and the restriction of recruitment visas, is 
struggling and proving to be flawed. The policy makers continue to tighten the grip over 
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the private sector insisting that time, patience, readily funded training and some sacrifice 
from the private sector will surely achieve success. 
The chapter also explored the various barriers to Saudization in an attempt to understand 
why such a richly funded and highly supported programme is not fulfilling its goals 
efficiently. One of the most important reasons is the fact that, the policymakers seem to 
unable to appreciate the severe qualification-and-readiness gap young Saudis must bridge 
to satisfy the private sector labour needs.  
And the Saudi educational system continues to produce hundreds of thousands of nationals 
entering into the labour market whilst lacking the skills and the work culture necessary for 
employment in the private sector.  
Saudi society, closed, immobile and afraid of change, is an added barrier to a youthful 
work force learning to change familiar ways and adapt to a new lower level of expectation. 
Add to that the wide gap in pay and in work conditions, it is little wonder that youthful 
Saudis, like the generation that preceded them, hang on to the safety net of government 
employment. As long as most government’s jobs still demand less work, give better 
pensions, offer fuller health insurance, and, most importantly, pay more than the equivalent 
posts in the private sector, many young Saudis will remain unemployed, waiting for a job 
and a salary that the private sector is unwilling to offer. 
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Chapter Five 
Saudization as a Solution for Unemployment:  
the Private Sector Perspective 
Introduction  
Having looked at Saudization from the perspective of policy makers, in this chapter we 
examine the process from the employer’s point of view, with an emphasis on the private 
sector. Considered the main target for the process of solving the increasing numbers of 
unemployed nationals, theprivate sector has found itself in a dilemma. Absorbing large 
numbers of Saudis meant not only leaving behind a way of operating that had worked well 
over the last three decades, it also meant facing grave economic and logistical problems.  
The chapter will begin by describing the way the programme was initially received by 
employers, the stages different private economies had to go through to Saudize their work 
force and where they find themselves today. The private sector’s issues regarding 
Saudization and how they deal with them (in different sectors and levels of personnel) are 
an essential part of this chapter. Furthermore, a description of the barriers different 
representatives of the private sector face while trying to meet the government’s demands 
are listed and supported by fieldwork findings designed to show what is at stake. The 
chapter also highlights successful stories of Saudization and where and why it was 
achieved. Finally, the chapter ends with a few suggestions from the private sector on how 
to improve the process and its outcome based on their experience with Saudization so far. 
In general, the private sector claims to be victimized by the enforcement of Saudization, 
but it is evidently the government’s only solution to the employment problem. Given the 
fact that Saudization currently stands at 30% in government organization and only 8% 
across the many industries of the private sector (Saudi Government Electronic portal, 
2009) it is clear that further radical adjustments are necessary.  
This chapter also aims to demonstrate the complexity of applying the Saudization laws 
from the viewpoint of employers. Unlike similar experiences and programmes in 
neighbouring countries such as Oman and the UAE which encourage increasing national 
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participation in the workforce, keeping the level of expatriate population below set limits 
and encouraging better economic roles for its nationals, Saudi Arabia is attempting to 
achieve something even more difficult; to decrease unemployment per se. This is why, to 
the private sector, replacing the bulk of the expatriate work force with young, 
inexperienced, and at times more expensive national workers who are forced upon them in 
a relatively short period of time by the policy makers is a daunting and complex task. The 
fieldwork shall elaborate on this argument using material gathered through interviews with 
entrepreneurs, businessmen, industrialists and small shop owners across many sectors of 
the Saudi private economy. It shows how employers view Saudization and how they 
manage to abide by its laws in spite of constant complaints and demands for its laws to be 
eased or lifted. 
How is Saudization Viewed by the Private Sector? 
Back in the 1990’s, when the media spoke of Saudization as inevitable and that 
we had to face deporting our expatriates, we joked comparing ourselves to 
Tarik Bin Ziad burning his ships to stop his army running away from fighting 
the Spaniards. [Saudi HR consultant and businessman] 
At present the Saudi private sector is commencing a new era of a mixed work force that 
includes higher numbers of nationals than it did five years ago. And although there are no 
cross sector figures that represent Saudization accomplishment per industry, in depth 
interviews with business owners and HR revealed better adjustment to both the concept of 
Saudization and the numbers of Saudis employed in many areas of private businesses than 
used to be the case 
Initially, the private sector was hit hard by Saudization in the late 1990’s. Interviews with 
businessmen conducted for this thesis revealed that they did not see eye to eye with the 
Government on how Saudization could solve the problem of unemployment. Many said 
that, in their view, policy makers should take into consideration the interests of the private 
sector and not jeopardizing their performance with the creation of seemingly arbitrary 
employment targets for nationals. 
Of course I want to see Saudis rule their national market. What is not right is to 
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poke their eyes with it (the private sector), bankrupt them and then live with 
the consequences of a more disastrous jam than unemployment, a failed 
economy. [Saudi HR, technology retail, Jeddah] 
A number of representatives from the private sector across all industries initially attempted 
to elude the requirements of this newly enforced law. The notion of deporting their reliable 
expatriate work force, and becoming dependant on “inexperienced and spoiled Saudis” 
was a novelty. The private economy of Saudi Arabia struggled for nearly a decade (1990-
2000) before it accepted the idea of having to culturally homogenize their workforce 
(depending primarily on Saudi nationals) but not necessarily applying it. Business owners 
hoped that the Government would not push for Saudization and each sector hoped to be the 
one exempted.  
None of us took it seriously at first. Which Saudi is going to stay on his PC 
until the wee hour of the morning of inventory, the Indian will! [Saudi 
Pharmaceutical chain GM Jeddah] 
Initial reactions to Saudization, then, were simply to ignore it. As growing demand from 
the government continued to build, resistance came and objections were made before the 
private sector finally realized that Saudization was here to stay.  
Many businessmen attempted to evade compliance by means of being connected to some 
higher authority “most often a high Government official or royalty” and by continuously 
presenting proof either that there was no demand for their available positions by nationals 
or else that nationals who applied for positions were under qualified and lacked the 
expertise or the work experience required. Others expressed anger and stated that they 
could not cope with the new reality of Saudization. 
I refuse to go beg his Excellency for visas to recruit skilled people from abroad 
[by] showing documentation of my advertising constantly in local papers for 
Saudi nationals in areas where he is well aware [they] don’t even exist! We’re 
dealing with lives here I need my Filipina nurses. [Saudi Private health care 
facility owner] 
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Many leading individuals considered, and still do, Saudization a curse, a kind of pay back 
for the golden days of the 1970’s, the days of free education and health care and that 
Saudization, would eventually, have negative economic consequences for the private 
sector. Although relatively few expressed this view, it was a significant indicator as to how 
the private sector regarded Saudization as something that impacted negatively on their 
performance and profitability, and thus, their competitiveness. Those who provide products 
or services to governmental, semi governmental, multi-national corporations or joint 
ventures especially expressed this sentiment. The reason for this was that being fully 
governmental, semi governmental or a large profitable international organization, 
automatically meant that these organisations could afford the cost of Saudization, as will 
be demonstrated later on in this chapter.  
Every time King Faisal’s Hospital is in financial trouble, the Government steps 
in and generously funds it, they can obviously pay better on all levels and 
tempt the few good Saudis with much higher pay than any private hospital can. 
[Saudi CEO Private Hospital Jeddah] 
Many in the private sector claim that they don’t have the capacity to deal with the poorly 
qualified products of the Saudi educational system. Fieldwork interviews conducted with 
managers and HR in different industries especially in the service industries portrayed their 
struggle with the new Saudi employees who are lacking many hard and soft skills. They 
went on to elaborate on their daily efforts in trying to help them acquire those skills to 
better their performance which costs time, money and can lead to friction between 
management and new Saudi recruits. 
Assuming I could train them on policy and procedure as well as how to use the 
computer, how am I supposed to teach them how to behave with patients and 
lend themselves to think and communicate appropriately for the work place. 
Manners, oh talk about manners! [Lebanese medical director, private hospital, 
Jeddah] 
Leading private sector organizations and individuals are divided over their ability to train 
and rehabilitate more nationals from a cost, knowledge and feasibility point of view. They 
say that, although it is a situation that requires a sense of civic duty, they feel they are 
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unable to sacrifice profitability. They add that the transitional period of training and high 
turnover of the newly employed Saudis certainly constitutes a loss of effectiveness, 
productivity and their competitive edge in an already very competitive market. 
So often in a private organization you’re paying two salaries for one position.  
The Government competitor can afford to pay better. They are subsidized.  If 
you are talking about a private health organization there’s a provider and a 
recipient.  You have to run it like a business. Or else I’ll put my money in a 
bank and get the interest, headache free. [Saudi consultant surgeon]  
Different representatives of the private sector echoed their struggle trying to abide by the 
laws of Saudization and serving its objectives of hiring nationals while they are trying to 
adjust to this situation that they describe as structurally difficult, subject to trial and error, 
costly and time consuming. The Ministry of labour adds insult to injury by tightening the 
process of acquiring visas to recruit for positions they are unable to Saudize. The latter 
category includes nurses, skilled technicians, and janitors for example. They go on to give 
details on how this hurts their performance at a time when they are already stressed as an 
economy to deal with the new hire of inexperienced nationals who are making the 
adjustment of upgrading their skills, modifying the work environment to better suit them 
and the extra pay needed to satisfy them. 
It is complicated, if the Ministry of Labour bans the private healthcare 
providers from getting visas, they will get their Filipina and Bengali nurses to 
work extra long hours. Consequently, the quality of service will deteriorate. 
[Saudi physician expressing the view of the private health sector]  
Many of the leading businessmen interviewed displayed a better regard for Saudization 
today than they did a few years ago. This is possibly because of the time factor that has 
allowed them to adjust to the idea, negotiate better with the Ministry of Labour on more 
realistic quotas, get training reimbursement from the HRDF and improve their ability to 
recruit and deal with the increasing Saudi body in their organization.  
We have changed but young Saudis have too during the past 10 years. Because 
so many are unemployed, they know they had better perform well or else! 
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[Saudi HR, marketing organization] 
Another factor contributing to the private sector’s better adaptation to Saudization, is the 
evident improvement of the image of some young Saudis who persisted in spite of low 
starting wages, and proved their worth.  It is evidently a case of trial and error by many 
private organizations before they could achieve a successful formula for recruiting, 
particularly since, until recently, Human Resources Departments were relatively 
uncommon. 
At first, we recruited bachelor degree holders aiming at getting better quality 
employees to start with. Time taught us, we needed to seek high school 
graduates and invest in training them. Their level of expectation is more 
manageable and they can feel the progress in their career better. [Jordanian 
Furniture chain store HR, manager] 
However, at present, the Saudi private sector still views Saudization with great scepticism. 
I believe eventually Saudis must take their right place in their own country but 
you can’t imagine the time and patience it took us to get to the better ones and 
get better at it. [Saudi HR, major chain of health care facilities] 
Based on logic and information from a 2004 published book by Dr. Al-Humeid, the 
present Secretary General of Ministry of Labour, research was carried out, through 
qualitative, informal face-to-face and tele-communication interviews, to explore the 
difficulties claimed by many representatives of different industries in adapting their 
specific sector’s needs to Saudization. The medical sector repeatedly insists that medical 
technology and a hospital environment are too critical to oblige any needs other than the 
lives of patients they care for.  
Our core business is unlike any other. We deal with human lives! Nursing and 
technical work, long shifts, dealing with cranky patients and delicate high-tech 
equipment. These are qualities not available in Saudis. My patient comes first. 
[Saudi Hospital manager] 
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Hotel and restaurant industries had their share of wanting exemption. Their field demands 
courtesy and service-oriented staff, not qualities Saudis are famous for. In a discussion 
with a five star hotel food and beverage manageress from the Lebanon I suggested that 
Saudis are hospitable by nature and asked her if this taken as a given when hiring Saudis? 
Her reply was:  
Actually, Saudis are hospitable when you visit them at home. This is a 
generalization that doesn’t apply so easily when speaking of them as part of 
your manpower. I’m usually looking at high school graduates who struggle 
with doing extra hours, have difficulty being there on time and can’t speak 
much English. Not only that, they sometimes come with an attitude problem 
and make training them just that much more unpleasant. My guests are mainly 
businessmen who need quick, efficient service and an ability to communicate. I 
can’t find that readily among Saudis I’ve hired (Lebanese manageress) 
These complaints are said to deter this industry from hiring nationals. Interviews with HR 
and hotel chain owners alike proved the difficulty they encounter to not only design 
programmes to train for this particular aspect of service but to retain the Saudi trainee after 
such an investment. 
Our last attempt to increase Saudization in our hotel allowed us to fully train 
10 young men and 20 young women. We managed to retain only 12 of the girls 
and 3 of the boys. I don’t think that is a satisfactory result. [Saudi HR, four-star 
hotel, Jeddah] 
The list goes on: Saudi youth can’t put up with long working hours, are only suited to sit in 
air-conditioned offices, can only handle prestigious jobs and last, but not least, Saudis 
can’t perform jobs that entail menial labour such as lifting and standing long hours. (Al-
Humeid, 2004) 
Merchants of various commodities claim that their area requires tastefulness and tact in 
dealing with customers, qualities unavailable in Saudi youth, unexposed to this type of 
service. This type of criticism was more evident and vocalized by private businesses, not 
just those affected by the quota system and the restriction of visas to recruits from abroad, 
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but also in areas that felt increased pressure to hire nationals such as most retail salesmen. 
Many in this predicament described themselves as feeling “squeezed” or even “ strangled” 
to the point where they consider shutting down businesses which have been their source of 
pride and income for generations.  
I’ve resorted to the unusual harder path. After trying endlessly to recruit and 
hire young Saudis to sell and deal with the elites buying what I offer, I ended 
up recruiting a small army of females because they are more tasteful and can 
acquire skills dealing with luxury commodities better than men. Never mind 
that I had to restructure my working hours and allow part time, special 
considerations and higher pay for this calibre of females. Some of the other 
small businesses simply shut down. [Saudi Large jewellery business owner]. 
The private sector view of Saudization is that it represents a handicap to their freedom to 
practice their choice of employees both in quality, number and gender. The latter is evident 
in the quote above. However, although the eighth development plan and Royal decrees in 
2006/8 supported female higher participation in the national workforce, private business 
owners in areas encouraged to hire females still struggle with the religious authorities and 
express dismay that this move is not coupled with enough protective laws for workers nor 
businessmen. 
I can’t afford to do what he did; do you know how many times he had to go to 
Mecca’s Governor to ask for immunity from the mutawaa? All he got was 
verbal assurance! Have you heard about Gazzaz (perfumery, toiletteries and 
home accessories chain)? They dragged his female staff off, nearly 24 of them 
because they didn’t look modest enough. [Saudi owner of female necessities 
retail Jeddah] 
Private Sector’s view on Saudization Objectives 
Interviews with businessmen and industrialists for our research portrayed a strong lack of 
belief in the objective of Saudization as a solution for unemployment. A list of issues and 
concerns were and still are vocalized by the private sector in regard to Saudization 
objectives. They feel that the responsibility government is expecting them to take in 
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solving unemployment conflicts with the laws of free market, with their profitability and 
also affects their competitive edge in the rapidly globalizing business world.  
It is simply not enough! The laws are merely one part of the equation. Since 
when do governments tell the business world whom to employ? Soon the WTO 
laws will be all over the kingdom, then what? How will they stop international 
organizations from importing higher calibre labour? It is such a scam! [Saudi 
HR consultant Jeddah] 
This logic is fortified with the argument that Saudis who really wish to attain certain types 
of jobs can still achieve this by getting qualified and demonstrating excellence. Another 
underlying argument is the fact that their labour needs tend to be filled with expatriates not 
only for reasons of cost (an expatriate employee is much cheaper than a national) but also 
in terms of the quality they bring to the job.  
These Saudization laws are blind! Even before the boom, carpenters, 
fishermen, builders and domestic staff to those who can afford them were 
expatriates: Indians, Yemenis and Egyptians. How come we now assume that 
we can get Saudis to do those jobs?[Saudi owner of a grocery store] 
The private sector seems to understand the economic need to involve Saudis in their 
economy and put a lid on remittance by foreigners to their countries, but they raise 
concerns that this objective of Saudization will not necessarily produce large economic 
benefits for two reasons. One, in a situation where the Saudi is to be employed instead of 
an efficient expatriate where he may need to be supported by another Saudi to do the same 
job, that is an economic loss. Two, although the expatriates transfer most of their earnings 
abroad, the fact is that their presence in the country enriches Saudi standards of 
performance and helps the Saudi economy.  
It’s simple, we benefit from them. Actually we benefit from their need. I don’t 
have enough nurses? Well, I go and get Filipina nurses. And I’m talking here about 
maintaining international standards. In teaching, the foreigner is better than the 
Saudi. The Saudi is lazy and she doesn’t even do the legwork before she teaches. 
However, Egyptians and Lebanese are very good teachers. She, as an expatriate 
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teacher, is talented, instigates, pushes us to learn more and go to the library. A 
Saudi teacher will not do that. Why would I not benefit from someone who is 
better at whatever? [Saudi executive administrator, Jeddah] 
Last, the private sector objects to the objective of forcing Saudis into the private sector at 
the same ratio, disregarding the different needs of the varied industries and services 
involved.   
The research findings show that the private business’s opinion of Saudization’s objectives 
is generally negative, and this is supported by discussions with business owners and 
managers in high positions in the private sector. The research also shows that although a 
good percentage of private businesses have accepted some of the Saudization objectives, 
because of the initial reaction to Saudization and a sense of insecurity in relying on 
nationals expatriates continue to be recruited as a safety net “in case the Saudi doesn’t 
deliver”. Furthermore, the fact that both the expatriate and the national are aware of this 
point weakens the core objective of Saudization; relying on Saudis instead of expats. 
You see, sometimes I think the Ministry of Labour knows very little. Ask me, I 
established the HR department here thirteen years ago. The day many Saudis 
come on time, accept taking orders from superiors and get the job done right, is 
still a decade away. The private sector will fight for expatiates hard and long). 
[Egyptian HR manager, private hospital, Jeddah] 
The most important reason for this stand is that the private sector still doubts young 
Saudi’s abilities to replace the expatriate worker and deliver the same quality performance 
because of the way he is under qualified (skills wise) and because of his lack of a work 
ethic.  
I’m offering the same course for all my staff to learn about expensive 
automation software due to be used fully in the next 6months. Why is it that 
none of my expatriates (who are more technologically savvy in the first place) 
never miss a session and some of my Saudis never even attended once? [Head 
of IT high-tech Industrial Organization] 
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Although most businessmen in the private sector, as mentioned above, admit that 
Saudization is a necessity and a civic duty, they all argue that it is their particular sector 
that should be exempted from the application of the process. All speak in praise of the 
value and importance of Saudization. All speak of national responsibility to employ Saudi 
youth and state that, one day, Saudization will be achieved. Yet, each sector fiercely 
contends that their field is the one and only which should be exempt from Saudization as it 
will suffer more than any other sector from Saudization enforcement. You can Saudize the 
banking industry at almost all levels, for example, but what about other businesses of 
services, medical care, and technical fields, do we have enough Saudis qualified to replace 
expats at the same level? [CEO Holding Company Jeddah] 
Their argument is mainly based on the rationale that the Saudis do not seem to be an 
efficient replacement for expatriates. They blame this inability to meet expat standards on 
the educational standards of the Saudi system and on young Saudis’ poor readiness for 
work and lack of a work ethic.  
In my organization, I take the time to prepare my new Saudi staff on what is 
expected, I offer courses and go as far as modifying the work hours to 
accommodate them. My records show they are more absent from work, they 
come late and they escape any task that may delay their day even for five 
minutes! How frustrating is that? [Saudi HR recruitment agency]. 
They argue that Saudis seem unready and unable to make work their priority over other 
social matters and that there are many social factors that prevent them from fulfilling work 
obligations. 
Although his colleagues the Egyptian and the Palestinian have families too, it 
seems that the Saudi is somehow strangely helpless, always wanting to pick the 
daughters and the wife from school and work himself. I believe he can’t handle 
the idea of a limousine(taxi) driver being alone with his women even briefly. 
[Jordanian HR, furniture retail]. 
None of the human resources managers and business owners argued against the value of 
Saudization in principle, but expressed concerns regarding Saudization as being a long 
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term and difficult process, the fact that they lack the knowledge to deal with it and the fear 
that it is bound to affect their businesses negatively. Basically, they fully understand the 
objectives of Saudization but they tend to reject it in favour of freedom of selection, and 
their own business needs. 
Why doesn’t the Government train them and qualify them well whichever way 
and allow “survival of the fittest” to rule? It shouldn’t be my problem as a 
businessman to search for the good ones among hundreds of thousands. [Saudi 
heavy machinery retail Jeddah] 
Fieldwork for this thesis also confirmed that the private sector suffered because 
Saudization laws were enforced suddenly and did not allow them to develop the expertise 
to select, hire and retain nationals on the job. 
At the beginning, we honestly didn’t know what to do with it [referring to 
Saudization]. We just hired them as they came along and we made lots of 
mistakes. We didn’t even know how to get them so we just accepted those who 
applied by walking in. It was chaotic! [Egyptian HR, private health care] 
As the private sector slowly comes to accept Saudization and comes to believe in its 
objectives, they are becoming aware that they must now deal with their new national 
recruits and accept the new expenses and time factors needed to employ them. 
On Saudization’s Methods  
Many in the private sector argue against the methods being used to enforce and apply 
Saudization. Theoretically, none of the private sector representatives is against the concept 
of culturally homogenizing the work force. However they question the methods by which 
Saudization is being implemented.  
This is a vicious circle, even if they solve the persisting problem of 
unemployed figures, at present, by force, what will they do with the millions to 
come.  [Saudi HR manager, multinational joint venture] 
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They go on to criticize the generalized, sweeping way, in which it was being applied with 
little or no regard to the differing needs of individual types of business. This research is 
able to show how the various representatives of the private sector suffered from the 
inflexibility of Saudization methods. Fieldwork findings demonstrate that, although many 
in the private sector complain about the methods by which Saudization is implemented, it 
is those in specialized and technical fields that had more objections. The reason behind this 
is straightforward. Young Saudis lack specialized skills, and training them is a complex 
process. The private sector specializing in the provision of technical high-order skills 
cannot function if its existing professional expatriate experts are deported by the 
implementation of progressive Saudization laws, let alone banned from recruiting 
foreigners.  
Many business owners complain when interviewed that the quota system of Saudization is 
neither dependable nor efficient and cannot be applied to the entire private sector in the 
same manner. 
Serving this country, setting a good patriotic example on unconditionally 
helping young Saudis to better qualify, training and sponsoring many to study 
abroad at my cost for many years, I deserve more respect from the Government 
than to tell me I’m still below quota of Saudization and I can’t renew work 
permits for my other Arab employees who’ve been with me for 30 years and 
they’re 10 times more reliable. [Saudi General Trade company owner] 
The quota method was severely criticized for its generalized view of the many different 
sectors’ ability to Saudize. The private sector representatives expressed anger at the 
Ministry of Labour for assuming that a quota system should suffice in fulfilling higher 
percentages of Saudization across all specialties and needs. They express frustration at 
having to deal with a system that is not “realistic” when it demands Saudi hires for 
construction work or cleaners for example when it has never been the norm for Saudis to 
take these jobs especially given that most Saudis believe that those occupations are beneath 
them. This view on the quota method was most noticed in interviews with the private 
construction /contracting and services in general. 
This is Saudi culture! Some jobs the Saudis aren’t qualified for or interested in 
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engaging. The quota system is stupid! Go read how many times your Minister 
backed up on decisions regarding the quota then come speak to me. At least 
have the wit to admit it. Some jobs they want, so grill me over the quota there, 
others they simply hate or will take only on a temporary basis [Saudi older 
generation manager, medium size Retail Company]. 
A few nationals in businesses that are technical in nature who have relied on imported 
professional expatriates “who deliver”, were more vocal describing the Governments stern 
laws of Saudization, which are represented in the Ministry of Labour’s actions, “as unfair”, 
“done wrongly” and at times hurting both parties the private sector and the Saudis forced 
upon their businesses. Their point of objection is the visa restriction on new recruitment 
and the way the Ministry of labour forbids the renewal of present expatriate specialists.  
You see, I’m not their parent! It isn’t my job to hold those unemployed by the 
hand, kick my Indian IT guy who has served me hand and foot for 15 years, 
put the Saudi in instead, and keep paying part timers to cover up for his 
shortcomings.  [Saudi medium size, maintenance company owner] 
The ban of visas to recruit seems to be on top of the list of objections on Saudization 
methods particularly in the private medical and high tech industries. Interviews for this 
research, with representatives of those two areas more than any other, uncovered a genuine 
struggle due to their inability to meet a part of their labour demands locally. Every time the 
contract of a specialized expatriate personnel ends, a new threatening reality is born; they 
are simply not allowed to get a replacement and even if they present all the factsit is a time 
consuming task, and chances are they will not be granted the full number of required 
recruits. 
Of course I am for Saudization. All I ask of the ministry of Labour is to 
acknowledge that my business relies on technical people. In my hospital 50% 
of staff are doctors and nurses, 25% are laboratory and high tech medical 
operators and the rest are different types of admin and non-skilled workers. I 
put a huge investment into establishing and running a nursing college which is 
the most difficult aspect to Saudize, when I ask for visas for janitors, a 
category, the Ministry is well aware, Saudis won’t fill these positions, I should 
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get it without any hassle or delays. [Saudi CEO and owner of a private 
hospital] 
The private sector also objects to the various decisions made about which occupations and 
markets are to be completely closed to expatriates. Female necessities sales, many retail 
businesses the gold market, the fresh produce market and the limousine (taxi) businesses, 
come on top of the list of industries complained about. 
Most of those who applied for a sales position were high school graduates who 
come from the suburbs. To them, dealing with fine Swiss cotton and different 
shades of lilac was like speaking Chinese! [Saudi female owner of fine linen 
and accessories boutique] 
The private sector understands the needs of specialized businesses and is accustomed to 
choosing their work force from cultures known for these qualities before the ban of visas to 
recruit as part of Saudization methods. The closure of a certain field to Saudis puts them in 
a hard position where they are forced to select and train for qualities that aren’t easily 
trained for. 
Please don’t be offended! Your people think they are better than anybody and 
every one. In sales, you need sweet, open-minded folks who are willing to 
please the client whether male or female, that is our business. [Lebanese 
chocolatier Jeddah]   
They argue that better assessment of available qualification and qualities among Saudis, 
should be applied by the Ministry of Labour before issuing those bans and assuming that 
the private sector will manage allocating them. 
There are only three female Saudi opticians that I know of. At least let me be 
until there are enough young men and women specialized and I will saudize. 
[Saudi female Optical business owner] 
Another example of this point is the Gold market closure, forcing many private businesses 
in this field attempt to find ways around this law. Their dilemma as they describe it is that 
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yes there may be many unemployed willing to work in this field instead of expatriates but 
are they qualified for it? 
Best described as the sector that requires fineness, taste, social manners and 
alertness to details, we in the gold markets were forced to hire villagers below 
high school certification who did more damage to the image of the trade than 
good. [Leading National Gold and jewellery retail and manufacturing business 
owner]. 
In-depth interviews conducted with decision makers in private corporations have 
confirmed that even those who aren’t nationals and who might directly suffer from the 
process of the replacement of expatriates, agreed in principle to the fact that the rule of 
Saudization is just and necessary to some extent. The reason behind this may be explained 
as a pure representation of the interviewees’ sentiment, but at times, it could also just have 
been what was felt to be the ‘right’ political statement. At present, it is politically incorrect 
for all, especially an expatriate, to criticize, let alone denounce, the process of Saudization 
publicly. Fieldwork interviews confirmed that personnel at management level in areas not 
restricted to Saudis expressed better understanding of the value of Saudization, and were 
consistently more objective in pointing out young Saudis’ areas of deficiency than those 
directly threatened by Saudization. 
You ask me, would I like a foreigner to take up my place in my country while I 
can’t lift up my head from the shame of being unemployed? Of course my 
answer is NO!  [Egyptian, Procurement officer, Pharmaceuticals Jeddah] 
Our company is pro Saudization all the way. I for one know for a fact that it is 
only a matter of time before I leave my position to a national. It is just a matter 
of time. [Lebanese GM retail business] 
The majority of successful wealthy nationals who own sizeable successful businesses 
demonstrated a visible sense of civic duty towards Saudization. Although they share the 
view of others complaining of the methods, quota, restrictions, speed of implementation 
and wish for a better way of dealing with the shortcomings of the national labour market, 
they still see the general benefits of the programme. They repeatedly stated in interviews 
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that the private sector must continue to try to assist in dealing with the indigenous 
unemployment problem and must carry its share of the burden for the good of the society. 
They are our children, they prosper, they open homes and feed more Saudi 
mouths we can’t stand back and claim it’s got nothing to do with us! Who’s it 
to do with then? [Saudi third generation CEO, merchant, large family business] 
Barriers to Saudization 
The private sector has a long list of what it views as barriers to the government’s 
expectations on Saudization. These five key barriers being the image of Saudization in the 
private sector and the society’s eyes, the lack of work ethics, lack of strategic planning and 
vision, the lack of human resources development awareness, the cost factor and, lastly, 
social considerations. 
Although the private sector it is coy about the reasons it took a decade to acknowledge 
Saudization, fieldwork and interviews with representatives of the private sector reveal that 
the image of Saudization, as they have been introduced to it by the Government, is to 
blame. The private sector, it is safe to state, did not have a clear understanding of the 
objectives of Saudization, was sceptical about the long-term future of the policy and not 
well prepared for it when it became inescapable. 
The initial response of the private sector was certainly disbelief: if, how and when 
Saudization was to be applied. Rejection then followed, coupled with efforts to change 
those givens. Eventually, the seriousness of the government’s intentions to prosecute non-
compliance became apparent. It was at this point that the private sector accepted and began 
to deal with Saudization systematically.  
Saudization is a national programme. It deals with humans, the economy, and 
the whole society. Yes, we knew it was coming, but it was like a rumour or the 
flu that comes and goes seasonally. [An elderly national businessman in 
electric appliances retail] 
Months after decisions regarding Saudization which affected the private sector had been 
123 
 
made, reports in local publications quoted businessmen, merchants and salesmen 
confessing they had no clue that a new law affecting their particular trade or occupation 
had been passed. 
It was shocking and demeaning to see lady inspectors for the ministry of labour 
barge in questioning my beauticians about their visa status and nationalities 
asking me to sign a report accepting to pay 4000 SR per each illegal employee! 
I had no knowledge that I could no longer employ expatriates in my business 
before then. Shouldn’t I have been made aware first, warned, and then fined? 
[Saudi beauty salon owner, in Jeddah for 15 years] 
The second barrier to Saudization, as the private sector confirms, is the issue of Saudi’s 
work ethic and work culture. The private sector readily expresses their negative regard for 
Saudi nationals’ work culture. In evident contrast to expatriate’s work characteristics, the 
Saudi employee stands out as lacking in key skills and knowledge. The private sector is 
adamant about the negative effects of the 1970’s oil boom and riches on the Saudi culture 
and how it is responsible for producing a generation with a disappointing attitude towards 
work. Saudis, according to many in the private sector, still feel they are above work. 
You would rarely ever hear of a young Saudi, for example someone in his mid 
twenties, who was thrown in the street by his family for not earning his 
income. Instead, he has a roof on his head, food and, on top, pocket money to 
pay for cigarettes and mobile phone bills. [Saudi CEO Retail organization 
Jeddah] 
Disrespect for an organization’s laws, lack of discipline and unreliability are all a set of 
characteristics that the private sector complains are innate in the Saudi’s nature. 
Ok, I totally accept and approve of the necessity of getting only Saudi females 
to sell female undergarments and nightwear, but it is close to impossible to 
fully saudize large retail clothing outlets like mine. How many young Saudis 
will work the long hours say around Eid“ religious national feast break”, 
sacrificing family and festivities and still serve the buyer with an 
accommodating smile? [Clothing retail manager, Children’s wear]  
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They also complain of the national’s negative attitudes towards written or verbal orders 
from superiors. 
I’d say lack of humility. If you don’t have that, you have no respect and don’t 
have what it takes to better yourself. [Saudi CEO, major Industrial 
Corporation] 
Managers and high administrators sometimes give an explanation as to why they face this 
problem with their Saudi staff. They associate it with the way the Saudis, being sheltered 
by his family and enjoying welfare status, are prevented from developing the right work 
attitude. 
Maybe, but I believe the effect of the boom is still responsible for this lousy 
attitude we face every day with Saudis. He never was told to get working or get 
out! [Saudi Family business chain of electrical appliances] 
The lack of a work ethic in the private sector’s view is the strongest reason for their 
reluctance to hire Saudis. 
Give me IT skilled Saudis who will deliver and give me my 9-5 at a quality 
and price that won’t bankrupt me and I’ll hire them. [IT and 
telecommunication chain owner]. 
Saudi’s work ethics and attitude to the private sector is responsible for many of their 
shortcomings, such as the ability to commit to attendance and meet deadlines. 
I need that God-fearing Jordanian as a backup for my storeroom of medical 
supply. How many times did the Saudi guy fail to come to his shift on time? 
What do I do? Not dispense medications until His Highness shows up and to 
hell with my patients? [CEO Private health care facility] 
A few representatives of the private sector mentioned the lack of exposure to more 
experienced staff as one of the plights that ail young Saudis. It is the kind of exposure that 
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could have made Saudis learn the appropriate work ethic by being exposed to professionals 
serving in the kingdom for the last three decades.  
Provided you have the right attitude, you could simply learn by rubbing 
shoulders with others who know better than yourself. [Saudi CEO industrial 
and retail Organization] 
Lack of exposure is how the researcher opted to analyze the following comment by the 
CEO of the JCCI  
His parents have brought him up like that, that’s all he knows. As a society, we have 
immediately moved from the tent to big towns. The societies generally begin from 
the tent, to a small village then to the town. In Saudi Arabia, we have not gone 
through those stages of development and exposure step by step. We have jumped. As 
you have questioned earlier, the quality of education is poor and does not encourage 
taking the initiative and possessing the right attitude. [CEO of the JCCI] 
The third barrier to Saudization on the list of the private sector is related to strategy and 
planning both from the government’s side and the private sector alike. The private sector 
complains that the laws of Saudization and methods seem as if they were invented on an ad 
hoc basis as the programme progressed. Described at times as a trial and error process, 
many in the private sector feel that the laws of Saudization came before the infrastructure 
for implementing them had been established. Generalized quotas that are unrealistic, bans 
of visas for occupations where there are currently no qualified Saudis or restrictions of 
sectors that Saudis aren’t interested in either because of unfavourable work conditions or 
for social reasons, are all expressed as proof of how haphazardly the programme of 
Saudization started.  
The Ministry says I have to have Saudi limousine drivers, when I placed ads in 
the papers I only had two applicants. It is partly the society, mind you, they 
still prefer riding with a polite and quiet Indian who doesn’t understand their 
conversation. [Saudi private taxi business owner] 
The private sector admits that up until early 2000 they were simply hoping the government 
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would find other ways to employ the jobless without executing the Saudization plan at 
least not rapidly and, with any luck, not on them. In contrast, those that succeeded, as will 
be described later in this chapter, are private organizations that had the vision and strategy 
to see Saudization as the future of the labour market.  
Because it is the sort of thing that needs management skills, that’s our forte. 
The others you mentioned may be strong in procurement or re-sourcing. Our 
general management training and development of human resources has evolved 
many years prior to Saudization, we could mobilize faster and at one point we 
would lobby for more Saudization instead of lobbying for stalling and lenient 
rule of application. [CEO of a major national industrial and retail holding 
organization] 
The lack of Human Resources development and awareness represent another serious 
barrier to Saudization. Interviews with private business owners (especially small to 
medium sized) demonstrated that organizations which in the past simply relied on 
personnel offices and admin clerks to handle their human resources, have only recently 
perceived the importance of specialized HR departments. Many of the private sector 
businesses in Saudi Arabia today still run their operations as a ‘household affair’. Only in 
the last five years has the private sector become completely aware of the importance of 
organizational charts, detailed job descriptions and personnel assessment methods. The 
majority admit that human resources expertise is severely deficient in the private sector. 
Even those organizations that focused on building an HR department complain that some 
of the most capable HR managers in the private sector are not qualified to design training 
programmes that will render successful lasting Saudization results.  
What new Saudi recruits need is rehabilitation rather than training. There is 
only so much that you can train for. [HR in national industrial organization] 
Additionally, the interviewees touched on the frustration of the private sector with this 
“lack of know how”. Their inability to remedy the scarcity of required skills in newly 
imposed areas and train Saudis, in spite of indisputable efforts to improve their 
performance and retention on the job, is a common finding. 
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Another significant barrier to Saudization is related to cost. Economically the private 
sector has to pay a hefty price for Saudization. The complaint of the ineffectiveness of 
nationals, namely the lack of appropriate work ethics, IT and language skills, has forced 
many in the private sector to employ larger numbers of unskilled Saudis to fill the quota. 
Theprivate sector’s reluctance to get rid of hard working experienced cheap labour and 
replace them by inexperienced often under qualified Saudis who lack the appropriate work 
ethic, has deep negative economic ramifications. To start with, Saudi manpower is more 
costly to hire compared to expatriate manpower, in spite of the government’s attempts to 
increase the cost of expatriate labour by means of imposing higher fees for visas and 
residency permits, intensive labour businesses, more than others, risk an enormous built-in 
extra cost when Saudizing. 
An important and direct part of ‘cost as a barrier’ is the transitional phase most private 
organizations had to go through, especially at the beginning of the Saudization period. 
Transitionally, some of the private sector entities resorted to employing two nationals for 
the job of one to deal with low productivity, non-attendance, and the high turnover Saudi 
employees are known for. 
Must I go through the expense and the headache of hiring two for the job of 
one just for the inspectors of the ministry to give me their blessings and not 
treat me like I’m running a disrespectful business? This is insulting. [Private 
health care clinic]. 
A small percentage of businessmen relocated their businesses to other countries in the gulf 
region where Saudization obviously does not apply. Those in the private sector who did 
not do this were compelled to deal with the imposed rising quotas in what seemed to be a 
relatively short period of time.  
Why should I go through the expense of hiring three times as many Saudis as I 
need, just because I know that by the time my numbers are checked I would 
have lost at least two thirds of those Saudis I hired? You and I know the high 
turnover when you’re dealing with Saudis. [Retail business owner, medium 
sized chain]. 
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The cost issue is also obvious in terms of training newcomers as it is often unavailable and 
is rarely to the effectiveness required. 
I did my bit. I’ve sponsored and sent on my expense thirty young men to study 
abroad so that in a few years they’ll be all over my businesses in key positions. 
Now you can’t blame me if they all left when I retired and new management 
took over. Ok, I agree it is good for the community, but who will pay me for 
my lost investment over eight years? [Holding organization owner and ex 
CEO]. 
The cost issue additionally affects the private sector dearly in producing the budgets 
needed to train the applicants in basic skills like IT and English business terminology. 
When asked why they don’t seek the financial help of the HRDF, the majority explained 
that one, they weren’t aware of how to use its help and two, once they had figured out how 
to use its help, they realized that it must be preceded with the preparation of a training 
plan, too sophisticated a task for their personnel officer to produce. Furthermore, there was 
always the obstacle of Saudi employees dropping out of the training programme, 
subjecting the private sector to grave financial losses. 
Some of us can afford to shelter the financial loss every time the Saudi trainee 
stops showing up! The rest can’t. Yes, the HRDF will reimburse me but only 
for those who completed the programme. [CEO medical facility Jeddah] 
On-the-job training isn’t something many of the interviewed organizations had the means 
to handle either. The lack of knowhow, shortage of quality private training programmes 
and good trainers all constitute an additional built in cost they could not afford. What adds 
to this cost factor is trying to adjust to those new laws, new employees and limited access 
to expert trainers whilst at the same time maintaining their competitive edge in today’s 
market. 
Initially, we kind of attempted training in-house to avoid the excessive cost of 
hiring professionals. They demanded astronomical charges per head and 
required classrooms and large meeting areas that we would’ve had to pay even 
more to rent. To be honest with you, we could neither afford it nor did we feel 
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it necessary, for they kept coming and going like in a bus station. [CEO 
Pharmaceutical and cosmetic medium size chain]. 
Last, comes the social barrier to Saudization as the private sector defines it. The fact that 
young Saudis now are in a position where they need to better themselves, lower their 
expectations and “stoop” to fill the expatriate jobs is something the private sector sees as a 
great barrier. The economic need that is now obliging Saudis to accept employment they 
would not have accepted ten years ago is further obstructed by the stereotyping of certain 
professions and an inability to adjust to changing times. Many parents of young 
unemployed Saudis would stop them from enrolling in the technology industry or 
accepting a career in services especially in those professions occupied by expatriates for 
decades. An example of that would be how some private organizations have to alter their 
job titles, hours and uniforms to better suit nationals. 
They refuse to wear short sleeved shirts “like waiters” they want a different job 
title “that sounds better” and we altered their schedules so that they can come 
at 9 instead of 8 because that was the only way to keep them. [Egyptian HR 
trainer in retail] 
Many unqualified young Saudis shy away from driving a limousine car as a profession not 
just because it isn’t prestigious enough but also because customers (the majority are 
females) are reluctant to use their services because they are nationals and still prefer riding 
with a far eastern driver. 
Riding with any non-family male, let alone a fellow national, gives me the 
creeps. I know he is listening and understands every word I say. I can’t trust 
him! [Saudi elderly woman Jeddah] 
I will stop as many limousines as it takes until I get one with a Pakistani or 
Bengali chauffeur. They are very polite, respect women and keep to 
themselves. [An expatriate female, private teacher] 
When this research probed into this area further to verify the point the private sector is 
making about social barriers, it was confirmed that in many cases the private sector’s 
130 
 
efforts to Saudize are certainly obstructed in this form. 
Of course he understands Arabic (referring to the far eastern driver), probably 
even sings it too, (laughter), but he is clever enough to nod and pretends he 
understands nothing. Even my father and brother prefer that I never ride with a 
Saudi, especially a young one. [Saudi female administrative assistant 
commuting 45 minutes to work daily] 
Successful Saudization 
The level of planning and strategizing necessary to succeed in implementing the 
programme was only shared by a few large national private organizations that were 
equipped with human resources departments, budgets and a plan to meet the ministry’s 
Saudization targets. 
We had a wonderful go at Saudization. We established our own academy and 
since we were in need of thousands of Saudis, we had the opportunity to plan, 
recruit expertise and invest towards the goal of Saudization, knowing that it 
would give us an edge over all other retail business as an image and in dealing 
with the Ministry of Labour. [Leading national industrial and retail CEO].  
It appears that although Saudization is achievable the profile of private businesses that can 
attain a good level of Saudization is not common. Here we discuss some of the reasons 
behind successful Saudization using examples from the fieldwork. 
Large organizations score a higher success rate in Saudization. ‘Large’, in this sense 
should not be measured purely via the number of employees. Instead, a more important 
factor is having a well-developed human resources department. This factor cuts part of the 
cost related to initial and transitional Saudization. Those businesses are better able to 
recruit, retain and design programmes suited for their labour needs and the nature of young 
Saudi new entrants. Those organizations can pay better salaries for their staff and can 
absorb the transitional phase and cost better than smaller organizations. More often than 
not, large organizations adopt modern means of policy design, training, On the Job 
Training OJT and retention of staff.  Therefore, they can deal better with some of the Saudi 
131 
 
employers’ most common problems and achieve higher rates of success. Another 
important characteristic shared by organizations that succeed at Saudization is a corporate 
structure. Due to the unique profile of unemployed Saudis that will be discussed in the next 
chapter, a corporate type of organization offers an added social aspect and cultural 
considerations to national employees. 
It is easier for a Saudi to follow rules that apply to all in a structured and preset 
manner than to be told off and reprimanded by the boss who happens to be the 
owner or the owner’s son. [HR private health care organization]. 
The expatriates and their collective individual work cultures shaped most of the Saudi 
business world expectations. This is part of the reason why a large, structured, multi 
national organization can afford to write realistic job descriptions catered to Saudis 
weakness’ and strengths as a work force guide them to better employment rather than try to 
fit them in the expatriate shoes. 
We listened to them, understood their problems and issues and restructured 
some of our policies accordingly. They can’t carry this title [referring to social 
and familial reasons], we change the title. They feel humiliated to put on a 
uniform with short sleeves; we let them help us design the kind of uniform 
they’re proud to put on every day. [HR academic consultant to successful 
national organization] 
Private organizations that Saudize successfully are larger, richer (mostly subsidized) or have 
a high profit margin and thus are able to dedicate substantial funds toward designing training 
programmes for the Saudi new hire according to assessment results designed and conducted 
via experts usually from a foreign specialized HR organization. Furthermore, organizations 
in this category are better able to bridge the pay difference between them and the public 
sector through alternative means such as a share in profit, a clear career path and easy loans. 
We may not be able to raise the pay to their needs and expectations. But being 
a rich organization we designed a programme of interest free loans on homes 
for our executives. We have an amazing policy to promote retention, better 
still, to thrill our employees. [Leading national retail and food industry, Saudi 
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senior manager] 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reflected on the Saudi private sector’s relation to the process of 
Saudization. To an extent, the private sector, the main target of placement for millions of 
unemployed young Saudis, is in a state of confusion and shock. The private sector 
expressed a mixture of views to Saudization over time. At first, in the 1990’s, the private 
sector ignored the process and decided it was never coming (and that even if it did come, it 
would not affect their particular sector). When the Government tightened its grip and 
passed stern laws affecting work permits and renewal of visas to recruit as well as pressing 
for quotas to employ Saudis, the private sector decided it was an unwelcome but inevitable 
reality. The reasons behind the private sector’s reluctance to employ Saudis are several. 
One: in most cases the private sector is obliged to lose its expatriates, bid farewell to their 
hard earned visas (that closes the door to their recruiting expatriates for the same jobs in 
the future) and adapt to the standards and quality of the Saudi worker. The latter, they 
state, is neither ready nor willing to perform the job to the standards they have become 
used to. They complain that the Saudi young newcomer lacks the dedication, the 
perseverance, and the skills the expatriate has. If they oblige the Government policy, they 
fear losing competitiveness and productivity, which will eventually affect their 
profitability.  
There are reasons why the private sector doesn’t welcome the process’ package of help by 
the government and the HRDF. The private sector is fearful of changing its ways and 
leaving their comfort zone. It is not for lack of patriotism or civic duty. They acknowledge 
Saudi youths’ need and wish for work and are willing to help so long as it doesn’t hurt the 
private economy. They express their inability to accept the policy maker’s quality of 
training funded by the HRDF. They also express their own inability to train Saudis because 
of the time and cost this entails. Each sector paints a vivid picture of the qualities 
unavailable in the Saudi employee ranging from lacking tact and finesse as a salesman to 
lacking the technical ability of an IT professional. In addition the concerns are always 
coupled with the rationale that they have a right to run their business and HR freely as the 
market dictates. Last, the issue of social readiness and expectations lingers as the young 
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Saudis adjust to the work place and this new era continues to be obstructed by social 
expectations on their side and reluctance from society. 
It is mostly women who need to use us. In my experience, she’s frightened to 
ride alone with a Saudi driver. She doesn’t feel as threatened with a Far 
Eastern. [Receptionist of hired chauffeured cars for hotels Jeddah] 
Time, know-how and cost are all areas of concern the private sector refers to when 
discussing Saudization and its methods. This argument was shared among all the sectors’ 
representatives detailing how those factors affect their standards of performance and the 
limited pool of national workforce available to them. They agree that they have been 
introduced to the idea of Saudization nearly a decade ago but that it only became a reality 
recently. For decades, Saudi businesses recruited their needs of labour of all skill levels 
from abroad. The expatriates generally came ready with their expertise and ability to work 
hard. This is obviously not the case with the Saudi new employee. The private sector is 
expected by the policy maker to assess, filter and train young Saudis to fit them with the 
needed hard and soft skills they lack. This adjustment, they confess, is time consuming, 
challenging, requires know how and is very costly. 
The chapter also covered how successful Saudization is partially achieved by the private 
sector and why. It is usually a case of a large structured organization that can absorb the 
added cost of hiring Saudis and training them. More often than not, those larger 
organizations have well established human resources departments and are equipped with 
the means to train and retain the Saudi new hire whether by paying better wages or 
offering overall better packages and compensations. Furthermore, Saudization is better met 
at such organizations because they are able to study and modify work environment for the 
national worker to accommodate his/ her special social and cultural needs. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Saudization, Workers’ Perspective 
Introduction 
Saudization is a complex process intended to eradicate unemployment among the 
indigenous population. It involves bringing together many of the Kingdom’s institutions, 
funds and manpower and involves long term planning and execution. It assumes both the 
commitment and the capacity of the government to achieve its targets as well as the 
willingness of the private industry to break with its heavy reliance on imported labour.  
As we have seen, the private sector, the main arena of employment for those young Saudis, 
is reluctant to accept the logic behind the process and contends that the Saudi workers are 
neither ready nor willing to take on the challenge of working in the private sector. 
Furthermore, forced in this manner to employ a great number of young Saudi workers unfit 
for the job market, it will bring grave financial losses upon them. The way the private 
sector defends this argument is by drawing a bleak picture of the Saudi worker’s ability, 
qualifications and work ethic. The government, represented by the Ministry of Labour, 
counters with the argument that with some patriotism, sacrifice and a lot of training, the 
Saudi work force should be prepared sufficiently for the labour market’s needs.   
Most of the research carried out on the subject of Saudization praises the Government’s 
initiative in identifying the benefits of replacing expatriates with nationals to create jobs.  
Another area of research covered in relation to Saudization is the private sector’s reactions 
to it, their compliance or reluctance to conform to it, and discussions and arguments about 
structural and financial concerns regarding its implementation. This chapter is intended to 
portray the viewpoint of the third dimension of Saudization, the work force. 
This chapter aims at exploring employed and unemployed workers’ perspectives of 
Saudization, the way they perceive it, how they see its objectives, the difficulties they 
encounter, how they view themselves and their expatriate counterparts, how the process 
affects them and what kind of change might bring hope to them as workers and citizens of 
Saudi Arabia. 
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It also aims to show how nationals of different skill levels regard Saudization’s objectives 
as workers and potential workers, and what impedes their attainment of those objectives. It 
will also review their opinions on the methods used to implement Saudization. Finally, the 
chapter aims at showing the aspects of Saudization that help workers achieve their goals. 
According to many employers, the Saudi work force is young, inexperienced and lacking 
in many skills needed for the labour market of today. This image of Saudis has persistently 
hindered the entry of young Saudis into the job market. The government insists that to 
solve the problem of youth unemployment, the private sector must accept reducing the 
extent of the expatriate work force and employ young Saudis instead. The private sector is 
unwilling to carry what they see as “inexperienced, arrogant” Saudis. The Government 
continues to raise the quotas of young Saudis, requiring the private sector to engage and 
also increase budgets to train and qualify new entrants from the fast-growing population. 
Even if they solve the persisting problem of unemployed figures, at present, by 
force, what will they do with the millions of us to come? [Saudi clerk Private 
healthcare facility] 
From the perspective of young Saudis expected to replace skilled expatriates who have 
long been employed in local companies, their high expectations of (their ideal job), are 
tempered by the prospect of taking over jobs that have been occupied by expatriates for 
decades. It is a great challenge and, at times, an unwelcome prospect. Often, in the midst of 
all these complaints and arguments, the worker’s voice is unheard. 
This chapter aims at looking at both Saudis and expatriate workers’ points of view, the 
way they both feel about each other as rivals and how they regard Saudization in the light 
of their knowledge of their counterparts. Finally the chapter aims at introducing the reader 
to the reality of the professional and social scene of today’s labour market. 
Worker’s View on Saudization  
Through the fieldwork conducted for this research, the researcher was faced with a range 
of reactions from the workers interviewed depending on the individual’s sense of 
confidence and security regarding their career opportunities. Overall, the workers’ view on 
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Saudization was simplistic and the researcher found a distinct lack of awareness among 
workers of the objectives, methods and impact of Saudization. Most of the young Saudis 
interviewed were not sure of the percentages of Saudization in the business or the sector 
they worked for.  
Yes I know! All companies must replace all its foreigners and employ Saudis. I 
also know that this puts them in trouble. [Saudi job applicant JCCI] 
The opinions of Saudis interviewed on the definition of Saudization were variable, 
depending also on their level of skill and future prospects. To the unemployed (typically 
unskilled) Saudis, their view of Saudization was one of helplessness, frustration and 
disbelief. The possibility of self-improvement seemed like an unattainable dream. 
Those up there (the policy makers) make the laws sitting in their offices; down 
here in real life, it’s very different. It is all talk. Look at me with all these laws 
for Saudization, should I still be searching and not finding a job? [Saudi 24 
year-old, unemployed, Jeddah]. 
Some argue that it can be too tough a journey, requiring much more than is being done by 
the government. Their understanding of the process is that it is the wish of the policy 
makers at a governmental level for it to happen. Nevertheless, they say that the 
government’s intention is not enough to sway the private sector to willingly accept it, nor 
is it sufficient to truly change the work environment to better suit them as nationals.  
In spite of their expressed despair, many are reluctant to accept simple jobs with poor 
wages currently occupied by unskilled expatriates. Experts in the unemployment field, 
including fellow nationals, acknowledge the workers’ despair but link it to the unemployed 
Saudi’s reluctance to take on menial jobs and the private sector’s demand for hard-working 
employees.  
Of course I’ll find a job as a cleaner! But is that it? Am I being punished for 
something that I don’t know? I’ll live worse than a rat on 1000 RS! [Saudi 
unskilled unemployed] 
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Distrust among the unemployed is a common reaction to Saudization as a mean to promote 
employment.  Interviews consistently recorded statements that revealed scepticism and 
bitter helplessness among jobless Saudis. Their rationale rarely puts the blame on their 
own shortcomings, whether it is their inability or disinclination to work long hours, or to 
accept a low wage. Instead, they always feel victimized and persecuted and they view the 
private sector as greedy, intolerant and spoilt by having been able to employ voiceless (and 
therefore compliant) expatriates for decades. 
It is just a big joke. This is my third Masar (job market). The private 
companies come, interview, sign and employ us for the trial period. Less than 
three months later, we’re terminated! We are being used as bait for them to fish 
visas. [Job fair applicant JCCI 2007]  
The less skilled workers believed in the generalized notion that Saudization is chiefly about 
the deportation of all expatriates from all sectors of the economy. The true definition of 
Saudization, its objectives and logistics, was rarely, if ever, detected in interviews with 
nationals, with the exception of those involved in HR or dealing with the ministry of labour. 
I hear Saudization, Saudization. I think it is just about numbers. [Saudi Lab 
technician private health care facility] 
To some, mostly the semi skilled Saudis seeking employment, it seems that there is an 
expectation that Saudization gives them a right of passage, a green card and a clear edge 
over their counterpart expatriates.  
Saudization means Saudi Arabia is for the Saudis. At least in theory it is.[Saudi 
Security guard Jeddah]   
The same category of workers were well aware of the advantages Saudization gave them 
over an expatriate when applying for a position, and they knew how and where to use this 
advantage to maintain their position. Many in this group admit that they are being 
supported technically or otherwise by an expatriate while apparently working in their 
appointed positions. The expatriate, who may hold a better qualification and more 
experience, is banned by the Saudization laws from assuming his rightful status, and 
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almost always covers holidays, absenteeism and hours not worked by the Saudi employee. 
In some cases Saudization laws are used to benefit a few who learned how to use them as a 
bargaining card. Often, a worker of this calibre would even challenge the management of 
the private organization because he is aware that his qualification is in demand and that 
Saudization inspection will check his position and fine the organization if it is filled by  
a non-Saudi.  
At this point, it is they who need me. I’m the only Saudi CPA certified 
accountant in the organization and as you know, they can’t dismiss me easily. 
[Saudi accountant in a medium-sized marketing Organization] 
The semi-skilled can sometimes seem expert in knowing how to land a job for a few 
months in a new position. A small percentage have developed a technique in which they 
can capitalize on their inability to cope with the job requirements in an unspoken threat to 
their private employer of how the ministry of labour could be their ally and win them back 
the job, at least for a while longer. 
Try correcting her, the first thing she’ll do is insinuate that she has a relative 
who has a relative who knows someone in the ministry. She knows we’re not 
up to quota; it is a hateful threat. [Saudi HR assistant, private health care] 
I hate to say it but they don’t have a choice, I know that if I blow the whistle on 
them with the Ministry of Labour, their work place will be flooded with 
inspectors! I’ll even tell them about the back door policy and how many 
sponsorships have they taken this year of expats. [Saudi personnel department 
private health care] 
The fieldwork conducted for this research among the expatriates showed similar view on 
Saudization to those of Saudi workers with reactions varied according to their skills level. 
Those aware of the concept of Saudization frequently realize it might have a direct effect 
on their future career in the country.   
To highly skilled expatriates, Saudization is a non-issue. It doesn’t affect them for they are 
usually confident of their expertise and feel secure about finding employment elsewhere. 
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Many work in the kingdom because the pay is good, tax-free and they are able to exit for 
home visits and travel around the Middle East, which compensates for the loss of freedom 
and a limited social life in Saudi Arabia. This group is familiar with the objectives of 
Saudization, but knows little about its practice and implementation, and they are restricted 
to dealing with other skilled expatriates and skilled nationals. In other words, unless their 
area of specialty is HR and training, they are not involved in the local labour market issues. 
My dealing with the young Saudi labour force is limited to greeting them as I 
get in and out of my clinic. When they’re absent, and that happens a lot, I call 
management for an immediate replacement and that’s that. [Egyptian 
Consultant physician, Jeddah] 
A few Saudi workers view the fact that the highly skilled expatriates lack interest in 
the issue of Saudization as a great loss to the skill development of the national 
workforce. They believe that if expats, especially those who are able to contribute at 
a high level were to set a good example by transferring knowledge this could have a 
positive influence on some nationals who work closely with them. 
         They don’t care, yes they know plenty and can work well but they are here just 
for the money and they live in a tower far away from us with others like them. 
[Saudi nurse Jeddah]. 
Other expatriates, especially those in supervisory positions and those who have worked in 
Saudi Arabia for a long time, seem to know much more about the concept, whom it affects 
and to what degree. As with the Saudi worker, their interest and understanding of 
Saudization varies with their level of skill but mostly to the length of time they have 
worked in the kingdom. Semi-skilled expatriates who have spent a long time working in 
the kingdom are reliant on the experience they have and the way they have adapted to fulfil 
the job’s requirements rather than their qualifications or talents. Their forte is learning the 
job requirements and applying discipline and work ethics to their performance. 
Eventually, the time will come when I have to leave. For now, I bend backward 
to prove to him (the owner of the business) that I’m indispensable. [Egyptian 
sales manager, clothing retail] 
140 
 
Perhaps it is the fact that Saudization is a direct and inevitable threat to their livelihood and 
income that they are motivated to follow news of Saudization and its effects on the labour 
market closely. 
Yes I am very aware of the concept. I read about it and I am watching what’s 
happening with Saudization every day. I see it as a very chaotic process; 
people come and go all the time. [Sudanese security officer, Jeddah]  
Hence, it is in their best interests that Saudization progresses slowly. It means that they can 
hang on to their jobs longer and avoid having to knock on other doors that have been 
rapidly closed to them by the employment of Saudi nationals. 
If only they knew how easy they have it, the Saudis, they’d be thankful and 
feel blessed. [Jordanian head of IT marketing Organization] 
The relationship between the expatriate and the employing companies in Jeddah today, this 
research has found, is obscure and has little structure. It is comparable to someone waiting 
for sentencing.  
Three months now I’ve been waiting for the Saudi supervisor (my potential 
replacement) to stay on the job. My kids’ school term started last week and I 
still haven’t registered them neither here nor back home. The wife is nagging 
me and I feel angry and helpless. [Egyptian food and beverage supervisor 
Jeddah] 
Those who have worked for a long time in the kingdom and who have established a good 
rapport with higher management are at an advantage and are somewhat more secure in 
their jobs. They are able to estimate their value to the organization and when that will 
expire. This is reflected in their view of Saudization.  
You can’t blame them if they have so many unemployed. It is theoretically fair. 
[Expatriate chief accountant, industrial enterprise, Jeddah] 
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In most cases, semi skilled and skilled expatriates are also armed with a survival instinct. 
They certainly feel threatened by the process and are aware of the consequences of its 
success. However, their knowledge of their counterpart, the national worker and his ability 
and attitude towards work, gives them hope that Saudization, although happening and 
eventually succeeding to some extent, is still a long way away from affecting them. 
I’ve been with my employer for eight years now. If you read his facial 
expression and frustration every time the Saudi leaves, loses the company’s car 
keys or misses a deadline, you’ll know! It’ll be quite a while before we’re not 
needed. [Lebanese executive secretary industrial organization] 
Worker’s View on Saudization Objectives 
The empirical work for this study produced a variety of views from workers on the 
objectives of Saudization. Nationals, who are for Saudization and are operating 
successfully in the labour market, express their belief in the nation’s ability to fulfil the 
goals of Saudization. They argue that if you are both patient and just with nationals, 
progress will result. They describe Saudis as “worth investing in”, “here to last” and “more 
transparent”. These qualities, they opine, are traits not found in the expatriate work force. 
He is honest and outspoken, which could actually put him in a lot of trouble. 
[Saudi chief housekeeper, private hospital, Jeddah] 
Saudis believe that the Saudi worker has the interest of the organization at heart because he 
is a national and cares for his country. 
Trustworthy in guarding the place he works in. Let’s put it in another way, I 
think the Saudi is keen on what he is responsible for. He worries in that sense. 
[Saudi medical secretary, Jeddah] 
They argue against the idea that the national is arrogant or ‘has it easy’ and instead 
compliment his ability to better represent the work place because he/ she has pride in 
his/her appearance. 
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He looks good.  He is keen on his appearance. The expatriate doesn’t care for 
his appearance or maybe he cares less. I guess an expatriate has less to worry 
about in terms of his image and prestige. [Saudi receptionist, IT organization, 
Jeddah]  
Fieldwork for this thesis, especially in-depth interviews with Saudi workers, pointed out 
that Saudis need to feel the support and the trust of the organization and that this would be 
an ideal way of getting optimum results from Saudi hire. 
Well, just try, giving them enough support, and there you have it. [Saudi 
administrator assistant, Jeddah] 
Saudi workers at all levels are, in general, supportive of Saudization. There are two main 
opinions:  “for it all the way” and “for it with caution”.  
It is important here to make the difference clear between the two standpoints. The group 
that is “all for” Saudization shares a sense of high patriotism and great deal of sympathy 
for nationals struggling to find employment in their home country. They are concerned 
about the immediate economic needs of fellow Saudis and regard Saudization objectives 
concordant with the government’s view. They might acknowledge that fellow Saudis lack 
skills and ethics at work and that they sometimes constitute a burden on the private sector. 
However, they regard the gap in qualifications to be insignificant. Furthermore, they insist 
that Saudis are more deserving because they are nationals, regardless of the structural 
difficulties or the economic consequences to the private sector. 
I don’t think it is exactly true what they say; the Saudis are inferior to the 
expatriates in ability. Of course, if you learn more and you have more practical 
experience, your performance will be better. But doesn’t the expatriate also 
require training and fine-tuning to the work place and the culture? [Saudi Lab 
technician, Jeddah] 
This group of Saudi workers that is “for Saudization all the way”, believes that all 
government and private efforts should go to enforcing the Saudization laws, further 
policing it and deporting expatriates aggressively. “The market will adjust” is their answer 
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when asked about the labour vacuum forecast if all expatriates and their necessary 
expertise were to be deported. Again, this group uses the economic argument, emphasizing 
the benefit of retaining the billions of Saudi Riyals remitted by expatriates to their 
countries which, by its leaving the kingdom, has a negative impact on the Saudi economy, 
its businesses and its people. 
I’m sure that those who claim that Saudization is not successful have their 
agenda. They are so used to the foreigners’ submissiveness and enjoy the 
power that they have over their destiny. They know darn well a Saudi will 
never take that kind of nonsense! Just ask the Ministry of Labour; they know 
well the tricks of the private sector. [Saudi clerk, electronics retail, Jeddah] 
Nationals who are “for Saudization with some caution”, have deeper concerns for the 
national economy and the dynamics of the social structure in Saudi Arabia. They are more 
informed about the rules of the free market, the effect of the government’s interference and 
the possible social threat of limiting any sector of Saudi labour market, especially at 
present, to Saudi nationals. 
Economically, they are realistic about what specialties and values the nationals still lack 
both in quantity and quality. They say that Saudis must qualify first before being able to 
assume an economic role without the help of the expert counterpart.  
We see few Saudi doctors, and fewer Saudi nurses simply because there are not 
enough available.  I see a lot of the girls from the nursing college. Some clerks 
“in management” but I feel we are doing it to fill the quota and they are not 
hired on merit. Actually, someone else is doing the work for them. [Saudi 
consultant surgeon, Jeddah] 
It will come to a stop, water desalination plant, the graveyard shifts, electricity; 
it is all non-Saudis who work, Egyptians, Filipinos. The social structure never 
encourages this in our people.  No marriage, no prestige…big problem in 
middle class, leave CEO’s and physicians aside…middle level jobs. Youth in 
the US pump gas, which is respectful. Can I put my son to sell in “Sawari 
Supermarket” or pump gas during the summer holiday? It may simply ruin his 
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reputation and I would be condemned. All these social structures must be dealt 
with and addressed before we’re ready for the shift. [Saudi physician, Jeddah] 
Their economic rationale presented for cautious Saudization says that it is counter-
productive in the long run to jeopardize the private sector through implementing the 
current laws of Saudization. They are convinced it is healthier to let the private sector be 
without the pressure of Saudization and wish for better policies that guarantee the genuine 
and sustainable cooperation of the private sector for the good of all. 
I don’t want them to be on my side temporarily and it is rather insulting to be 
in a private organization by force, as a number. I’d rather be there as a part of a 
common benefit, an incentive, a win-win deal for both. [Saudi assistant 
director, private hospital, Jeddah] 
When discussing the social effects of Saudization with caution, the researcher noted 
different levels of awareness and concerns among different levels of education and 
exposure among Saudi workers. The majority of well-educated, moderate Saudis 
agreed that it was never in the benefit of the society to rid itself of all expatriates. 
Oh, it will be apocalypse! To get rid of all expats, that is. I see Arab workers in 
foreign countries in huge numbers. No! Every country has some expatriate 
workers, even the United States of America. [Saudi head secretary, Jeddah] 
This mixture of a workforce is not only needed to fulfil the market’s need, in 
my view, it is crucial for the society to remain open minded and tolerant, 
especially nowadays. [HR admen, Jeddah] 
Saudi youth at work, especially those who enjoy mixing with expatriates and sharing their 
open life style and joie de vivre, argue that the presence of expatriates adds moderation and 
colour to everyday Saudi work life. 
No on the contrary I should benefit from this openness, My God, we’ll go back to 
pre-historic ages. [Saudi HR trainer, industrial organization, Jeddah]  
145 
 
This group sees the mutual benefit to the nationals, the expatriates and the economy in 
maintaining this healthy mix in the workforce. They also point out to the different positive 
qualities that other cultures bring to the Saudi different industries. 
It’s simple; we benefit from them. Actually we benefit from their need. I don’t 
have enough nurses? Well, I go and bring Filipina nurses? And I’m talking here 
about maintaining international standards.  In teaching, the foreigner is better than 
the Saudi. The Saudi is lazy and she doesn’t even do the legwork before she 
teaches. However, Egyptians are very good teachers. She, as an expatriate teacher, 
is talented, instigates, pushes us to learn more and go to the library. A Saudi 
teacher will not do that. Why would I not benefit from someone who is better at 
whatever? [Saudi executive secretary, Jeddah] 
Many young Saudis, especially those secure in their jobs, point out that Saudis are not 
ready to stand completely on their own to meet the demands of the national labour market. 
They feel strongly the importance of experience, expertise and ethics of their co-worker, 
and trainer the expat. 
Having many people from other countries certainly will teach you, expose you, 
and enlighten you to a different way of life. Imagine putting a girl from Riyadh 
next to a girl from Jeddah at work; eventually, they will both learn something 
from each other, won’t they? [Saudi accountant, marketing, Jeddah] 
They add that the expatriate adds the element of competitiveness and represents a source of 
valuable information. The expat, they say, contributes to the work place in many positive 
ways professionally, as a motivator and socially, as a teacher, with his tolerance, and ability 
to cope with Saudi daily life. 
The presence of foreigners will defuse some of our strict characteristics as 
Saudis. Come to think of it, maybe this is why we have a competitive 
environment in the lab! Yes they have more experience but look at me I lasted 
longer than anybody said I would last in this organization. As if I want to prove 
to my expatriate colleagues: I got better. I learnt. I persevered. Maybe I did not 
surpass the expatriate, but I certainly exist as a worker in the lab. [Saudi lab 
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technician, Jeddah] 
Saudis who think Saudization must be approached with caution for social reasons, present 
their view in the light of much-needed exposure to the ways of the greater world outside 
their borders. Without exception, the group that brought up those concerns was the more 
educated, better employed and held a more global outlook on matters than other 
respondents. They voiced their anxieties about closing Saudi Arabia to non-Saudis because 
this would only lead the society to close, encourage reluctance to accept the other and 
enhance negative traits embedded in Saudi society such as tribalism, xenophobia, feelings 
of superiority and an inclination to religious prejudice. 
We are already a more closed society than any other Arab Moslem country. Our 
women still can’t drive! What benefits do we get when we’re all like that: 
strict, rigid and feeling superior? [Saudi construction project manager, Jeddah] 
If we’re left to our own devices, we’ll never get better. The expats represent 
colour, humility and alternative ways. It is more real like that. [Saudi medical 
technician Jeddah]  
On the highest level of awareness, comes the argument that it is counterproductive to 
deport expatriates, at least in the foreseeable future. The issue of national security and fear 
of harbouring terrorism is at the centre of discussion here.  
Dismissal of expats is not wise circumstantially. As a matter of fact, it is 
dangerous. We need them to defuse us, teach us acceptance of the other and 
maintain an example of an alternative way of life. [Saudi executive secretary, 
Jeddah] 
 
Workers on Saudization Methods 
Saudi workers’ opinions on Saudization methods are a clear reflection of their level of 
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optimism regarding their careers. The majority are not concerned as to how Saudization is 
implemented, provided it gives them that extra edge on the expatriate rival in finding a 
much-needed job. Percentages of quotas, restriction on visas to recruit expatriates and the 
closure of specific occupations and markets to foreigners are all different faces of the same 
coin. To those skilled and expert in the labour market, better methods are often suggested. 
Many Saudi workers expressed doubt at the wisdom of some of the methods employed in 
Saudization. They say that they are inconsistent, and at times naïve. Among this group, the 
researcher recorded some criticisms of some of the methods of Saudization as being 
“unrealistic”.  
To the unemployed and the unskilled, the tighter the methods of applying Saudization, the 
better regardless of the general outcome. They praise the Ministry of Labour’s inspections, 
ban of visas and cheer for closure of markets to nationals. 
About time! The Government understands that the private sector is greedy and 
has no sense of responsibility for anything but profit. If it were up to them, 
they’d see us starve on charity but not employ us. [Saudi trainee gold market 
Jeddah] 
The severity of methods used to enforce Saudization is cheered on, among the unskilled 
and semi skilled nationals. 
I think it is wise and fair, in reference to closing the gold market to nationals. 
Maybe now we can claim some of those jobs to ourselves. [Saudi trainee in 
gold shop, Jeddah] 
Another common reaction to the Saudization methods shared by all interviewed higher 
than the unskilled level was that Saudization methods are inconsistent and, at times, 
experimental.  
One day teaching is banned for non-Saudis, the next day they say: no, you can 
import certain specialties. The third day I read they’re importing teachers from 
India to teach English! Those are rules of Saudization.  It is like trial and error! 
[Saudi unemployed English major, Jeddah] 
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Our fieldwork regarding this point found variations in the reactions among Saudis 
depending on their hierarchy and status at work. Those who are well integrated into a 
private organization and are secure in their career path revealed that it is wiser in the long 
run if the Government doesn’t push so hard. They fear that one it is only a matter of time 
before the private sector finds a way to get rid of them. And too strict enforcement of 
Saudization will encourage many Saudis to just take advantage of the situation and not 
better themselves. 
I have great sympathy for all fellow Saudis who are unemployed. But if we 
continue to press on the private sector and demand nothing of those 
unemployed we’ll just add to the problem if not now, in ten years time. [Saudi 
chief security guard Jeddah] 
Saudi workers and those in high management responsible for performance, quality and cost 
are certainly disturbed by current methods of enforcing Saudization, and hope for a 
change. 
They also argue that the harsher the methods, the more counterproductive the outcome. 
Extreme methods, they contend, harbour reluctance and encourage evasion by the private 
sector to avoid compliance. 
I don’t think it is helpful to tighten the lid so much on private businesses. One, 
they’ll find other crooked ways to get the visas and two, from personal 
experience, the presence of expats is still crucial to most organizations. [Saudi 
retail business, Jeddah] 
In summary, Saudis’ reactions to Saudization methods are clear. On the one hand, those in 
higher management positions almost always agreed that strict methods may work 
temporarily but are damaging in the long term. Their day-to-day experience, managing the 
body of labour in an organization, gives them a clearer view of the needs that cannot be 
fulfilled solely by nationals. On the other end, unemployed and newly employed Saudis are 
in agreement that their odds in finding jobs are higher when expatriates are dismissed. 
Thus, regardless of the method, their attitude is that ‘the government knows what is best 
for us and for the private businesses'. The expatriate’s opinion on Saudization’s methods is 
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rather one of despair, sadness and humiliation. Those that have come recently to the 
kingdom and are employed in menial jobs are simply happy to have been recruited and are 
willing to extend their stay in any way possible once their contract expires. Eventually, 
they will face deportation, they say, but until then, a few extra thousand Riyals would help.  
To others, who have built a life for themselves and their families in Saudi Arabia for years 
and even decades, the kingdom is their only home. They are often at an age that prevents 
them beginning again elsewhere, including their home countries. To this group, 
Saudization laws are “unwise” and “unfair”. They express the view that most young Saudis 
are not willing to put up with the long hours and hardship they have experienced. They 
also point to a failure of judgment on the government’s side and the possible damage and 
loss to private businesses due to the absence of qualities such as dedication, hard work and 
a positive work ethic among the majority of Saudis. 
I hate bringing this up, but it is true. Will the Saudi stand there and take all that 
arrogance and nonsense from the buyer and still serve him. [Egyptian sales and 
retail, Jeddah] 
Sadness and feelings of betrayal are easy to detect as a reaction, especially to non-renewal 
of their status in the kingdom. Most of the expatriates couple their sentiment with the view 
that although their lives in Saudi Arabia were restrictive, isolated and hard, it was good for 
them and the future of their families. They argue that, although they are aware that Saudis 
need their place theoretically, it is too soon and some expatriates with an immaculate 
record of service and personal record must be exempted as a reward for their good and 
long service in the kingdom. 
I’ve lived here since 1976. I always thought I’d leave when the youngest of my 
daughters had graduated from university and married. Yes, I’ll take my old 
woman then and we’ll retire back home. But this is too soon. I feel almost 
cheated yet I don’t like saying this. You probably think I’m a greedy fool! 
[Expatriate food and beverage, Jeddah] 
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Barriers to Saudization 
Many observers believe that the barriers facing Saudization are due to the inefficiency of 
its objectives, policies, timing and lack of groundwork. Others believe it is the private 
sectors’ inability to oblige, sacrifice time and resources to invest in the Saudi national.  
Saudi workers referred to their economic expectations, educational factors, and choices of 
career planning, work circumstances and social constraints as barriers to their success in 
playing their expected role in Saudization. Firstly, Saudi workers are under great economic 
pressure and expectation to perform. The high cost of living, ratio of dependency per 
person and lack of women’s participation in the economy, adds to the pressure and conflict 
for the individual seeking a job. Young Saudis’ expectations are high as a result of being 
brought up in a welfare society. Free education up to the level of university, plus a monthly 
stipend from the government, encourages many who are academically able to take 
advantage of the highest level of education available to them. 
One of the disadvantages of this, many Saudi human resources managers say, is that 
graduates are suddenly faced with real-life economic needs and an inability to meet the 
labour market’s requirements at the time of graduation. In addition, culturally, most young 
men are expected to get married, become the breadwinner of a new family as well as 
financially helping their aging parents and many siblings. This intense socio-economic 
pressure is an additional challenge to the new graduate and makes the adjustment to the 
work place, patience in building experience and climbing the employment ladder that 
much harder. This drives many young Saudis to change jobs often looking for an instant 
pay increase, depriving them of focus to learn and time to adjust to the work environment, 
let alone a chance enjoy what they are doing. 
Really, you cannot blame me! Five hundred Riyals might be insignificant to 
you. To me, it is fewer instalments on my car and may get me closer to 
marrying. It is most definitely worth changing jobs. [Saudi receptionist, private 
hospital, Jeddah] 
They try to outsmart me; I’ll do the same. I’ll get some experience here, and 
bye bye! I’ll automatically get another 20 percent increase now that I have 
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them on my CV! [Saudi IT technician officer, Jeddah] 
The second barrier relates to the lack of proper educational background. Fieldwork clearly 
indicates that most unemployed young Saudis struggling to find a job are High school 
graduates, followed by a small percentage of university graduates in specialties not in 
demand by the Saudi labour market. The reason high school graduates struggle with 
finding employment, considering the fact that millions of expatriates working in the 
kingdom are not much more qualified, is the quality of skills learned in the Saudi school 
system. The reference here is to basic soft skills, for example communication, problem-
solving and professional conduct, as well as hard skills like a command of the English 
language and IT literacy. 
They ask me how good my English is. I tell them, as good as they taught me in 
the school! You can’t expect me to speak English like the Filipino or the 
Indian; it is fed to them since childhood. Ask anyone; we learn English ABC 
at14 by a Saudi teacher who translates the lesson into Arabic! [Saudi errand 
messenger, industry and retail organization, Jeddah]   
Another complex barrier to Saudization from the worker’s perspective has to do with lack 
of career planning and awareness. As mentioned earlier, surprisingly many of the 
unemployed are university graduates. A closer look at their situation suggests that 
thousands of graduates yearly from Saudi universities hold a major that is simply not in 
demand by the labour market.  
This was not the case fifteen years ago. Then the government was able to find employment 
for all. Now, however, certain subjects (for example Arabic language, Islamic law, libraries 
and archives) are taken mainly by young Saudis who did not achieve their high school 
academic expectations. Their chances of obtaining jobs that relate directly to these subjects 
are slim.  
Right now, I’m employed with my high school diploma. I stayed nearly three 
years after university waiting for a job. Do you see this guy next to me? He is 
paid twice as much as me, and we’re both university graduates! Don’t four 
years of education count for anything? [Saudi receptionist, industrial 
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organization, Jeddah] 
I’m still looking for a better job. If in another year or two I can’t find one, I’ll 
open a small business of my own. [26-year-old Saudi Islamic Law graduate, 
Jeddah] 
Saudis who feel challenged because they landed a lower position than expected because 
they were not qualified enough, often realize this deficiency and are willing to compensate 
for it. Some even channel their disappointment into a genuine desire to better themselves. 
The luckier ones are those who land employment in an organization committed to training 
its employees and have a career path clearly set. The national newcomer, who is willing to 
put in the necessary work and develop their skills, will flourish in such an environment. 
However, the majority do not. They seek private courses, workshops and training 
programmes. With this, comes the cost issue, for most reliable courses offered by private 
educational and training institutes are completely unaffordable for the starting income of 
the young Saudi employee. 
The company won’t pay and I cannot sacrifice two thirds of my monthly pay 
for that long. Maybe I’ll wait until one of those centres offers a good course for 
affordable instalments. [Saudi secretary, private hospital, Jeddah] 
Although the private sector complains of Saudis’ lack of motivation and low initiative as 
innate characteristics, the workers’ present a causal rationale coupled with many heartfelt 
justifications.  
Look, let’s be fair, the Saudi is brought up in a certain way; protected and 
unexposed. He receives poor education and little guidance as to what his future 
requires of him. All his life, he is expected to attend university regardless of 
what and how. He ends up studying a different major to what he desires 
because his marks are low. He is not only poorly qualified and unready, but the 
private sector shuns him on arrival with impossible demands and  
a preconceived notion that he will fail. [Saudi personnel, retail business] 
Additionally, for young Saudis approaching work and failing in a new job contribute to the 
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vicious circle of low self-esteem and de-motivation most feel. 
The fact that Saudis feel that the work, pay structure, requirements and workplace 
ambience are more suitable for expatriates represents another barrier to Saudization from 
the worker’s point of view. They state their refusal to work the same long hours without 
the appropriate financial compensation as their counterpart the expatriate does. The latter is 
forgiving when the private organization dismisses his right for overtime a manifestation of 
his keenness on retaining employment. They confirm that a significant part of the problem 
facing the process of Saudization, on their part, is their inability to sacrifice their identity in 
order to fit into the expatriate worker’s stereotype, as created by the private sector.  
According to the Saudi Press Agency, citing government data, a high percentage of Saudis 
are dissatisfied with the pay system in the light of inflation and having large families to 
support. Saudi Arabia's annual inflation rate rose to 10.6 percent in June 2008: the highest 
in 30 years. They say that most expatriates, whom they are to replace, have few expenses 
while living in the Kingdom and that their transferred monthly pay to their homeland is 
sufficient for a decent life and future for the standards of living there. 
Be logical, he, the Filipino accountant clerk, can live as a rich man back in Manila 
on 700 dollars a month. He lives and eats in the company’s compound for nothing. 
Translated in Riyals it is 2600, just a bit more than my rent and we haven’t started 
with expenses, the wife’s needs and the car instalments. Can we both live the same 
life on the same pay? [Saudi accountant trainee, marketing organization] 
Complaints about the work environment by unemployed Saudis and new entrants describe the 
work ambience as governed by ways only the expatriate worker can be comfortable with. The 
kind of superiority supervisors’ hold over employees in setting policies and communication is 
described as impossible and demeaning. This is made worse by the Saudi’s exaggerated fear of 
how this could affect his image, being a national, and feeling that unlike the expatriate, 
“everybody around here knows me!” 
They are so impatient and can get angry and yell at you like they are your 
father or uncle. One mistake and it is a public lecture on the do’s and the don’ts 
all over again. [Saudi medical filer, Jeddah] 
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This old Egyptian head of our department, he calls every one Ya walad (Hey 
boy) when he’s angry. The Indians and Filipinos laugh at being called so. 
Either they don’t get it or they don’t care. Me, I want to wring his neck![Saudi 
salesman, retail, Jeddah] 
The expatriates, submissive and under the threat of deportation, have set a record of 
obedience and cooperation beyond the young Saudis’ ability to tolerate. Superiors have no 
respect for them, they protest, as a result of having their way and a tight grip on the 
expatriates’ life while working in the kingdom. 
They hold their passport and could stop them from returning to their countries, 
even if it is for a family member’s death. They are ruined and spoiled from 
playing God to those poor people. [Saudi administrative assistant, Jeddah] 
A statistically insignificant number of the unemployed Saudis interviewed blame personal 
attitude or lack of skills for their unemployment (only two out of ten interviewees for this 
research mention lack of ability or willingness to fulfil the job requirements). Some feel 
too intimidated to fill the shoes of their rival non-nationals. The ability to work long hours 
or have little time off for social matters and family obligations, they claim, is “something 
the foreigner can do” 
He came here just for work. No family, wife or friends. I can’t work late or 
during the national holiday because my family is in Mecca and I must be with 
them. 
They also feel that their education and basic working skills are challenged in a modern 
work environment. As soon as the Saudi starts working in a private organization, he is 
confronted with the need to write reports competently, enter data in English and adjust to a 
much more technically sophisticated style of performance than he is prepared for. Saudis 
complain that neither their grasp of English nor their use of technology is of a similar 
standard to their expatriate counterparts, and feel frustrated that this is expected of them on 
commencement. 
I honestly know I’ll eventually learn all this and that. But it is unimaginably 
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hard the first few months to grab what everyone around me knows and does so 
easily. [Saudi storekeeper, Jeddah] 
I spent nights educating myself on PowerPoint and Excel. It was part of 
everything that was asked of me. I was certain I’d be sacked if I didn’t get it 
right. [Saudi social worker, Jeddah] 
A last barrier to Saudization is represented by social constraints that Saudis feel do not 
allow them to fill many of the potential jobs made available by Saudization. Unemployed 
Saudis, and those who tend to move jobs frequently (mostly high school and below 
qualifications), complain that social considerations still prevent them from accepting 
certain categories and type of occupations. They confess their fear of society’s stereotyping 
and low regard of manual labour and certain service-oriented job categories. A few have 
even mentioned claiming that they have different (and better) jobs than they in fact do to 
their family, spouse and future in-laws. Saudization, in their view, is creating jobs. 
However, they contend that the jobs created are in many cases not suitable because of low 
wages, social reasons or both.  
Saudis who need a job frequently feel unable to break the norms of what is socially 
accepted. As a result of this, many young Saudis will not take up many available jobs 
because society still has a low regard for manual and technical occupations, considering 
them inferior to a lower paying office job that involves a desk in an air conditioned office. 
Not yet. It is the society. Look at the west, England, France and the USA; 
plumbers, bakers and carpenters are locals. We must change that in our society. 
The whole nation can’t possibly expect to work as bankers and real estate 
agents! [Saudi baker Jeddah] 
Even if I went technical and I knew I’d have a job ready, what would I tell my 
in-laws? I am a carpenter? [Saudi unemployed 22-year-old, Jeddah] 
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Worker’s Interrelations and Saudization  
It is worth exploring the relationship between the Saudis and the expatriate in the national 
labour market. The way each regards the other is important, for although one is 
theoretically supposed to replace the other, they still work side by side and are very 
dependent on each other for getting the job done. It is also interesting to note what the 
Saudi employee thinks of the expatriate’s strengths and weakness, and vice versa. After all, 
the Saudi labour market is built largely around one (the expatriate) and needs to be 
adjusted for the other (the Saudi national). 
Fieldwork has uncovered a wide assortment of impressions and sentiments that Saudis and 
expatriates hold of each other and.  
The following section will analyze the different opinionsheld by Saudis towards 
Expatriates, but also Expatriates’ views on Saudis, as well as Saudi’s views of other Arab 
nationals and their own fellow Saudi workers. 
The balance of power in the workplace obviously plays an important role in shaping 
employment relations in the case of Saudi Arabia. Relations of power are built along the 
perceptions of the level of power that each party may have of the other and by assessing 
which party hold the advantage (Rose, 2008). The interviews conducted showed that 
Saudis’ relations to expatriates differ according to their skill level. For instance, Saudis 
would feel threatened by highly skilled expatriates as they fear the expatriate’s level of 
expertise and education; on the other hand they tend to take their frustration out on the less 
skilled expatriates to whom they feel superior in terms of cultural and social background.  
For Saudis, stereotyping expatriates at the supervisor level, as well as their fellow 
expatriate workers, is evidently a means of expressing frustration. According to the theory 
of stereotyping in employment relations, this represents a common behaviour when two 
ethnic groups come into competition with one another for economic rewards (Rose, 2008). 
This feeling is aggravated by the Saudi’s struggle to maintain employment as a national 
new-hire in many private sector organizations (especially medium to large in size). 
Stereotyping is defined as the process of thinking in terms of fixed and inflexible 
categories (Rose, 2008), and in this sense, race, nationality and behavioural characteristics 
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are all stereotypes that Saudis, young and old, use as an answer when asked about the 
characteristics of their counterparts.  
Oh, it is like the United Nations here, the Arabs, Africans, Mediterranean and a 
few blonde ones that we rarely get to work with, countries should learn from us 
how to deal with other countries. I’ll write for you a page of description on 
every nationality. [Saudi receptionist JCCI] 
Fieldwork, however, has revealed divisions in the way the Saudis’ opinions are split 
regarding negative and positive traits in the different nationalities with whom they share 
the work place. Generally, positive characteristics, the researcher realized, turn negative 
when talking about those expatriates directly in charge of Saudis or who have a say in 
dismissing them.  
The worst is the Arab supervisor. He is mean, ignorant and foul mouthed. I 
think his only reason for being here is to enjoy authority over us. [Saudi trainee 
retail Jeddah] 
A sense of superiority and judgment was noticeable when Saudi workers were assessing 
expatriates. Interestingly, the lower the skill level and social status of the Saudi worker, the 
harsher the verdict is of the expatriate. Scapegoating, or blaming people for things/events 
which are not their fault is a kind of stereotyping behaviour which was recognizable during 
some interviews carried out for this research among Saudis on their views towards 
expatriates. Superficial features such as appearance, body odour and accent were always 
mentioned and mimicked disapprovingly when referring to socio-economically less 
fortunate expatriates who had a submissive and non-confrontational cultural background, 
such as the Egyptians and the Indians. Sadly, among this group little was mentioned in 
regard to the expatriate’s style of work, dedication or ethic.  
He does not care at all about his hygiene.  He might manage looking good on 
the outside but his personal hygiene, God he stinks. What else can I tell you 
about the Egyptian employee? He is ill tempered. He keeps saying, “I 
understand, I understand.” I’m trying to picture some of the Egyptian 
employees here in the hospital that I work with and God he’s a liar.  He would 
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never take the information correctly to the superior. [Saudi security guard, 
industrial and retail organization.] 
Other negative descriptions have flowed, usually toward the end of an interview, of more 
relevance to the core of Saudization. Saudis condemn expatriates with accusations of 
faking their qualifications and accusations that they are rarely serious about protecting the 
organization that employs them.  
They say we aren’t qualified, I assume they verify every diploma of Filipinos 
to check if it is original, don’t give me that! [Saudi receptionist Jeddah] 
They claim the expatriate work force is like a spider web in an organization. ‘Threads’ of 
relatives and friends are usually recruited to fill vacancies using dubious diplomas and fake 
degrees to prove eligibility. This also implies that the web of relatives will cover for each other 
and hide mistakes and discrepancies while doing exactly the opposite to the new inexperienced 
Saudi workforce; magnifying their shortcomings and reporting them to management. 
Contrary to what is believed the expatriates also have some kind of support 
system. Say he’s working here in Jeddah; he will work hard to bring his 
brother, then his wife, then his other brother, then and his friends. It’s like a 
spider web. I notice them here in the hospital every day around me. They then 
cover for each other like family and make each look better individually. [Saudi 
IT personnel, private hospital, Jeddah] 
Saudis feel isolated in an organization as they commence training and declare that their 
counterparts, the expatriates, are keen on keeping them in the dark. Saudis express their 
anger at expatriates, claiming that they are not sincere when it comes to training the Saudi 
newcomer, and that they intentionally withhold helpful information that might lead to 
Saudis acquiring the skills required faster and performing better sooner. Seniority, 
experience and the foreign language they share in an organizational subculture are all 
means of further alienating the National employee.  
Yes, especially the group I am working with. Even the foreigners amongst us 
are highly educated and quite scientific but I must say there is something 
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secretive about them. [Saudi lab technician, private health care] 
Saudi workers complain that as they enter an organization, part of their struggle in 
adjustment is that older expatriate workers are not keen on delivering all aspects of the 
requisite training. To them, this is an indication that the expatriate not only distrusts the 
Saudi newcomer’s ability to learn but it is also a way to delay and interfere with his/ her 
training negatively. 
For example, when I ask how are you going to charge this patient?  What’s the 
method?  They would say later, later. Oh, it’s okay. It’s easy. We will tell you 
later. I would ask how do I channel this patient? Is there a special treatment for 
his being a VIP or an insurance patient? She would not give me the 
information I need. [Saudi administrative trainee, private health care, Jeddah] 
Probing into how Saudis regard other nationalities at work proved Saudis have some 
positive remarks on some of the expatriate workers when asked questions out of the 
context of their own employment. In this context they would praise the expatriates’ ability 
to apply himself to the job with dedication. 
It is easy for me to say that they know better than the national and that they are 
able to accomplish things faster. [Saudi secretary, pharmaceutical company]  
The majority of findings agreed on the many positive traits the Filipino worker has. Their 
discipline, personal hygiene and hard work were all commonly given answers when asked 
why they value the Filipino so highly. 
I put Filipinos in first rank. They are very submissive and punctual. In fact 
he/she is made for work. His requirements are nearly always very limited. 
While Arabs, Oh my God the Arabs!  [Sudanese Consultant physician, Jeddah] 
Nationals also express their admiration for the way in which Filipinos manage years of 
exile from their homes and families working in Saudi Arabia, trying to make ends meet 
while still maintaining a positive outlook on life. 
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Filipinos have a great work ethic and they are being paid for that. I also respect 
the fact that they tend to find ways to enjoy themselves as well, so they live a 
bit better and contribute to the work place with their pleasant attitude. [Saudi 
Lab technician, private hospital, Jeddah] 
Young Saudis and other nationalities credited the Filipino workers with qualities they 
regarded as ideal and impressive in an organization. The research confirms, however, that 
credit is not due to the Filipinos’ effort to work hard, applying him/ herself to the job and 
being ethical alone. Instead, more simply, the Filipino has a greater economic motivation 
to work hard. Only the skilled and highly skilled Saudis were objective as to why the 
Filipino worker has admirable qualities. Fieldwork recorded fascinating rationales given by 
Saudis in this regard, varying from crediting the American influence on the islands of the 
Philippines, to superior Christian work values. 
Although Saudis are critical about other religions and are rarely interested in other faiths, 
many of the Saudi workers interviewed revealed appreciation of the positive qualities in 
their counterpart “despite” his/her religious faith being different to theirs. 
And you know how three quarters of them are Christians, they’re not Muslims 
like us. But my God, they watch themselves and “they are conscientious”.  
This is what I call work ethics. [Saudi Administrator, private hospital, Jeddah] 
Some even acknowledged that some Far Eastern have the advantage of being judged as 
individuals and not because they are of a clan or a family of status as with Saudis.  
Their importance and joy actually come from doing a good job; not like us - 
ours comes from saying I’m the son of so and so, I’ve got so and so. [Saudi 
Secretary, private hospital, Jeddah] 
Those who regard the expatriates positively refer to characteristics of discipline, focus, and 
hard work and to a lesser degree, efficiency. Commonly, those positive traits are seen as a 
result of the expatriate’s living condition, and his or her exile in a foreign country. In other 
words, the majority of Saudis struggling to land or keep employment believe that the 
expatriate is skilful at what he does because he has no choice but to perform well or else to 
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face repatriation and the loss of income. 
He is focused, he is a hard worker, and there is no limit to what he can accomplish. 
Maybe because he came from his country for a specific target and he is also 
obedient. And they only will ask for the overtime when they’re sure they’ve 
earned it. [Saudi medical secretary, private health care] 
Well, the non-Saudi is somebody active, because this is his only source of 
income, nothing else.  He comes to the work place on time and understands the 
tasks quickly. I think they are disciplined. [Saudi administrator, IT 
organization, Jeddah] 
Stereotyping by Saudis is not limited to south East Asians; it includes Arabs from 
neighbouring countries. Again, the mixture of negative and positive traits appears vividly 
in Saudis’ descriptions of their fellow workers. A harsher tone was detected in Saudis 
describing other Arabs, perhaps because Saudis feel that they could do the jobs of 
expatriate Arabs just as well, unlike the case of the unskilled menial labourers (who work 
with their hands all day) or the very technical Asians. 
The Syrian and the Lebanese are different.  The Lebanese works perfectly, 
even when he selects things, even the tasks he’s about to do, usually elegant 
and sweet mouthed. The Syrian, goes yella, yella Mitelhek“as such”. The 
Jordanian, is similar, but a little bit more efficient than the Syrian. [Saudi 
administration assistant, heavy machinery enterprise] 
During the course of fieldwork conducted for this thesis, clear evidence emerged that the 
expatriates in the majority of businesses generally held Saudi workers in low regard. 
Exceptions were only made for a small percentage of Saudis who have acquired high 
levels of education and also for those who possessed skills of high international standards 
and language ability. Fieldwork showed that different nationalities working in the kingdom 
stereotype and mock other nationalities and use similar jibes as the Saudi work force. 
However careful and discrete about their opinion, when probed, they labelled, mocked and 
ethnically grouped Saudis and other expatriates in characteristics, attitude, accent and 
appearance. 
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The expatriates also had opinions about his new Saudi colleagues. He regards them mostly 
with envy and, in many interviews, disdain. The majority felt that Saudis had it easy; the 
government paves the way for them, offering free education, training and employment. 
The young Saudis, they claim, are arrogant, undisciplined, disrespectful and under no real 
pressure to perform. They have a well-formulated answer when asked why they think 
Saudis are not qualified for the labour market. They state reasons including upbringing, 
education, economic stature and lack of exposure. Upbringing and education among 
Saudis, they deduce, are deficient in building a personality that is realistic about the 
importance of work and the attitude to acquire the skills necessary for an ethical, skilful 
and hard-working individual. Their view of the Saudi family upbringing is that it harbours 
a sense of false importance and dependency.  
When the Saudi is a little boy, I heard, he is always served. His mother is a 
home keeper, girls, his sisters, come second to boys and they do everything for 
him. [Filipina secretary, IT business, Jeddah] 
As for the expatriate’s view of the Saudi educational outcome, it is a guess rather than 
knowledge of the system that brings them to the conclusion that it is poor and inefficient. 
They express doubt as to the technical, practical and ethical value of the system. Their 
basis of comparison is their own educational background, bearing in mind that their 
countries are economically less fortunate and education is not free past a certain basic 
level, unlike in Saudi Arabia. 
When I see how young Saudis are disrespectful of authority at the work place, I 
wonder if their school ever taught them to respect the school or the teacher. 
[Expatriate training instructor, Jeddah] 
Things like singing the anthem and respecting school uniform are all in my view 
things that build character and respect of the organization. I doubt Saudi schools 
care for any of that. [Expatriate Administrator, private hospital, Jeddah] 
Fieldwork further exposed the expatriates’ low regard of the basic technical, linguistic and 
soft skills Saudi graduates bring to the labour market. Lacking sympathy, they complain 
that Saudis are neither fit to replace them nor easily trained to compensate for their 
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deficient practical skills. 
I’m not saying that we, expats, are perfect but it is in our basic education 
curricular to acquire IT skills, learn whatever terminology needed for our 
discipline and we even have competition in surviving the challenges of another 
foreign work environment. [Filipino admen assistant industrial organization] 
In addition to the wrap-around nature of family upbringing and education, expatriates 
consider that Saudis, born in relative wealth and in a state that subsidizes or offers free 
services that elsewhere have to be paid for, never feel the economic pressures to learn, earn 
or qualify for anything. 
To most expatriates, especially at the medium level of skill, it is shocking and unusual how 
young Saudis pocket money and extras from their parents even into their late teens, and 
that they almost always depend on a relative to find them a job. 
Back home, we wash cars after school, wait on tables to earn our pocket money 
and help our families. Later at college, we study by day and take a part-time 
job at night in a gas station or a restaurant to pay for our tuition and books. I 
don’t think many Saudis learn to work before they hit the job market. [Indian 
communications officer, Jeddah] 
Observers never fail to notice the cultural shock Saudis from different social strata suffer 
when introduced to a mixed work environment. Brought up in complete isolation from 
females, except immediate family members, young Saudis generally react negatively in 
one of two ways. 
The first reaction is negative: rejecting the mere idea of working alongside a female fellow 
worker. Male Saudi workers are far less forgiving of Saudi women than expatriate women 
for allowing themselves to be among men; the latter is not required to abide by Islamic 
cultural and religious teachings especially if she is from another faith. The researcher 
concludes that, although the core of Islam encourages tolerance, respect of other faiths and 
kindness, young Saudis have a sterner, more prejudiced understanding of its practice. The 
lack of exposure to a mixed environment in this case comes also from an added solid 
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cultural common belief that a female’s place is at home, nurturing children, being 
responsible for house chores and being looked after by a male.  
Listen to me, well, actually not just me. The Imam in our mosque even speaks 
of this. It is the end of time when women stoop to work shoulder to shoulder 
[with men] in no Mahrams [male next of kin] presence. This is imported from 
the corrupted west. If their men were men, they wouldn’t accept this shame 
[Saudi driver, pharmaceutical retail, Jeddah] 
The second reaction is also negative and disruptive; the young Saudis become completely 
distracted by the unsupervised proximity of a female colleague. Flirtation and harassment 
are not uncommon in such situations; it is counter-productive for both sexes and extremely 
intimidating for the female work force. 
Our worst problem with Saudis when we started to build our Saudi work force 
was their inability to deal with the women around them. To most, this was a 
first! To see her, talk to her and watch her go about her day was like a miracle. 
I swear, we used to drag them like lambs back to their posts. Months would go 
by before the last few succeeded at controlling their impulses. [Jordanian HR 
admen, private hospital, Jeddah] 
The Expatriate’s criticism of the Saudi worker is not far different from this of nationals 
criticizing other nationals, except maybe harsher. The hard reality of the expatriate, whose 
job is at threat, is reflected in his/her judgment on the Saudi replacing them or acting as a 
management superior because that job is reserved for Saudis. 
I mean the wealth falls from the sky on Saudi Arabia, and then it gets 
distributed to the individuals. What do they do? Just marry 2, 3, 4 ladies and sit 
spending all at wealth on their enjoyment and pleasure. What do they do for 
their nation? What’s their contribution to the generations to come? The result is 
just big cars and large numbers of children. [Expatriate physician, Jeddah] 
The Saudis who share this opinion of other Saudis are usually ones who have invested in 
education, skills and experience. They are haunted by the negative image of Saudis held by 
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the private sector, although they admit that many young Saudis are difficult to retain on the 
job. They say that some Saudis, lacking in skills and work ethics, continue to contribute to 
the bad image of the Saudi employee by reducing the private sector’s efficiency and 
feeding its preconceived negative image of national manpower. 
He does not accomplish (anything) quickly. He tends to procrastinate and if he 
can, he’d let someone else do it. He works, but it’s almost like he’s not really 
into it.  He needs the money, yet he does not want to put in the effort. [Saudi 
administrator, private hospital, Jeddah] 
The Saudis’ negative opinion of other Saudis at work is purely for professional reasons. 
They say that it is hard enough for them to find a job, to train and to progress in it, whilst 
being burdened by the reputation of Saudis as being spoiled and lacking in work ethics. 
Being labelled, they claim, is a battle on its own, and that it takes extra effort and years of 
maintaining high standards on the part of the successful few because of this label. 
When we started working here, they looked down at us, as Saudis. The kind of 
instructions they gave me is similar to the ones you give to a five year old. They 
had made up their minds that I wouldn’t last, just like those that they had worked 
with before. I feel judged and scrutinized all the time. [Saudi medical supplies 
dispenser, private hospital] 
Successful Stories 
Success stories of workers and Saudization are many. There are, as fieldwork portrays, 
positive images of young men and women who set examples of genuine hard work, 
perseverance and dedication. It is imperative here to distinguish clearly elements that 
contribute to the success of Saudization from the perspective of workers; one is on an 
individual level, regardless of skills, and the other is on an organizational level.  
On the individual level, Saudi workers who succeed are typically from a family 
background characterized by hard work, emphasis on academic excellence and a structured 
upbringing. According to many years of professional experience working in human 
resources and with establishing productive families programmes, this family’s environment 
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is respectful of work as a concept; it harbours independence and encourages its children to 
plan for the future. They are generally exposed to other cultures and respectful of 
differences in others. Examples of this appear in how they regard co-workers from other 
nationalities and their moderation in accepting other cultures as represented at work, in the 
media and on satellite TV.  
Regardless of the socio-economic status of the family, the mother’s role is predictive of 
how able young family members are to be when they reach the labour market. An aware, 
educated and working mother is most often associated with professional and work-
respecting children. This family environment is less reliant on domestic help; parents and 
children are involved in each other’s wellness and care. Most workers who are a product of 
such a family background describe growing up in what seems to be a sub-culture protected 
from the general ways of Saudi living and the socio economic effects of the 1970’s oil 
boom. 
My God, I always felt I was brought up in a military camp. Compared to my 
cousins and my younger brothers, they are utterly spoiled. But I am proud 
because I made something out of myself. Neither of my brothers finished their 
high school. One of them went to Cairo to get a (nonsense) diploma of some 
sort and my parents just flew to Egypt yesterday to bring him back and put him 
through university. Problem is, they are still promising him a car if he does it, 
and a long holiday with his friends. I don’t know what’s gotten into 
them![Saudi female executive secretary, private hospital, Jeddah] 
It isn’t like we couldn’t afford hiring a chauffeur, but my parents made sure one 
of them picked us up from school and lunch time was all about who did what 
that day and which one of us scored high in school. [Saudi 23 yr old 
entrepreneur, Jeddah] 
Commonly, the family background of successful individuals at work is connected with the 
home role in education, ethics and role modelling. Many examples of young Saudis at 
work referred to school religion as “theoretical” and described the possible influence of 
Islam taught to them as “do’s and don’ts, “strict practices of rituals” and “in complete 
separation from real life”. 
167 
 
The teacher himself has no clue about his mission. He comes, he blabbers and 
leaves without the slightest concern if the students got it or not! [Saudi nurse, 
government hospital, Jeddah] 
Basically, a successful Saudi worker (diligent, and honest) is a product of a family that is 
structured, respectful of hard work and connected to their children’s progress both at home 
and at school. It seems to be conclusive that the role of the family in the lives and 
performance of successful Saudis at work compensates for the difference in soft skills and 
ethics learned via the educational system. In other words, successful individuals involved 
in this research repeatedly mentioned the importance of home education and family role 
models contributing towards their high achievement (both academically and in attitude) 
rather than their education at school. 
The second element that is evident in success stories of Saudization on the workers’ level 
is related to their luck in joining the right organization early on in their career. Workers, 
then, are institutionalized into a structured work environment with clear guidelines and a 
good career path. They are integrated into the work culture and are automatically part of a 
life-long learning experience. Such organizations are able to “housetrain” the worker (as in 
ARAMCO or Savola), guide and improve his abilities by constant in-service training, 
courses and a chance to grow. 
There are a lot of Saudis, Iraqis Egyptians, and Arabs generally who work and are 
successful in the West. Do you know why? They took their mother culture with them 
and modified their performance successfully according to that country’s rules and 
ways of life; they excelled there in a foreign land. I believe you can do that locally in 
a strong organization. [Saudi consultant head, HR, national organization, Jeddah] 
This stable and secure work environment compensates for what many young Saudis lack in 
their upbringing and education. It is, however, not available to the majority of new entrants 
because of the scarcity of such strongly-structured private organizations in the kingdom, 
compared with the huge numbers of newcomers to the labour market. Typically, these 
organizations have restrictive profiling and selection processes only a few Saudis can pass. 
To work for Savola means you’re good to start with. As you start, the organization 
168 
 
takes your hand, cares for you, and your education. It continues to promote you. The 
sky is your limit. I lucked out! [Savola, Saudi employee, Jeddah] 
Aramco and other Government Organizations such as the National Guard Hospitals are 
also good examples of successful organizational Saudization. Other Private organizations 
such as The Saudi American Bank and Savola have 100% and 80% Saudization achieved. 
They all share a pattern of selectivity, career path and good wages. Additionally, those 
organizations have a strong work culture and a sense of professional pride. Other 
successful organizational profiles are seen in Government organizations. Their investment 
in hiring Saudis is older than the private sector. Although their experience cannot be 
generalized for matters of size and resources as they are subsidized, one can learn from 
their positive experience and factors that promote success in Saudization. To start with, 
having a large body of employees most often helps enabling the organization to absorb the 
initial loss of productivity when hiring Saudi entrants. Another factor would be that their 
resources, being a government organization, are unlimited: thus profitability and budgetary 
constraints are never a concern. Last, these organizations have already established 
successful human resources targets, management practices and policies. Therefore, their 
management of the labour force, multi-national and local, is well established, leading to 
success in Saudization. 
Conclusion 
Saudis exhibit a mixed set of opinions about the expatriate worker. They accept the 
expatriates’ contributory skills, yet resent the skills they bring to the workplace.  The lesser 
the skill and qualification of the national, the shallower the knowledge he has of the 
process of Saudization or what is required. Expatriates also differed in their views of 
Saudization. Again, the unskilled are often unaware of the concept. Their priority is to stay 
in the kingdom for as long as possible for fear of losing a much-needed source of income. 
The skilled expatriates were aware of the aims and process of Saudization, and ranged in 
their views from understanding the need for Saudis to culturally homogenize their labour 
market, to expressing doubts about the outcome. Their views are based on personal need 
and reflective of their need to secure and prolong the kingdom’s need for their services. 
Highly skilled expatriates showed the least interest in what Saudization is about. Their 
expertise arms them with a confidence in their ability, unchallenged by the laws of one 
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particular troubled market economy. 
The Saudi and the expatriate tend to regard each other negatively. The Saudi workers 
believe that the expatriates must leave in order for them to find their rightful place in the 
national labour market. They accused expatriates of crowding them, stalling and plotting to 
exacerbate the Saudis’ negative image. The expatriates in turn demonstrated sympathy to 
the objectives of Saudization and the Saudi’s need for jobs, yet the majority verbalized 
their doubts about the national’s readiness.  
In this chapter we have argued that Saudis are not very concerned as to how Saudization is 
applied; it is the advantage it gives them in replacing the jobs of expatriates that they 
applaud. The expatriates’ response was also acknowledged regarding Saudization and its 
methods. Fieldwork reflected their real suffering at an uncertain and confusing part of their 
professional career in the kingdom. They are torn between their admission that Saudization 
is fair, and their own self-interest. Cooperation with Saudization jeopardizes their stay in 
the kingdom and the future of their families. 
Saudi workers then took centre-stage, where they discussed barriers to Saudization as they 
saw it. They candidly presented the despair, frustration and helplessness felt when 
confronted with the expectations of their profession. Some addressed their lack of skills 
and the pressure of the private sectors’ constant demand of them to simulate the 
expatriates’ level of dedication and skills. The workers also described the difficulty they 
face professionally and socially at being challenged to replace the expatriate in a labour 
market that was built around expatriate abilities and the circumstances of working away 
from their home country. They echoed their anxiety and sense of loss at trying to train 
themselves to meet these demands, given their level of skill, education and training, while 
keeping their jobs. Through it all, they are haunted by the images of “lazy” “arrogant” and 
“inefficient” Saudis as pre-conceived by the private sector.  
The chapter introduced the reader to the irony of Saudis and expatriates sharing the work 
place, which stipulates the responsibility of expatriates to assist in Saudization. This is 
fraught with conflicting interests, with so much at stake for both. In the light of this irony, 
the Saudis confessed some of their weaknesses but were happier to state the perceived 
weaknesses of the expatriate. The expatriates’ viewpoint of the national work force was 
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also addressed. 
Lastly, success stories looked at from an individual and an organizational level were 
covered to suggest which elements within a family and an organization tend to produce 
successful Saudization. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion: Managing The Transition 
 
Introduction 
Saudization is a process in transition. As it involves three stake-holders (the policy makers, 
the private sector and the workers), it has changed its dynamics since its introduction to 
better suit the parties involved. However, as we have seen in chapters four, five and six, 
Saudization objectives have not changed over the last decade. Neither has the viewpoint of 
the stakeholders regarding those objectives. Rather each of the three stakeholders has 
managed a transition of their own in terms of their dealing with Saudization. The policy 
makers still believe that the Saudi labour market must make way for unemployed nationals 
by removing as many expatriate labourers as possible, as soon as possible. They insist that 
training is the answer to the nationals’ lack of skills and work ethic. The private sector still 
regards Saudization objectives as nationalistically important and agrees that Saudis have a 
right to fully participate in his/her economy. Nevertheless, they still struggle to implement 
the laws of Saudization and argue that it is too costly to replace their expatriates with 
Saudis. As for the workers, the nationals feel that the policy of Saudization works to their 
advantage and many have used this as a weapon against the private sector especially at the 
beginning of enforcement of Saudization. Today, many young Saudis still believe they 
have a right to the expatriate’s jobs, but they have matured in their view of what this 
entails. They are becoming more educated about labour market needs and more vocal in 
stating what issues need to be addressed by both policy makers and employers.  
To conclude this thesis, this chapter will discuss the transitions of Saudization by these 
three stakeholders with a view to showing what needs to be done to more effectively 
implement the policy, reducing unemployment but maintaining efficiency. 
The Policy Maker’s View 
The Saudi Arabian Government is facing a major unemployment problem among young 
Saudis and newcomers to the labour market which requires urgent action. The economy of 
Saudi Arabia has flourished because of its oil wealth which was distributed to create state 
provision for education, health care and infrastructure. The government pursued a policy 
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that allowed labour to be recruited from out with Saudi Arabia. Government organizations 
and private businesses had no difficulty in recruiting labour from neighbouring countries, 
Europe, Africa and Asia to build the economy over a span of 30 years. This imported 
labour provided for an expanding economy which needed skilled and unskilled labour in a 
country that had to establish nearly all its ministries, organizations and policies from 
scratch. 
This oil wealth continued to support Saudi Arabia's development of state-of-the-art 
airports, government buildings, roads, highways and educational institutions. At this time 
Saudi Arabia didn’t have the expertise to go with that infrastructure, thus, it had to be 
purchased/imported. The state, lacking expertise in formal government, utilized its 
experience of tribal rule in developing a paternal system of governance. In this paternal 
system of government the oil wealth trickled from the top to the bottom creating a welfare 
state and a population that came to expect the state to provide the financial support for their 
affluent lifestyles. In addition to ruling the nation politically, Saudi Arabia produced 
millions of nationals who were followers of Wahhabism. Wahhabisim is a strict and 
orthodox school of Islam and the young nation was quick to base its educational and legal 
system upon its tenets. 
Meanwhile, as we have seen in chapter two, the population was growing at an explosive 
rate of 4.6 per cent, which only came down to 3.8 per cent in early 2000. An observer 
would note at least two problems with the population growth with regard to the labour 
market. First labour from the traditional agricultural areas had a tendency to migrate 
towards the centre of industry in search of easier ways to earn an income. A 
straightforward example is the near desertion of the local labour force of the agricultural 
lands in the south and north of the kingdom in search of easier ways to earn a living 
working for the many growing Governmental sectors in major cities. Today, Pakistani 
farmers herd sheep in the farmland in the centre and North of the Arabian Peninsula, 
instead of Saudis and their families, who own the land and the herds but live in nearby 
cities. 
The highlands of the South, which receive enough rainfall per year and produce superior 
quality fruits and vegetables, still fail to produce quantities sufficient for local consumption. 
The expatriate farmers work in the complete absence of the landowners who inherited the 
land and, until one generation ago, the skill to look after the land was passed from father to 
son. 
173 
 
 
Secondly, population growth has severely jeopardized the countries’ limited natural 
resources of food and water. In the golden years of the 1970’s oil boom, the population 
explosion was not predicted and even if it had been, politicians would probably have 
assumed that oil wealth would enable a solution to be found.  
 
Today, Saudi Arabia faces many social and economic problems: the most urgent being high 
unemployment, (estimated at 15 % excluding female unemployment). Unemployment of 
this magnitude is not unknown in other economies, however, the source of Saudi Arabia’s 
unemployment is unique and the policies adopted by the Saudi Government to address it 
add to the uniqueness of the situation. The key point is that the Saudi indigenous 
population simply does not possess the appropriate qualifications to be actively employed. 
Young Saudis, who are not lucky enough to be working for the government, are struggling 
to meet the requirements of the private sector, the only source of employment available to 
them. The private sector has learned to import specialized and other not so specialized but 
hard working labour from abroad. To the private sector, the young Saudi (with some 
exceptions) is not nearly as qualified (as his Indian IT counterpart for example) nor as hard 
working (as his Filipino counterpart: another example). 
Third, it is not an option for the private sector to hire, train and accept non-Saudi 
newcomers: instead, the government forces the private sector to do so through the process 
of Saudization. Fourth, the Saudi unemployment situation is unique because in order to 
employ all the jobless Saudis, the private sector will ultimately have to shed 4.7 million 
efficient expatriates and replace them with Saudis in the shortest time possible. 
Through nearly a decade of enforcing Saudization via the methods discussed in chapter 
four, the government has not changed its view of the policy of Saudization as an economic 
and social necessity. It, however, realized through the reluctance of the private sector the 
difficulty the policy presents to the private sector. The policy has not changed in principle 
but it has been transformed through unwritten and a few written changes to its logistics and 
targets. The policymakers have certainly realized the ineffectiveness of the ‘top down’ 
approach and have become somewhat more responsive to the reality of what the labour 
market is. They now accept that without an open forum with all stakeholders the policy 
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will continue to fall below its expectations. 
The Ministry of Labour and the Labour Offices have become more flexible about the 
methods of monitoring and imposing the process. The quotas have been reduced 
significantly with the realization that some jobs can be immediately Saudized and others 
are a long-term project that will require more effort on the part of education and human 
capital development over a generation or more. Construction labourers and other manual 
jobs, initially required to be 30 per cent Saudized, have been reduced to five per cent 
simply because young Saudis are not interested and the construction private sector will fall 
into paralysis if the quotas were not reduced. Visas to recruit expatriates for reputable 
organizations are granted provided the request is coupled with a five-year plan detailing 
how they plan to increase the numbers of Saudis they employ in the future. The complete 
restriction of certain sectors to Saudis (such as the taxi hire or the fresh produce markets) 
has eased.  
In addition, the government is communicating better with the private sector and 
considering some of their issues and suggestions on two levels. On a national level, the 
policy makers have been actively engaging in national forums to discuss unemployment 
with representatives from the private sector, NGOs, the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Higher Education and young Saudis approaching the labour market. The 
recommendations of those forums are published.  
On the policy enforcement level, the policymakers have agreed to more realistic quotas per 
sector and are presently approving a memorandum of agreement by the JCCI to raise each 
sector’s share of visas to facilitate recruitment of expatriates where Saudization is sluggish 
or not achievable in the short term. This approach is unprecedented and portrays flexibility; 
it is viewed by the private sector as a positive move towards mutual understanding by 
policy makers. 
 
The Private Sector’s View 
The private sector in Saudi Arabia has been facing a difficult situation with the 
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enforcement of Saudization. For three decades, up until the commencement of the 
Saudization programme, the private sector was dependent on imported labour for all its 
needs. It had learned over the years what countries provided the expertise best suited for 
the variety of occupations available. Visas to recruit labour were never really an issue until 
the Saudization programme became a reality. Indeed, many well connected individuals and 
businessmen have built significant fortunes from using hundreds and thousands of 
expatriates working in the kingdom under their name for others in return for monthly/ 
yearly fees. Provided the private sector knew how to recruit and paid the expenses, the 
Government did not interfere. Furthermore, the laws passed by policy makers regarding 
expatriates strengthened the private sector’s grip over them as long as they worked and 
lived in the kingdom. The expatriate is totally under the control of his sponsor starting 
from needing his sponsor’s permission to perform any mundane personal procedure to 
having his passport held by the sponsor and not being able to own anything under his own 
name. All of the above provided the private sector with an expectation of what conditions 
would make their employees work best. It is fair to say that the majority of expatriates had 
these qualities, adjusted to the sponsorship regulations, (which can be abused), and 
managed to adjust to the many social and religious restrictions.  
To the private sector, loans to start or expand a business were made accessible. Reduced 
cost for utilities and free land encouraged the private sector to develop. Minimum taxation 
was imposed for religious purposes (Zakat), and although many businesses did not see the 
value of paying Zakat through the government, no objection was made for such a small 
sacrifice. 
In the early 1990’s Saudization was starting to be mentioned in the local press as the 
Government’s immediate plan for the labour market. The majority of the private businesses 
simply ignored the idea of nationals ever replacing their dependable expatriate workers. 
Businesses considered this just a precaution from the policy makers after the Gulf War left 
its dent on the national GDP and the Government’s grand plans, construction contracts and 
infrastructure expansions all came to a grinding halt. 
At the time, the private sector and the rest of the, then, expanding population trusted that 
the world would never survive without Saudi oil and that the economy would bounce back. 
Reports of rising poverty and rates of unemployment were not alarming to the private 
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sector and it just wished Saudization away. As mentioned earlier, it was not until 1998, that 
the Government made its intentions about imminent Saudization very clear. The 
Saudization laws started to be passed, and to the private sector it seemed that, suddenly, it 
had to abide by the new startling reality of the Saudization programme. 
Initially, many of the private sectors’ representatives presented a case to the policy makers 
hoping to be the exception to the rule. They pleaded with the Ministry of Labour and the 
Manpower Counsel to postpone the compliance deadlines and continued to issue them with 
visas and renew old ones. The Government position however was unyielding. Soon after, 
by 1999, the Ministry of Labour was conducting random inspections of private business 
premises with inspectors to insure that the organizations started fulfilling the designated 
initial quotas of Saudi employees and covered the stated restricted job titles with nationals. 
As a result of these inspections, a large percentage of national organizations responded with 
practices such as hiring Saudis as a front for businesses, hiring young unqualified Saudis just 
to have them on the payroll, and buying visas to recruit expatriates from a then flourishing 
black market. What made matters worse was that the Saudization formula then was primitive 
and the logistics of going through the replacement process were haphazardly carried out by 
policymakers. Even those representatives of the different private sectors who were willing to 
conform lacked the knowhow and thought it was insulting to have to deal with this new 
breed of labour; the Saudi worker. 
The private sector, in an attempt to meet Saudization quotas, started hiring individuals 
recommended by the labour offices and others that felt encouraged to knock on the private 
sector’s door. Their experiences in hiring varied depending on the field of specialty, level 
of qualification (of the employee) and the pay offered. The majority of employers began 
this process by delegating the Saudis to menial and simple clerical jobs visible yet 
insignificant to the flow of work. The expense of keeping those Saudi’s on the record to 
present to the authorities was small compared to the benefit of appearing compliant to the 
Labour Ministry whilst at the same time continuing to renew and obtain visas to recruit 
expatriates from abroad. By the end of 1999 the Ministry of Labour recognized this was 
happening and applied tighter measures regarding job titles and wage percentages allocated 
to Saudi employees.  
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With this, a new era of added difficulty began for the private sector in which not only were 
they expected to hire increasingly larger numbers of nationals, but were also obliged to 
make them work. Moreover, the Saudization laws at this point began to widen the list of 
occupations restricted to Saudis. Inspections of businesses at this stage became more 
thorough to verify any organization’s non-compliance with stated job role criteria 
mandated by the Government. 
The logical thing for private organizations to do was to hire a Saudi professional for the 
job stated by the government whilst maintaining the expatriate as a subordinate to him to 
guarantee quality of performance and minimise the disruption caused by the Saudi’s lack 
of expertise, experience and poor time-keeping. It wasn’t uncommon at this time for 
private organizations to demote heads of essential departments and replace them with 
Saudis, whilst continuing to pay both staff members full salaries. Obviously in the long 
term this would constitute an unacceptable financial burden on any organization.  
Protestations to the Ministry of Labour to relax those job restrictions went unheeded. The 
circle of restrictions widened and was followed by the full closure of the banking sector, 
the gold market, the fresh produce market, and the limousine [taxi hire] business to expats. 
Only the banking sector survived those restrictions and, as detailed in chapter five, the gold 
market, fresh produce market and the limousine business are still struggling to meet these 
severe employment requirements. 
As a result of this, many private businesses were bankrupted, or relocated in other Gulf 
countries. A few managed to keep their businesses struggling on despite being forced to 
hire unqualified, uninterested nationals instead of their usual hardworking and reliable 
expatriates. Here we will use the example of the closing of the gold and jewellery markets 
to further explain the shortcomings of Saudization laws and highlight that particular 
sector’s difficulties through attempts to abide by the Ministry of Labour’s laws. The 
decision to close the jewellery and gold market was postponed for nearly a year before it 
came into effect in 2004. In the first place jewellery and gold are different commodities. 
They require different skills, knowledge and training, and experts in the field object to 
combining them as one specialty in the first place. Fieldwork has highlighted the 
differences between the two professions. A gold salesman deals with accurately weighing 
gold and in pointing out the features of each piece. On the other hand a jeweller is 
someone who has preferably studied gemmology or had enough experience with gems and 
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other less precious stones. Examining clarity, type, weight and the colour of a precious 
stone is a highly skilled job and the expatriate’s expertise in the field surpasses that of a 
local individual, let alone an unemployed national who migrated to the city in search of a 
job. The gold and jewellery business regarded this particular decision as harsh and 
unjustified; there were simply not enough Saudi’s qualified to fill the demand created by 
the vacuum of the expatriates’ dismissal. 
The private sector eventually managed to fulfil a part of the Labour Ministry’s 
requirements, negotiated another part and settled to improvising via hiring extra Saudis and 
investing in training them. However, the private sector’s attitude regarding Saudization has 
evolved out of a sense of survival and protectiveness of its own interests. Throughout the 
earlier phase of Saudization the private sector’s attitude was one of rejection and panic. 
Today after some success in certain sectors and where they have fulfilled the quotas, they 
have come to take the initiative on two levels. See appendix three for a suggested gold and 
jewellery Saudization plan. 
With the policy makers, the private sector has become vocal about its needs and issues 
with national hire. They present facts and data as to which areas and to what degree they 
can afford to replace their expatriates with minimum disturbance to their own performance 
and competitiveness. They demand to be heard with regard to areas that they believe to be 
currently lacking in training and higher education. In other words, the private sector 
learned to negotiate and has become more open about communicating the obstacles they 
face when hiring Saudis with policymakers. 
On the other level, the private sector has developed a set of ways to deal with the Saudi 
employees. First, they are slowly changing their ways of dealing with their workers, 
becoming more civilized and mature in communicating with the workers and modifying 
the work environment to suite the Saudi worker’s needs. Second, they are taking more 
responsibility in improving the skills of their new Saudi employees and becoming more 
resourceful when it comes to training on the job. Third, private organizations today 
understand the value of human resources management and seek the advice of qualified HR 
staff on matters of developing their staff’s skills on all levels and achieving better 
manpower management. Fourth, many large private organizations (generally family 
owned), have taken the matter of contributing to their industry, young Saudis and the 
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economy into their own hands. This is particularly true in the areas of health care, nursing, 
medicine and some technical fields where Saudi staff are either unavailable, scarce or not 
up to the standards they accept. This group is earning great respect and generous funds 
from the government to encourage other private businesses to do the same. 
The Worker’s View 
Judging by the principles of Saudization, one would assume that the Saudi workers would be 
happy because they are granted a higher position than the expatriate in their own homeland. 
Although some are, many still struggle with finding employment in the private sector and 
securing their position in the long-term. The private sector complains of a high turnover and 
with reference to their Saudi employees these complaints are valid, however, the national 
workers don’t see the reason for these phenomena as being their fault alone. They realize 
how Saudization laws work to their advantage in the short term, yet they argue that it will not 
secure the interest of the private sector (in them) on the long term. They regard the laws of 
Saudization with mixed feelings. Those that are skilled and semi skilled find that it is to their 
advantage and make full use of it. The unskilled and unemployed regard the Saudization 
objectives with distrust and state that the laws, as such, are simply an incentive to the private 
sector. They understand that the position they are in is only a license to enter the private 
sector and that after that it is up to them to adjust and contribute to the workplace at the 
standard that has been set by the expatriate workforce for decades. Despite the fact that they 
estimate the job to be difficult and demanding, the majority of the unskilled believe that they 
bring to the workplace better qualities than their counterparts. They state that expatriates are 
not all that they appear to be – they don’t care for the interests of the organization or its 
property, they lie about their qualifications and previous work experience, and make the 
Saudi newcomer feel isolated in the workplace. Held in such high regard by their employer 
for their service, the expatriate practices a variety of methods to belittle his Saudi colleague 
and magnify his shortcomings/weaknesses to management. The expatriate fieldwork has 
pointed out their disrespect for their Saudi rival claiming negative character traits such as a 
sense of superiority, being culturally unexposed, and lacking in hard and soft skills.   
Expatriates state that working alongside Saudis is a challenging experience since the 
nationals regard themselves as superior which affects their dealings with ‘the other’. 
Although many expatriates are economically disadvantaged, and are desperate for a job, they 
still believe that Saudi Arabia needs them. They view Saudi as a closed culture that has never 
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learned how to deal with anything or anybody outside the borders of their comfort zone. 
They give real life examples of how Saudis are unable to respect, appreciate or work with 
people from other faiths and cultures and other people by name, colour and race.  
Another example of this point is how Saudi men find it difficult to deal with female 
colleagues in the workplace especially if they are fellow nationals, and react negatively to the 
idea that Saudi women too deserve an opportunity to earn for their families, just like men. 
Saudization is facing many barriers on different levels. Those barriers relate to the Saudi 
worker’s level of readiness as they enter the labour market, their economic expectations, 
adjustment to the work environment and many other social considerations. Saudis commence 
their careers after generally earning a four-year degree in one of the Saudi universities with 
no practical experience. Their economic expectations are high as they start their career in 
expecting to remain in the life style to which they are accustomed and start families. Many 
have to provide support to their parents and siblings since inflation rates in Saudi Arabia 
today are increasing year on year and the ratio of dependence is also very high with many 
young men supporting their families (being the only bread winner in a large family). A young 
Saudi employee on average would receive RS 2000 - 3000 per month, while car instalments 
to commute to the workplace and rent would consume two-thirds of his pay. Adding a young 
wife, children and food would set him back to a level of (comparative) poverty. 
The second barrier is the state of awareness with which the Saudi employee arrives at the 
labour market. Career planning is not part of the Saudi curriculum and many young Saudis 
study in areas determined by their grades rather than according to their interests. Hence 
instead of diverting to a specialty needed by the labour market, they go on to study in a 
specialty not in demand at present. 
The work environment is said to be the third main barrier to Saudization from the worker’s 
perspective. Set to suit the expatriate workers limited expectations of space, hours, and ways 
of working, the Saudi national often complains that he cannot easily assimilate into the 
expatriate work environment. The expatriate is not unduly fussed over his working 
conditions and does not mind the limitations set upon him by his sponsor. The Saudi on the 
other hand has preset notions of how and where he needs to work and is very unforgiving 
when it comes to spending any extra time in the workplace. After all, the foreigner has no 
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family to go back to or social obligations to fulfil. He expects to be treated with tact, forgiven 
for his mistakes and be treated with patience whilst training. Nationals feel they have a right 
to be treated differently and therefore feel frustrated when faced with the reality of the labour 
market. 
The last barrier to Saudization is the aspect of social considerations. That is the kind of 
elements that obstruct nationals having a smooth entry into the labour market whilst having 
to live up to society’s traditional expectations. Saudi Arabia as a country did not develop a 
work culture in the traditional way. Saudis in the majority lived by subsistence farming or 
trade prior to the 1970s, yet since then Saudi nationals have come to regard some 
occupations as acceptable and others as unacceptable. For example, clerical jobs, the key 
professions, and of course, the civil service are considered acceptable. Practically all the rest, 
fall into the ‘socially unacceptable’ category. Saudis have dismissed the traditional artisanal 
roles and other manual jobs such as plumbing, carpentry and blacksmiths, considering them 
to be beneath them. The researcher has discovered that there are several on-going private 
efforts in the Western region to re-educate the population near the Red Sea coast [for 
example in the town of Leith] to revive the occupation of fishing among the locals. They 
offer small loans to purchase fishing boats which could earn a number of unemployed youths 
RS 7000 – 8000 instead of having to commute two hours to the nearest city for office work 
which would earn them less than RS 2000 per month, plus the cost of transportation.  
In spite of all those barriers a considerable number of Saudi nationals have maintained jobs 
in the different industries of the private sector very successfully. What is important is to 
distinguish the elements that contributed positively to the success of those individuals and to 
highlight that those factors that cannot be easily replicated for the majority of unemployed 
Saudis. 
The research has confirmed that nationals who succeed in fulfilling a career path with the 
private sector normally fall into one of two categories. They are either individuals with 
educational and familial characteristics that contribute positively in shaping their character, 
sense of professionalism and readiness. Or, they were lucky to start their careers at certain 
organizations that have specific elements that contribute, again positively, to their 
professional success. In a sense, those organizations act as a surrogate family to compensate 
for the lack of work related characteristics that the individual failed to acquire whilst 
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growing up.   
Individuals who come from a family background that puts great emphasis on excellence, 
education and ethics constitute the first group. Their family is more involved in the children’s 
wellbeing, overall performance at school and grades than the average Saudi family. The 
mother plays a more significant role in the lives of her children. Individuals who are the 
product of those families have learnt through their upbringing the importance of being 
responsible for their actions and of self-reliance. They feel more responsible for their own 
careers and they expect less from society or the Government in terms of guidance and 
opportunities. They have a true and realistic sense of the world as it is today and understand 
their need to better themselves. They relate and interact with expatriates with ease and 
respect. It is important here to emphasize the ethical make up of those individuals, because 
they do not manifest the typical religious expectations of the Imam of the Mosque or Islamic 
teachings at school. 
The second group of individuals are those who succeed in taking their place in the labour 
market as a result of joining the right organization; these eventually reach the same status 
that the first group acquires through their education and family. They join an organization 
with the right work culture at the onset of their professional career and benefit from a pre-set 
organizational human resources structure, taking advantage of in house training, a clear 
career path and a proper working environment. Those organizations are generally large, well 
established and have a social corporate responsibility towards the development of the 
indigenous population whether they are national companies, international or joint ventures. 
An individual who is lucky enough to go through the screening and appointing process of 
such an organization will probably earn a certificate of excellence and a kind of work 
experience that makes him valuable to other organizations if he ever wanted to change 
careers.  
Unfortunately both of these categories of nationals who have taken full advantage of 
Saudization cannot be applied to the mass of the unemployed, for in the first place if 
individuals were lucky to qualify because of their upbringing or by ending up in the right 
organization, unemployment in such magnitude would not exist in modern Saudi Arabia.  
The family type mentioned earlier is not a typical Saudi family and organizations of such 
characteristics exist only in small numbers. Human Resources as a concept is new to the 
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Arab business world and Saudi Arabia in particular. 
In the table below, is a summary of all stakeholders stands on the policy. Again, the policy 
did not change in writing however all parties involved have adapted to more realistic and 
practical approaches to dealing with its application. 
Table 7:1 Summary of all stakeholders stand on Saudization 2008 
Impact of 
the policy 
on the 
economy 
The policy's negative 
implications on the 
economy are valid. 
However, the private 
sector must endure 
and the market will 
eventually re-adjust. 
The policy conflicts with 
economic growth, 
competitiveness and disturbs 
performance. 
Saudization's control over 
private sector's choice of 
labour is against free market 
rules. 
Policy's impact on the 
economy is not an issue to 
Saudi workers. 
How does 
the policy 
take action 
at present? 
Continued set quota 
and restrictions on 
imported labour. 
Enforce policy rules 
on private sector, 
monitor and control. 
Fund the necessary 
training in existing 
training centres via 
HRDF. 
Better recruitment from pool 
of available manpower of 
nationals. 
Seeking specialized human 
recourse's expertise. 
Adapting to a more 
responsible role in training 
the new Saudi recruits. 
Modifying the work 
environment to adjust to 
national's requirements 
becoming more aware to 
national worker's cultural 
needs. 
The policy is only a licence to 
enter the private sector's 
employment. 
Policy's targets, quotas, visa 
restriction and closure do not 
address bridging skill level of 
nationals to private sector's 
requirements. 
What 
impedes the 
policy  
Policy is impeded by 
private sector’s 
reluctance to co-
operate. 
Nationals are not 
interested in 
occupying certain 
jobs i.e.: menial, 
labour and non-
clerical in the 
majority. 
Existence of 
expatriate labour in 
abundance. 
Policy makers do not 
differentiate labour needs 
across job families.                  
Policy targets are not 
realistic.        Available 
training fail to qualify 
nationals to competency 
standards. 
Nationals lack the work 
ethic the expatriate 
possesses. 
Expatriates’ competitive 
presence. 
Lack of readiness to meet 
private sector's specific skill 
and work ethic demands 
generally met by their 
counterpart the expatriate 
worker. 
High economic demands 
impossible to be met by the 
private sector pre set around 
expatriate profile. 
Unsuitability of the work 
environment (satisfactory to 
minimum needs of expatriate 
worker). 
High social expectations and a 
stereotypical view of what 
jobs are suited for nationals. 
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Can 
Saudization 
be 
achieved? 
To what 
extent 
Saudization is 
achievable to a great 
extent. 
Saudization is achievable 
over a longer span of time 
provided the targets are 
amended. 
Education, higher education 
and vocational training must 
be restructured and 
improved to meet future 
needs of labour. 
Saudization is achievable to a 
great extent. Government 
should continue to monitor, 
and enforce private sector's 
compliance to policy's targets.
New entrants qualifications 
must be improved to suite the 
market's present and future 
labour needs. 
Note: This table was prepared by the researcher to facilitate better assessment of the policy at the glance. 
The policy makers believe that the policy of Saudization works, its targets are achievable to a 
great extent and that the economy will adjust in time. They maintain pressure on the private 
sector to cooperate and sacrifice time and profit. They are aware that young nationals are 
reluctant to occupy certain jobs and have obliged this point by reducing the quotas and eased 
the restriction on visas to recruit expatriates in those fields and attempting better 
communication with the private sector. 
As for the private sector, fieldwork points out its continued struggle to satisfy the 
government’s requirements voicing real economic, logistical and practical concerns. Issues 
of a free economy, choice of hiring according to specialized labour needs and quality of 
training funded by the policy makers, are in the heart of the private sector’s argument. Efforts 
to communicate with the policy makers to further ease restrictions of the policy and to 
exclude more job families while better training and adjustment to the work place (to suite the 
national worker) take effect are on going. Furthermore, the private sector is adamant the 
policy of Saudization is achievable however not in the short term.  
The workers vary in their views on the policy of Saudization according to their skill level 
and future prospects of employment. The lower the skill level, the less hope and 
understanding the worker has of what the policy entails, how does it take effect on the 
market and how does it work for him. The workers in all skill levels voice that the policy 
although may work to grant them an entry to the private sector, it fails to bridge the 
qualification gap in skills and readiness of the national workforce. They readily name work 
ethic and other qualities the expatriate has at work (which they do not have) and express 
social and economical reasons behind their high expectations of work difficult to be met by 
the private sector’s present givens. Overall, Saudis, of all skill levels, believe in the policy’s 
goals, methods and applaud the government’s pressure on the private sector to remove more 
expatriate workers. 
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Is Saudization effective? 
Saudization, as a process, is hampered by experiments, trial and error, and disappointments. 
The policy makers have come to the realization that Saudization is not the short-term 
solution for unemployment. The Minister of the Labour Market [Counsellor to the King at 
present] has declared on several occasions over the last few years that he does not expect to 
fully Saudize the labour market; moreover he has admitted that it is not feasible. The reality 
of the private sector, the quality of the Saudi educational experience and the nature of Saudi 
society are all reasons that lead us to conclude that full Saudization is not an option. Perhaps 
the last decade of trial and error with Saudization plus the advice of honest and loyal Saudi 
citizens representing the private sector, have swayed the government to consider options less 
short sighted than Saudization. After all Saudization would not be successful if it were to 
jeopardize the strength of the private sector, the only real hope of diversifying resources and 
securing careers for the millions of Saudis to come, not only for the currently unemployed. 
What the Saudi policy makers fail to admit is that the social and national security threat of 
complete Saudization. At the moment, Saudi Arabia is on the brink of a completely new era, 
not just economically but culturally in an increasingly globalized world where issues such as 
the World Trade Agreement, human rights and women’s rights are becoming ever more 
pressing and Saudi Arabia needs to adjust and cope with a changing world from which it can 
no longer remain isolated. In addition there is the persistent threat of religious 
fundamentalism, which has proved to be a more pressing danger than unemployment since 
September 11, 2001. Saudi Arabia today surely understands the value of opening up its 
society and embracing the other. King Abdullah Ibn Abdul-Aziz’s initiative towards Inter-
faith dialogue, attempts at empowering women, and the national dialogue conferences, are 
all proof that the Kingdom is trying to reach out to the world and invite better acceptance of 
change and alternative ways of life via peaceful means. Those commendable attempts have a 
clear objective of making Saudi Arabia a more worldly country only if coupled with forceful 
logistics, continuous dialogue and follow up.  
Saudization then, as a concept of replacing expatriate workforce by Saudi nationals 
regardless of the economic and social damage this would cause, goes against the objectives 
of the mode of change the Kingdom is heading towards. If Saudi Arabia were to get rid of 
seven million expatriates who educate, serve and teach the population, then the poor 
educational system and the country’s strict Islamic ideology will further isolate the country. 
The expatriates contribute to balancing a society that suffers from xenophobia, rigidity and 
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chronic nepotism. Saudization laws have already hurt this balance when the government 
forced schools for example to get rid of expatriate teachers, replacing them with nationals 
who were not only insufficiently trained but had only entered the teaching profession 
because it was the only means of income available to them. Many educators and HR experts 
insist that the Saudi educational curriculum cannot be held solely responsible for poor 
educational outcomes and suggest more often than not it is the teacher that plays the most 
significant role in shaping his students’ views and attitudes. The expatriate teacher brings to 
the classroom qualities of excellence and an international perspective to their pupils. They 
also personify the characteristics of hard work, a passion for what one does, and reasons to 
excel other than ‘who you are’, ‘what your father does’, and ‘what your faith is’. This applies 
to many less crucial professions than teaching and affect Saudi life on many dimensions. 
Unemployment in Saudi Arabia is merely a symptom of what ails Saudi society. Complaints 
of the Saudi worker as feeling superior, being unethical, lazy and under-qualified are only 
symptoms of a more general malaise. The Saudi society has a most unusual pattern of 
development. Fifty years of trying to make the population into one entity have failed to 
produce a solid culture and loyal population that is able to serve its country’s economy and 
prosper. 
The speed with which Saudi Arabia has reached its wealthy status goes only to emphasize 
the dilemma of having purchased development instead of building it. Education, in 
particular, is responsible for many of Saudi society’s problems today. It is true that not 
enough planning has gone into the field of educating the population. Yet, education might 
have progressed in the right direction if it had not been placed under the strict control and 
censorship of the government and religious authorities. The ideology of Wahhabism has 
altered the growth of education [like many other institutions in Saudi Arabia] by controlling 
the curriculum and all other school activities usually responsible for building character, the 
ability to communicate, and problem solving. In the absence of a worthwhile educational 
system young Saudis really had no choice but to develop the persona the private sector 
complains of, as being unemployable and hopeless. The teachings of Islam on the value of 
work, diligence, precision and reward for hard work is at large absent from their 
understanding of what a good Muslim should be. Some even admitted that they were taught 
that in order for them to be good Muslims all they have to be is obedient and never miss their 
practice of rituals. The researcher sought confirmation when consulting religious experts that 
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the value of work in Islam far surpasses the value of rituals.  
Judging by the results achieved by Saudization thus far, it is evident that the plan of 
Saudization has forced the private sector to employ Saudis, some to oblige the government’s 
requirements, others because they feel it is the right thing to do. The numbers however do 
not indicate that the quota targets of Saudization have been met. A good Saudi worker was 
and still is a great asset to any organization regardless of whether the Government has forced 
the private sector to employ him or not. Allocation of labour ought to be based purely on 
personal merit and economic need. Instead of supplanting their expatriate population with 
nationals, the Saudis should be working hard to create new jobs and work opportunities by 
expanding their economy and expediting the country’s growth (including its service and non-
oil based sectors). That is the economically sound thing to do.  
The researcher has come to conclude that Saudization is not an advisable solution (on its 
own or as part of a range of measures) for unemployment in Saudi Arabia. Saudization is a 
myopic solution and a short-term remedy for the country’s unemployment problem. No such 
thing as nationalization of labour exists in industrial modern economies, even if 
unemployment is on the rise. Western countries pursue a policy of naturalization, granting 
residency (and eventually citizenship) to skilled-labourers and professionals whose trickling 
into the work force is essential for economic growth, and consequently the creation of more 
jobs and work opportunities for the unemployed among their indigenous populations. Other 
international solutions to unemployment place most focus on human skills and the deficiency 
in the supply and demand side of the labour market.  
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
This study was faced with several limitations due to one: shortage of reliable data and two: 
social and cultural restrictions. Obtaining the data necessary to formulate and write this 
research was an obstacle throughout. Available unbiased resources were limited and we 
constantly faced with the dilemma of verifying which of the conflicting data is more accurate 
and to which degree they represent a more recent application of the policy. Government 
website are unfriendly and fall short of supplying straightforward statistics and in many cases 
(such as more detailed and actual information regarding expatriates’ distribution over sectors 
according to qualifications for example) do not exist. In most cases, government 
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representatives did not have all the recent data and were not aware of their duty in pointing 
out where or who can provide it. Available research on Saudization as mentioned in chapter 
three is limited to a one-stakeholder view and in the majority is biased to the government’s 
favour. Comprehensive research on Saudization from all stakeholder’s view and practice is 
unavailable and almost never backed up by fieldwork. As for the cultural and social 
limitations that faced this research, they were mostly reflected in some participants’ lack of 
appreciation and willingness to give an open viewpoint on the policy of Saudization. Policy 
makers, the private sector and the workers representatives are subject to the Saudi cultural 
attitude of not criticizing those in power. Government employees fear echoing an opinion 
different than that of the decision makers because it is politically incorrect in Saudi Arabia to 
do so and may have more serious consequences. The private sector is not free to discuss their 
actual level of cooperation with the policy’s rules to avoid penalties and upsetting the policy 
makers. As for the national workers who already face the ‘shame’ of unemployment, they 
too will not object publically to the policy’s shortcomings as a cultural norm and will channel 
their frustration into blaming the private sector’s greed and lack of patriotism in continuing 
to favour hiring expatriates to Saudi nationals.   
Suggestions for further research include: 
The researcher recommends studies of different sectors of the economy’s needs of labour. 
The Saudi labour’s future will benefit from the outcome of research on the different sectors 
requirement of specialized labour and the outcome will certainly encourage the policy 
makers and private investors to respond in terms of providing youth with those educational 
needs. 
This study also suggests that research be conducted to apply successful experiences of 
human capital development via open forum and rethinking educational programmes to the 
Saudi educational and vocational targets. The Singapore experience of government 
commitment engaging in forums with the private sector and how this contributed to the 
thriving of their social growth and economic performance is a good example. The 
Malaysians (another example), restructured and re-invented educational systems three 
times in two decades before reaching the results planned over two decades. Saudi Arabia’s 
development of human capital could be guided by those examples and other successful 
experiences. 
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Another suggestion I would like to make is studies on how to better activate the media 
engines to serve the purposes of building a work ethic and an appreciation to the value of 
all types of occupation currently not in demand by young unemployed nationals. 
Last, this research suggests improving the quality and accessibility of government websites 
for better research use and improved general public awareness of the labour situation. 
Recommendations for the policy 
This study examined the process of Saudization as a solution for high unemployment rate 
among Saudi nationals and a way to restructure the imbalances of the Saudi Labour 
Market. It is evident that the Saudi government has regarded Saudization as an immediate fix 
for high unemployment levels among Saudi youth. The emphasis the policy makers have put 
on this programme in the last decade to ensure that the private sector shelters large numbers 
of workers only goes to show the desperation of the policymakers. Methods used to enforce 
Saudization including unrealistic quotas of hiring nationals, the many attempts at restricting 
jobs to expatriates and the ban on visa issuing to recruit expatriate labour, all go to further 
prove how far the pressure is on the government to deal with unemployment. The HRDF is 
another means to highlight how far the policy makers are willing to invest to make 
Saudization a reality. 
In order for Saudization to succeed in due time, all stakeholders: the policy makers, the 
private sector and the workers, must be encouraged to establish a channel of communication 
and open forum led by the Saudi government. The policy’s targets must be re-evaluated in 
the light of the last ten year’s outcome and re-set realistic goals to be met within a plausible 
time period.  
All economic and political efforts have a direct impact on education, training policies and 
management. A review of the curriculum of Saudi schools, its relevance and correlation to 
the labour market demands has to be the centre of attention for the next two decades. The 
policy makers would benefit tremendously from re-structuring the education, higher 
education and vocational programmes in Saudi Arabia to set up adequate educational 
systems based on the needs of the labour market and away from centralism, bureaucracy and 
difficulties in licensing. Reputable international educational entities must be invited, 
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encouraged and licensed to contribute to the qualification of Saudi youth with restrictions 
only on quality and universal accreditation. Twinning programmes such as exist in Malaysia, 
another Muslim nation, should be an example to follow when aiming at tapping into the 
human capital of the country via quality training. For the outcome of the Saudi educational 
system to improve, the environment as a whole has to be taken into consideration.  
Open forum among policy makers, representatives of business leaders on a national level 
and educators to rewrite and execute the targets of the policy. In addition, targets of human 
capital development and an increased awareness of the future labour market needs must be 
integrated into the public’s life via trained teachers, religious figures and the media to 
serve a more holistic lasting outcome. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia must put emphasis on the importance of re-evaluating the 
labour market policies in the light of a new education and vocational system inviting 
change.  
Saudi Arabia is embarking on a critical new stage of economic and populace growth that 
would benefit greatly from an open channel of communication between the policy makers 
and youth. A planned change towards modernization, openness and the reality of today’s 
world is a necessity to achieve visible and measurable effect over the next generation not 
just for young Saudis to become more involved in their national labour market, but also for 
an overall adjustment to the demands of a rapidly changing world. 
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Appendix I 
 
List of Manpower Restricted to Saudis 
1. Cashier 
2. Storekeeper  
3. Librarian  
4. Home appliances salesman  
5. Auto Decoration item salesman  
6. Home ware seller  
7. General home appliances and wares salesman  
8. Video tape salesman  
9. Textile salesman  
10. Shoe salesman 
11. Discounted goods salesman  
12. Tent seller  
13. Paint and dyes salesman 
14. Cold chicken salesman  
15. Flowers and Gifts seller  
16. Watch seller  
17. Children game seller  
18. Women Abaya seller  
19. Perfume seller  
20. Aoud ( perfume ) seller  
21. Stationary seller  
22. Furniture seller  
23. Telephone, mobiles and sets seller  
24. Cafeteria and buffet Seller at the school and government bodies  
25. Seller at Kiosks and commercial compounds  
26. Ticket seller  
27. Dates seller  
28. Artificial jewels seller  
29. Golden jeweller seller  
30. Silver jewels seller  
31. Vegetable and fruit seller  
32. Spices and herbs seller  
33. Seller at the events shops  
34. Seller at auto used spare parts shops  
35. Seller at the new auto spare parts  
36. Book seller  
37. Sewing item seller  
38. Jewels seller  
39. Auto exhibition seller  
40. Children cloth seller  
41. Men cloth seller  
42. Women cloth seller  
43. Plumbing and building item seller  
44. Security guard  
45. Guard  
46. Lock guard  
47. Military cloth sewer  
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48. Auto vehicle driver  
49. Secretary  
50. Secretary and short hand writer  
51. Land and real estate broker  
52. Cashier  
53. Public relations officer  
54. Telegram telecom clerk 
55. Mail telecom clerk  
56. Telephone telecom clerk  
57. Charges clerk  
58. Statistics clerk  
59. Civil status clerk  
60. General administration clerk 
61. Literary clerk  
62. Data entry clerk 
63. Technical catalogue clerk  
64. Tourist information clerk 
65. Public information clerk  
66. Hotel reception clerk  
67. Patient reception clerk  
68. Cargo receipt clerk  
69. Debentures and share clerk 
70. Production clerk 
71. Trial and auditing clerk  
72. Travel auto rent clerk  
73. Insurance clerk  
74. Social insurance clerk  
75. File editing clerk  
76. Material planning clerk  
77. Customs clearance clerk  
78. Auditing and signature verifier  
79. Travel ticket clerk  
80. Coding clerk  
81. Land and real estate registration clerk  
82. Student affair registration clerk  
83. Birth registration clerk  
84. Death registration clerk  
85. Documentation verification clerk  
86. Cost clerk 
87. Telex clerk 
88. Employment clerk  
89. Customs clerk  
90. Nationality clerk  
91. Travel booking clerk 
92. Charges booking clerk  
93. Luggage service clerk  
94. Stevedoring services clerk  
95. Time keeping clerk  
96. Senior and dialogue writer  
97. Personnel affairs clerk  
98. Legal affair clerk  
99. Personnel clerk  
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100. Journalist  
101. Notary clerk 
102. Public relations clerk  
103. Book keeping clerk  
104. Financial clerk  
105. Follow up clerk  
106. Advocate clerk  
107. Court clerk 
108. Bank clerk  
109. Library clerk  
110. File clerk  
111. Incoming and outgoing clerk  
112. Personnel identification clerk  
113. PABAX operation  
114. Procurement office  
115. Cashier  
116. Debit collector  
117. Arabic typist  
118. Academic affairs manager  
119. Credit manager  
120. Research and study manager  
121. Telecomm manager  
122. Historic antiquities manager  
123. Press department manager  
124. Broadcast manager  
125. Investment manager  
126. Operation and public utilities manager  
127. Media manager  
128. Banking business manager  
129. Insurance business manager  
130. Admin manager research and development manager  
131. Advertising and public relations manager  
132. Production manager  
133. Radio and TV. Production manager  
134. Movie production manager  
135. Theatre (stage ) production manager  
136. Mail manager  
137. Hospitality Home Manager  
138. Commercial manager  
139. Editing manager  
140. Planning manager  
141. Marketing manager  
142. Movie camera man  
143. TV manager  
144. University director  
145. Society director  
146. Accounts and budget manager  
147. Social welfare manager  
148. Sport and youth manager  
149. Social affairs manager  
150. Economic and commerce manager  
151. Rural and Municipal affairs manager  
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152. Cultural and media affairs manager  
153. Agricultural and irrigation affairs manager  
154. Health affairs manager  
155. Industrial affairs manager  
156. Labour and workmen affairs manager  
157. Court and justice affair manager  
158. Financial and accounting affairs manager  
159. Personnel affairs manager  
160. Maintenance manager  
161. Printing  and publication manager  
162. Personnel relations manger  
163. Industrial relations manager  
164. Public relation manager  
165. Operations manager  
166. Manager , chamber of commerce and industry  
167. Hotel manager  
168. Retail manager  
169. Electrical manager  
170. Sales manager  
171. Follow up manager  
172. Museum manager  
173. Fast food store manager  
174. Store manager  
175. Test lab manager  
176. Scholl manager  
177. Industrial city manager  
178. Farm manager  
179. Animal breeding farm manager  
180. Poultry farm manager  
181. Hospital manager  
182. Veterinary hospital manager  
183. Polyclinic manager 
184. Polyclinic manager  
185. Theatre manager  
186. Projects manager  
187. Procurement manager  
188. Telecom projects manager  
189. Project manager, Business Services  
190. Transport project manager  
191. Factory manager  
192. Airport manager  
193. Restaurant manager  
194. Restaurant or coffee shop manager  
195. Institute manager  
196. Laundry manager  
197. Library manager  
198. Water and sanitary drainage manager  
199. Port manager  
200. Club manager  
201. Marine transport manager  
202. Land transport manager  
203. Air transport manager  
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204. Telephone manager  
205. Industrial cooling workshops manager  
206. Travel agency manager  
207. Correspondent  
208. TV antennae fixer  
209. Admin assistant  
210. Data recorder  
211. Land transport manager  
212. Housing (Camp) supervisor  
213. Printing and copying operator  
214. Expeditor  
215. Land passenger transport service inspector  
216. Receptionist  
217. Sale and lease of land transport manager  
218. Customs clearance agent  
219. Land transport shipping broker  
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Appendix II 
Useful web links 
AMEinfo Middle East business and financial news, directory and current events. 
www.ameinfo.com 
Central Department of Statistics and Information is the principal agency in the Kingdom for 
the collection, analysis and distribution of statistical information. 
www.cdsi.gov.sa 
CIA, ‘World Factbook’ (Saudi Arabia) US government profiles of countries and territories 
around the world. Information on geography, people, government, transportation, economy, 
communications, etc.. 
www.cia.gov.library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). Material about Saudi Arabia and its activities with the 
IMF. 
www.imf.org/external/country/sau/index.htm 
Index Mundi the online most complete country profiles, detailed country statistics, charts, 
and maps compiled from multiple sources. 
www.indexmundi.com 
Library of Congress: Saudi Arabia Country Study.  The Library of Congress is the USA 
oldest federal cultural institution and serves as the research arm of Congress. It is also the 
largest library in the world. In the Country Study Section it offers an overview of life, 
history, and culture of various countries. 
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http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabia/ 
Library of Economy and Liberty is a free online library of economics books and articles. It 
supplies educational resources of economic thought. Econlib hosts several different 
resources including daily, weekly, and monthly articles, podcasts, and blog items, all by 
economists. Their archives include over 100 economics books and essays. 
www.econlib.org/ 
Middle East and North Africa Financial Network. Middle East and North Africa - MENA - 
financial markets reports, company and legal data, daily stock and index prices information. 
www.menafin.com 
Migration Information Source. It is alist of country resource pages catalogues and analysis of  
migration experiences of many countries around the world. 
www.migrationinformation.org 
Ministry of Education – Saudi Arabia 
www.moe.gov.sa 
Ministry Of Higher Education – Saudi Arabia 
www.mohe.gov.sa 
NCB the National Commercial Bank is the most prominent of Saudi banks and was the first 
bank established in Saudi Arabia. 
http://www.alahli.com/index.asp 
The International Journal of Human Resources Management is a forum for HRM scholars 
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and professionals worldwide. It providesencourages focused articles on a wide range of 
issues including employee participation, human resource flow, reward systems and high 
commitment work systems. It is an essential publication examining all management 
decisions that affect the relationship between an organization and its employees 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713702518 
SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency). The Agency acts as the central government bank. 
The website offers information on the development of the Kingdom's banking system. And 
the country management of foreign assets, inside and outside of the Kingdom. 
http://www.sama.gov.sa 
SAMIRADthe Saudi Arabia Market Information Resource and Directory is the gateway to 
comprehensive, up-to-date information on Saudi Arabia for those conducting business. 
www.saudinf.com 
 
SAGIA the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, created in 2000, is responsible for 
managing the investment environment in the Kingdom. 
www.sagia.gov.sa 
Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Economy and Planning. The website of the Ministry provides 
information and news on the development and economic planning of the country. 
http://www.mep.gov.sa/ 
Saudi Government Electronic Portal. It is the SaudiE-Government Portalwhich provides full 
information about the government services, organization, agencies, regulation and bylaws, 
national plans and government initiatives. 
www.saudi.gov.sa 
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UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
www.undp.org 
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Appendix III 
Suggested Saudization Plan of the Gold and Jewellery Market 2009 - 2018 
   Year Programme Outcome 
2009  The labour market representatives meet 
with the private gold and jewellery sector / 
They meet with expert and trainers 
[authorities in the field] 
• A detailed understanding of 
field’s expertise requirement. 
• An educational training plan 
reflecting the above is drawn up 
• HRDF and designated 
committee funds plan in action 
within 8 months 
2010 Government starts a public campaign via 
media, schools and among High School 
educators 
• Boys and girls aged 16-18 are 
selected or invited, or channeled 
into starting their education in 
the gold and jewelry field 2 year 
and 4 year degrees are offered 
2011 Government continues the public campaign 
via media, schools and among High School 
educators 
• Policymakers, representatives of 
this specific sector and 
specialized trainers assess the 
progress and outcome of the 
programme.  
• Necessary adjustments are in 
place, if required 
2012 Government continues the public campaign 
via media, schools and among High School 
educators 
 
2013 Government continues the public campaign 
via media, schools and among High School 
educators 
• Graduation of the first wave 2-
year diploma graduates 
commences working in the 
sector. 
2014 Government continues the public campaign 
via media, schools and among High School 
educators 
• Graduation of the second wave 
of 2-year diploma graduates 
commences working in the 
sector. 
2015 Government continues a public campaign 
via media, schools and among High School 
educators portraying their success, lifestyle 
and income. 
• 4-year degree graduates 
commence working in the sector.
• A group of the 4 year graduates 
will gain practical experience for 
two years in the trade before 
they are invited or encouraged to 
pursue an additional certification 
to become trainers themselves 
2018  • 90% Saudization is achieved in 
the gold and jewellery trade and 
education sector. 
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Glossary 
Ba’thism The Arabic word Ba’ath means "renaissance" or "resurrection" as in the party’s 
founder Michel Aflaq’s published works "On The Way Of Resurrection" in the 1940s. 
Ba'athist beliefs combine Arab Socialism, nationalism, and Pan-Arabism. It functioned as a 
pan-Arab party with branches in different Arab countries, but was strongest in Syria and 
Iraq in the 1960s. 
Bid’a In Arabic translates to ‘’novelty’’. In religious puritan teachings it has the 
connotation of a heresy which applies to a wide range of practices and personal choice that 
goes outside the traditional religious norm. 
Dutch Disease is an economic concept that tries to explain the apparent relationship 
between the exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector 
combined. The theory is that an increase in revenues from natural resources will de-
industrialise a nation’s economy by raising the exchange rate, which makes the 
manufacturing sector less competitive and public services entangled with business 
interests. 
Eid Is an Arabic word meaning "festivity" is a Muslim holiday that marks the end of 
Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting and emend of the Pilgrimage (Hajj). 
Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam, a once in a lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca, to those 
who can afford it. 
Hijaz In Arabic, Hejaz means literally "the barrier" as it separates the land of Najd in the 
east from the land of Tihamah in the west. Hijaz is a region in the west of present-day 
Saudi Arabia better known for the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. 
Ibda’ Innovation and creativity 
Ikhwan "brothers'' in Arabic, it was the tribal military force formed by the muttawa and 
dedicated to fighting in the name of Jihad. 
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Jihad In Arabic translates as Holy war, it is also one of the pillars of Islam, usually 
misinterpreted, it is actually an act of correction and self-defence.  
Jizya Head poll tax that early Islamic rulers demanded from their non-Muslim subjects 
Kaaba Also Ka’bah is a shrine located in the centre of the holy Mosque in Mecca. 
According Qur'an, the Kaaba was first built by Adam. Ibrahim and Ismail rebuilt the 
Kaaba on the old foundations. Moslems around the world face to Kaaba during prayers and 
pay pilgrimage once a life time if able. Pre Islam, Christian and pagan tribes from all 
around the Arabian Peninsula would converge on Mecca to perform pilgrimage. 
Mahram/sMale next of kin 
Majlis Court. 
Masar Job Market Fair 
Mua’ggeb   In Arabic is a word for ‘the person who follows up’; the word refers to the job 
of liaising between private companies and the government. 
Muttawa Najdi religious specialist/volunteer 
Rentierism A rentier state is a term in political science and international relations theory 
used to classify those states, which derive all, or a substantial portion of their national 
revenues from the rent of indigenous resources to external clients. The term is most 
frequently applied to states rich in highly valued natural resources such as petroleum. 
Shari’a linguistically "way" or "path", in Islam it represent the body of religious law; 
Shari’a deals with many aspects of day-to-day life, including politics, economics, banking, 
business, contracts, family, sexuality, hygiene, and social issues. 
Shi’a is the second largest denomination of Islam, after Sunni Islam. Shi’a Muslims further 
believe that Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was the first of these Imams and was 
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the rightful successor to Muhammad and thus reject the legitimacy of the first three 
Rashidun caliphs. 
Al-Shu’ba al-Siyasiyya Political Committee  
Shura Is the Arabic word for "consultation". It is believed to be the method by which pre-
Islamic Arabian tribes selected leaders and made major decisions, and is a word often used 
to name political councils in Muslim-majority countries. 
Ta’at woulaat al-amr the concept of obediently following the ruler. 
Wahhabism Is a puritan form of Sunni Islam attributed to Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, 
an 18th century scholar from what is today known as Saudi Arabia. 
Zakat "alms for the poor" is the Islamic principle of giving a percentage of one's income to 
charity 
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